John Bateman Confusing Two Traditional Orientations Towards Meaning

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

In Peircean terms, the representamen, the interpretant and the object *co-art[i]culate* one another; there is no reference from semiotic stuff magically reaching into non-semiotic stuff (that would, indeed, as Malonowski [and van Fraassen] would have it, actually *be* magic!).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an example of logical fallacy known as 'the straw man':

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

Bateman's (unsourced) notion of "reference magically reaching from semiotic stuff into non-semiotic stuff" confuses

• the transcendent view of meaning, where linguistic meanings refer to meanings outside language, such as physical objects or concepts, with 
• the immanent view of meaning, where non-meaning is transformed into meaning.  

As previously noted, SFL adopts the latter perspective.

[2] For what Malinowski actually *says* about magic, download a free copy of his Magic, Science And Religion (1948) here.

John Bateman Misunderstanding Firth

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34: 

In this sense, Firth's turning language back on itself is just ('just' sounds a bit unfair here but is not intended evaluatively, only ideationally) the working through of the belated (OK, that one was evaluative...) Wittgensteinian (and already of course Peircean :-) ) realisation that we don't have any direct access to some 'out there' where we can attach labels. Got it, been there, bought the T-shirt.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the Firth quote 'language turned back on itself'.  It is not concerned with the realisation that Bateman attributes to Wittgenstein and Peirce.  It simply means that linguistics involves using language to model language.  Halliday (2002 [1996]: 384):

All systematic knowledge takes the form of ‘language about’ some phenomenon; but whereas the natural sciences are language about nature, and the social sciences are language about society, linguistics is language about language – “language turned back on itself ”, in Firth’s often quoted formulation.

To be clear, for Firth (1957: 190), the systematic constructs of linguistic theory 'are neither immanent or transcendent, but just language turned back on itself'.  On the SFL model, however, since meaning is held to be immanent (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 416), meaning about meaning (the systematic constructs of linguistic theory) is also immanent.

[2] To be clear, just serves no ideational function at all; its interpersonal function is to enact 'counterexpectancy' of the type 'limiting'; that is, it limits what is to be expected (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188).

In this sense	Firth's turning language back on itself	is	just	the working through of the belated  Wittgensteinian (and already of course Peircean) realisation that we don't have any direct access to some 'out there' where we can attach labels
	Identified Token	Process: identifying		Identifier Value
conjunctive Adjunct: matter	Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
	Mood			Residue

[3] On the SFL model, it is not a matter of having access to 'out there', because there are no meanings 'out there' to have access to.  Instead, we transform our experience of 'out there' into meaning, distinguishing two orders: the 'material' (phenomena) and the semiotic (metaphenomena).

[4] Apparently, this is a variation on an idiom that expresses the speaker's complete familiarity with a situation, with overtones of cynicism or exhaustion.  (This again is the language of bullying: 'I know this stuff backwards, so don't try to argue'.)

John Bateman On Reality And Actual Existence

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

For example, observations that we cannot get to reality itself and that protons, quarks, etc. do not (might not) actually exist at all are, well, obvious aren't they? Does anybody anymore try to come up with proofs of the existence of the real?

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Bateman uses ideational metaphor in order to limit arguability:

For example	observations [[[that we cannot get to reality itself || and that protons, quarks, etc. do not (might not) actually exist at all ]]]	are	well	obvious	aren't	they
	Carrier	Process: attributive		Attribute
conjunctive Adjunct	Subject	Finite		Complement	Finite	Subject

Neither the proposition we cannot get into reality itself nor the proposition protons, quarks, etc do not (might not) actually exist at all is presented by Bateman as arguable.  All that is presented as arguable is the proposition that both of these propositions are obvious.  (This is the language of bullying: if they are not obvious to you, you must be uninformed or stupid, right?)

[2] On the SFL model, 'reality' — "thinginess" — is the ideational meaning we construe of experience, as material and semiotic orders.

[3] On the SFL model, propositions as to whether protons, quarks, etc. exist are interpersonally assessed as valid or invalid according to criteria interpersonally assessed as valid in the field of physics.

John Bateman On Existence

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

With respect to the existence of this and that (or non-existence), etc., I often have the feeling that these discussions are just ways of detracting away from the main business of work (that is, when they occur in linguistics dis[c]ussions rather than in philosophy). There are certain places where a certain consensus can be found (philosophically), although there are of course always discussions and debate (that is the usual business of philosophy after all). It seems of limited use to put those debates at the centre of discussion when we discuss linguistic method, even though the texts that are thereby produced might sound deep.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, ideationally, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are construals of experience as processes of 'being', reconstrued metaphorically as things.  Interpersonally, propositions that predicate what does or doesn't exist are assessed as valid or invalid according to the criteria that are held to be valid in a given cultural context.  For example, much of what is deemed valid in science (systematic knowledge) is not deemed valid in fundamentalist religion (literal readings of mythic metaphors).

Because the field of philosophy is realised in language, the SFL model of language can be used to reconstrue the meanings of philosophy in terms of the metalanguage.  See, for example, any of the reconstruals of philosophy (or science or mythology) through SFL theory at Informing Thoughts.

[2] To be clear, it is Bateman himself who is most responsible for raising questions of existence in Sysfling discussions, and so it is Bateman himself who is most responsible for the distractions away from what he defines for us as 'the main business of work', and so, for producing the texts that "might sound deep"; see

• John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Text (10/2/17)
• John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Accessible Data (10/5/18)

David Rose Claiming That Jim Martin's Stratified Model Of Context Is "Justifiable"

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 15:44:

It may be possible that SFL itself is a metaphysical theory that facilitates empirical research. That might explain why it accommodates competing incommensurate models of stratification, if each is justifiable but not falsifiable??

and later at 17:56:

I think sorting out the nature of our theory must be part of it, particularly our competing models of stratification. I’m interested in how a purportedly empirical theory can produce and sustain such incommensurate models. My suggestion was influenced by Popper’s that "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories.”

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it presents a view that Popper recanted as if it were Popper's final view on the matter.  To be clear, Popper (1978: 344-6) admitted his error in characterising Darwin's theory of Natural Selection as metaphysical:

The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwinists and even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological," and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. …

I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. …

The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true. There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising.

Popper, K. R. 1978. "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind." Dialectica, 32:339-355.

To be clear, SFL is a scientific theory, in the sense that its architecture is systematic, consistent and explicit. It is this that makes misunderstandings of the theory easy to identify.

[2] To be clear, the "two incommensurate models of stratification" in Rose's competition are the two different models of context: Halliday's versus Martin's.  However, "sorting out the nature of our theory" won't explain why these two models are both "accommodated" — simply because it is not the theory that accommodates both of them, but the SFL community.

[3] This is misleading because it is demonstrably untrue.  Both models are falsifiable, at least in terms of self-consistency, and moreover, at least one of them, Martin's, is falsified by this criterion, and so: not justifiable.

Put most simply, Martin models varieties of language, genres and registers, not as language, but as more abstract than language.  This is analogous to claiming that varieties of bird, such as penguins and emus, are not birds at all, but something more abstract than birds.

More technically, Martin's model misinterprets the instantiation relation between language and register/genre as a realisation relation (symbolic abstraction) in which genre (text type) is more abstract than register, and both more abstract than language.

The number of inconsistencies escalates when Martin's stratification hierarchy is cross-classified with the cline of instantiation — the most obvious consequence being that instances of genres and registers are, by definition, instances of context, not language.

For more detailed arguments that identify some the theoretical misunderstandings on which Martin's model is based, and explain why the model is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, see here (stratification), here (context), here (register), and here (genre).

See also:

• Two Reasons Why Halliday's And Martin's Models Of Stratification Cannot Be Integrated
• Martin’s Cline Of Instantiation Applied To Martin’s Stratification

John Bateman On Instantiations Of Theory And Peircean Semiotics

John Bateman replied to David Rose on sysfling on 13 May 2018 at 22:50:

I think predictions/hypotheses have to have a different status to observations, and I think the suggestion of a cline between full (prediction) and partial (observation) loses important aspects, although that is part of what is going on. Presumably it is the status that these representations within some discourse of doing science that makes a big difference. Certainly very meta. 

So all together, perhaps indeed Peirce might help a bit. When we are making observations (and describing them) we are making use of instantiations of the theory (using those instantiations as a resource to impose sense). And that does not mean that observations are then 'just' instant[i]ations of theory as if that defined what observations are. 

So at first glance I like your object : representamen : interpretant ~ data : description : observation proposal...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear — given the strategically omitted word here 'instantiation' — Bateman previously claimed (here) that both predictions and observations are partial instantiations of theory, while simultaneously asserting that the relationship between observation and theory is not one of instantiation.

[2] To be clear, since an instance of theory is an actual theory, rather than an observation or prediction, this is not "part of what is going on".

[3] It is worth pointing out here that this statement is consistent with the notion of instantiation, since instantiations of theory — that is, actual linguistic theories — are used in observations about, and descriptions of, language.

[4] As previously explained here, these proportionalities are invalid, since they misconstrue an observation as the meaning or ramification of a description.

David Rose On "Co-Instantiation" And Peircean Semiotics

David Rose replied to John Bateman on sysfling list on 13 May 2018 at 22:31:

At any rate, I’m certain that any semiotic instance is a co-instantiation of many systems at multiple strata 

And that any observation co-instantiates multiple theories, more or less consciously …

Could Peirce help us here, if data were his object, observation the interpretant, and description the representamen?

Blogger Comments:

[1] With the term "co-instantiation", Rose follows Martin in confusing the distinct dimensions of instantiation and stratification.  In SFL theory, instantiation is a token-to-type (attributive) relation between an instance and the system of which it is an instance.  This necessarily locates both the instance and the system on the same stratum.  The relation between (instances of systems across) strata is realisation, a token–value (identifying) relation. 

[2] Since an observation is not an instance of theory (potential) — see the earlier post — it does not "co-instantiate" multiple theories.

[3] This mapping of categories is invalid, if only because it misconstrues an observation as the meaning or ramification of a description.  In Peircean semiotics:

An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant.

An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which the sign's being true or undeceptive would make.

A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial.

John Bateman On Facts

John Bateman replied to Ed Mcdonald on sysfling list at 13 May 2018 at 21:06:

And back to Ed's mention of 'facts'. The only facts I can think of would be theorems that are mathematically proved to hold; and since we are not doing math on this list we don't have many of those to deal with. It's like the phrase that you have to keep correcting in student texts when they suggest that they have 'proved the hypothesis', which is logically impossible. 'Facts' in a more everyday sense can only be descriptions of the world for which we assume indexicality to hold. And as a discourse assumption that must always be defeasible.

Has this all be done in systemic terms somewhere? 

Should be in any case...

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, a fact is a pre-projected clause, typically functioning as a participant in a relational clause; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547, 549).  The interpersonal function of wording a projection as a fact — instead of a locution or idea — is to render the validity of its proposition unarguable.  For example, if the fact serves as the Subject of a clause, only the validity of what is predicated of the fact is arguable, not the fact itself.

In the field of philosophy of science, facts constitute the data (e.g. biological evolution) on which theories (e.g. natural selection) are constructed.  That is, facts are the linguistic meanings that are reconstrued as theory.

[2] To be clear, here Bateman's orientation towards meaning is inconsistent with that embodied in SFL theory.  The notion of indexicality, in this context, assumes the transcendent view: that meaning also exists outside semiotic systems, for example as physical objects or concepts; this is the orientation of the logico-philosophical tradition.  SFL, on the other hand, takes the immanent view: that meaning is a property of semiotic systems only, construed of experience and enacted intersubjectively; this is consistent with the orientation of the rhetorical-ethnographic tradition.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416).

John Bateman On What Is And Isn't An Instantiation Of Theory

John Bateman replied to David Rose on sysfling list at 13 May 2018 at 21:06:

Now, observations are not instantiations of theory; they cannot be, otherwise we could only observe what our theory says. And thus we could not observe anything which did not conform to theory: this may be the case with certain kinds of discourses that call themselves theory, but I have problems with those. [another topic!] 

I would suggest (discussion sought) that instantiations of theory are *hypotheses*, that is, they are descriptions of how the world would be given the theory. 

Observations are then distinct from that, since they aim to listen to how the world actually is rather than how the theory says it is. 

Observations are, however, never divorced from theory, since theory gives us the basis for making observations: the relation just cannot be (simply) one of instantiation. 

So, observations must be partial instantiations of theory in the sense that they are what you get when you take some phenomena and construe those phenomena drawing on some partial instantiation of theory. The result is a description that relies on the theory without being a full instantiation (like a partially frozen idiom). Only then is it possible to find places where there is a lack of fit between what the theory predicts (its instantiations) and what was observed (construals/descriptions of data where the descriptions are partial instantiations of theory). One might be willing to drop certain parts of the theory more readily than others. This is then the practice of exploring and developing theory. …

This also provides further methodological and theoretical support for pursuing triangulation: since one can use descriptions of phenomena partially instantiating different theories to play off against one another. Single theories might not have sufficient resources for doing that. 

And back to David's:

His ‘weather and climate’ analogy for instantiation is an apt metaphor for the observation/theory relation in SF research.

I'd be hesitant about that, exactly because the relationship between observation and theory is not instantiation. So you can't get quite the same time-depth phenomena... 

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the question as to whether the relation between observation and theory is one of instantiation, Bateman writes:

• observations are not instantiations of theory
• the relation just cannot be (simply) one of instantiation
• observations must be partial instantiations of theory
• the relationship between observation and theory is not instantiation.

To be clear, a "partial instantiation" is instantiation, and so this is self-contradiction.  On the SFL model, an observation is an instance of observation potential, and an instance of theory potential is a theory.

[2] On the question as to what constitutes an instance of theory, Bateman writes:

• instantiations of theory are *hypotheses* 
• descriptions of how the world would be given the theory 
• observations must be partial instantiations of theory 
• what you get when you take some phenomena and construe those phenomena drawing on some partial instantiation of theory 
• a description that relies on the theory without being a full instantiation 
• what the theory predicts 
• what was observed (construals/descriptions of data where the descriptions are partial instantiations of theory) 
• descriptions of phenomena partially instantiating different theories.

To be clear, Bateman identifies instances of theory as theoretical predictions and descriptions of phenomena/data, the latter equated with both hypotheses and observations.  Even ignoring the differences between predictions, descriptions, hypotheses and observations, this contradicts his own claims that

• observations are not instantiations of theory, and
• observations are distinct from hypotheses/descriptions.

[3] To be clear, on the SFL model, "how the world actually is" is itself a construal of experience as meaning, either through language (first-order meaning), or through the re-construals of linguistic meaning as theory (second-order meaning).

David Rose On Different "Takes" On The Theory

David Rose replied to himself on sysfling list on 13 May 2018 at 13:51:

PS Re our take on the theory 

Robert’s story also highlighted how our different takes are shaped by who trained us and when. Himself by MAKH when it was still a bunch of notes. Myself by Xian and Jim with 1st IFG as textbook while theirs were still photocopies. Others were trained by Robin Fawcett or his students, whom MAKH trained in the 60s, in early stages of the theory. Others by Ruqaiya and colleagues and many more. 

If only these discussions would involve more diverse experiences of its evolution, as well as the same old wrinklies correcting each other ;-)

Blogger Comments:

The implication here, that any take on the theory is as good as another, is an example of the anti-intellectualism identified by Asimov:

David Rose On Observations As Instances Of Theory

David Rose replied to Ed Mcdonald on sysfling on 13 May 2018 at 10:43: 

[Halliday's] ‘weather and climate’ analogy for instantiation is an apt metaphor for the observation/theory relation in SF research. Unquestionably the theory shapes observations, and observations change the theory, but over 60 years the shape of change has been continual refinement and expansion of its description of semiosis.

and again at 13 May 2018 at 12:43:

Absolutely, observations instantiate the theory (or at least our take on it). The line I have trouble with is between theory and description, since SFL purports to mimic its object of description.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, an instance of a theory is an instance of a higher-level socio-semiotic system that is realised in language.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 605):

Socio-semiotic systems that are realised through language. This category corresponds to Hjelmslev's (1943) concept of a "connotative semiotic": a higher-level system that has language as its plane of expression. These include theories: every theoretical construction, scientific, philosophical, aesthetic, and so on, is a higher-level semiotic realised in language.

On the SFL model, an instance of theory potential is, by definition, an actual theory, whereas an actual observation is, by definition, an instance of observation potential — both at the level of context.

[2] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 55) provide a useful distinction between theory and description:

While a description is an account of the system of a particular language, a theory is an account of language in general. So we have descriptions of various languages such as English, Akan and Nahuatl; but we have a theory of human language in general (see e.g. Halliday, 1992e, 1996; Matthiessen & Nesbitt, 1996).

[3] Here Rose confuses the relation between theory and description with the relation between theory and data ("its object of description").  Linguistic theory "mimics" language in the sense that linguistic theory is language about language, metalanguage, or, in the words of Firth (1957: 190): 'language turned back on itself'.

See also David Rose Following Jim Martin In Confusing Description With Theory.

David Rose On Popper, Socrates, Einstein, Halliday, Marx, Hegel, Empiricism And "Materialist Dialectics"

David Rose replied to Ed Mcdonald on sysfling on 13 May 2018 at 10:43:

Popper didn’t invent falsifiability, just described it. The idea goes back at least to Socrates. Einstein is supposed to have said, "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.” It is the essence of dialectics’ thesis-antithesis method. It is what you are offering here, Ed. 

It was also central to the practice of that great dialectical thinker, Michael Halliday, as Robert Spence recounted for us, "Michael, having once lost an argument on this and therefore being rather cautious about it”. Halliday gave us the method for empirically describing semiotic systems that became SFL. 

He belonged to a very long and diverse tradition of applying empiricism to semiosis, but he devised a particularly powerful method that deployed materialist dialectics, to explain language systems in terms of social functions. He turned idealist lx argumentation on its head, as Marx did for Hegel.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Rose confuses the falsifiability of Popper's Falsificationism with the Socratic method.

The concept of falsifiability was introduced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper, in his exposition of scientific epistemology. He saw falsifiability as the criterion for demarcating the limits of scientific inquiry. He proposed that statements and theories that are not falsifiable are unscientific. Declaring an unfalsifiable theory to be scientific would then be pseudoscience.

[2] Here Rose confuses his confusion of the falsifiability of Popper's Falsificationism and the Socratic method with Kant's thesis/antithesis dyad, itself mistaken for Fichte's triad of thesis/antithesis/synthesis in Hegelian dialectics. 

[3] Here Rose provides what he understands as an example of (Kant's) "thesis-antithesis method": losing an argument and becoming more cautious on the matter.

[4] The word "empirically" here is redundant. Halliday designed a theory that could be used to describe language and other semiotic systems.  To be clear:

Empiricism in the philosophy of science emphasises evidence, especially as discovered in experiments. It is a fundamental part of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world rather than resting solely on a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation.

[5] Here Rose confuses a purported type of dialectic (materialist) with a type of materialism (dialectical), and falsely attributes the dialectic method to Halliday in his approach to theorising.  To be clear:

Dialectical materialism adapts the Hegelian dialectic for traditional materialism, which examines the subjects of the world in relation to each other within a dynamic, evolutionary environment, in contrast to metaphysical materialism, which examines parts of the world within a static, isolated environment.

David Rose On Register And Discourse Semantics

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

Iterated activity is a register level meaning, that may be realised in discourse semantics as an event sequence, or as one event x quality, that may be realised in grammar as a clause complex and clause simplex respectively.

Blogger Comments:

The series of propositions declared by Rose can be represented as follows:

stratum	"unit"
register	iterated activity
↘ discourse semantics	↘ event sequence	↘ event x quality
↘ lexicogrammar	↘ clause complex	↘ clause

[1] 'Iterated activity' is a rebranding of 'activity sequence', a term which Martin (1992: 537) adapted from Barthes' (1966/1977) notion of 'sequence' in narrative, and misunderstood as an ideational unit of context, field, itself misunderstood as a dimension of register.  For some of the theoretical inconsistencies in Martin's notion of activity sequence, see any of the 48 clarifying critiques here.

[2] Within and without SFL theory, a 'register' is a functional variety of language.  In SFL theory, register is modelled as a point of variation on the cline of instantiation.  Here Rose follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing register as a level of context rather than as a sub-potential of language (that realises a cultural situation type).  For reasons why register, as something less general than language, is not coherently modelled as something more abstract than language, see some of the 82 clarifying critiques here.

[3] Here Rose is following Martin's (1992) misunderstanding of the SFL stratification hierarchy as 'all strata make meaning' (which is a characterisation of semogenesis, not stratification).  For Martin, strata are 'interacting modules of meaning', whereas, in SFL, the theoretical function of the dimension of stratification is to parcel out semiotic complexity into distinct levels of symbolic abstraction, in language: meaning (semantics), wording (lexicogrammar) and sounding/writing (phonology/graphology).

In SFL theory, meaning at the level of context is not linguistic meaning.  The stratum 'context' constitutes meaning in the sense of the culture as content, with language as its expression plane.  The meaning of register, on the other hand, is linguistic meaning; it constitutes the sub-potential of the semantic stratum that realises a sub-potential of the culture (a situation type).

[4] Here Rose is following Martin (1992) in misconstruing the relation between register and semantics as one of symbolic abstraction ('realisation'); see [2] above.

[5] The term 'event sequence' does not figure in the discourse semantic model of Martin (1992), and in Martin & Rose (2007: 267), it is located in field (context), misconstrued as register.  Here, however, Rose locates 'event sequence' in discourse semantics.  In SFL theory, 'sequence' is the highest order of phenomena in ideational semantics; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104-27).

[6] In Martin (1992: 317), 'Event x Quality' is presented as the discourse semantics of the experiential grammar of the verbal group.  Here Rose misrepresents the structural relation as the discourse semantic counterpart of the clause.

David Rose On Coordination And Proposition

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

Coordination is a grammatical term, for relations between grammatical units. Proposition is a discourse semantic term, for messages exchanging information.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the traditional category of 'coordination' is interpreted as the logico-semantic relation of paratactic extension.  Logico-semantic relations obtain at the level of semantics (meaning) and are realised at the level of lexicogrammar (wording).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'proposition' is 'the semantic function of a clause in the exchange of information' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 139).  The intrusion of the word 'discourse' reflects the fact that Martin (1992) rebranded Halliday's interpersonal semantic system as a 'discourse semantic' system.  ('Message' is a semantic unit of the textual metafunction.)

David Rose Misconstruing What Constitutes A "Stratified Account"

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

We could say their meanings are similar (iterated activity), but at what stratum? A stratified account allows for the proportions you have observed, without having to undo rank as the entry point for grammatical systems. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, linguistic meaning is modelled at the level of semantics.  Here Rose follows Martin (1992: 21, 40, 55, 56, 96, 137) in confusing semogenesis ("all strata make meaning") with stratification (meaning–wording–sounding).  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, here, here or here.

[2] In SFL theory, strata represent different levels along the dimension of symbolic abstraction.  Here Rose's notion of what constitutes a "stratified account" follows Martin (1992: 129, 390, 391, 392, 488, 490-1) in misconstruing strata as "interacting modules" of meaning, to which theoretical categories can be allocated, without regard for the level of symbolic abstraction.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, here or here.  Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Accessible Data

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 10 May 2018 at 19:50:

since 'data' does not (accessibly) exist, but is only filtered through observations operationalized according to frames of interpretations (including measurements), will/can/should one always know

(a) that the data fails to fit the theory and

(b) that the particular construction of the data is not what needs changing rather than the 'theory'?

Blogger Comments:

data	does not	(accessibly)	exist
Existent	Process:	Manner	existential

[1] To be clear, here Bateman locates 'data' outside language; that is: as the experience that is construed as meaning by language.  On the SFL model, the data to be modelled as linguistic theory are the construals of experience as language.

[2] To be clear, testing the fit between data and theory is testing the fit between 

• construals of experience as language and 
• construals of language as linguistic theory.

[3] To be clear, a "particular construction of the data" is a construal of language in terms of a linguistic theory.  If the theory is inaccurately applied to the data, then it is the "particular construction of the data" that needs changing.  If an accurate application of the theory to the data reveals a shortcoming in the theory, then it is the theory that needs changing.

For an analysis of a previous example of Bateman's epistemology, see John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Text.