David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Meaning Potential

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 30/7/22 at 21:06:

This para bears reviewing as it seems pivotal to the history of the grammatico-semantic model...

The term «meaning» has traditionally been restricted to the input end of the language system: the «content plane», in Hjelmslev's terms, and more specifically to the relations of the semantic interface, Hjelmslev's «content substance». We will therefore use «meaning potential» just to refer to the semantic options (although we would regard it as an adequate designation for language as a whole).

Interestingly, linguistic tradition is presented as point of departure, and the reason for restricting the use of ‘meaning potential’ to the semantic stratum. 

Its conflict with MAKH’s theoretical position is added almost apologetically in brackets. Was it too radical to say out loud that language as a whole makes meaning? At any rate, associating meaning with just one stratum, for whatever reason, had far reaching consequences for the model’s development.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The quote from Halliday (1972) merely specifies how the term 'meaning potential' will be used in the paper, relative to traditional usages of 'meaning' (interpreted in terms of Hjelmslev's model). It does not present linguistic tradition as the reason for the how the term 'meaning potential' will be used.

[2] This very misleading because it is very untrue. There is no conflict here. SFL models language as meaning potential, in terms of the dimension of instantiation, and stratifies the content plane of that potential into two levels of symbolic abstraction: meaning (semantics) and the wording (lexicogrammar) that realises meaning.

[3] Here Rose repeats Martin's confusion of semogenesis (making meaning) with stratification (wording realising meaning), encapsulated in Martin's characterisation of stratification as 'all strata make meaning'. As a consequence, Martin (1992) even misconstrues phonology as a stratum of meaning.

[4] This is potentially misleading. Even though semantics is the stratum of meaning, lexicogrammar is the stratum whose forms, modelled as a rank scale, are interpreted in terms of their functions in realising meaning. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) say:

it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday's Development Of SFL Theory

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 29/7/22 at 13:21:

As quoted earlier, axis was the breakthrough that opened up metafunctions and rank scale system/structure cycles, which I’ve tried to symbolise with this diagram (hexagons borrowed from Giacomo Figueredo)...

But there was a tension with the earlier model predating axis, that assumed the abstraction relation lay between grammar as form and semantics as substance, and kept being repeated alongside axis...

The term «meaning» has traditionally been restricted to the input end of the language system: the «content plane», in Hjelmslev's terms, and more specifically to the relations of the semantic interface, Hjelmslev's «content substance». We will therefore use «meaning potential» just to refer to the semantic options (although we would regard it as an adequate designation for language as a whole).

This historically nuanced conditional formulation then gets reduced to a catchphrase...

Grammar is what the speaker CAN SAY, and is the realisation of what he means. Semantics is what he CAN MEAN

...which is later cemented as the commonsensical triad ‘meaning, wording, sounding’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Halliday (2002: 12) summarises the development of his theorising as follows:

The steps that have seemed to me perhaps most critical in this endeavour might be summarised as: the unity of lexicogrammar; the priority of the view ‘from above’, from meaning and function; the move into systemics (system networks), freeing the grammar from the restrictions imposed by structure; the metafunctional foundation, disentangling the strands of meaning that are woven together in the syntax; the construction of language by children, from protolanguage to mother tongue; the decoupling and recoupling of lexicogrammar and semantics – the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor; the conceptualising of the relation between system and text (instantiation) and the probabilistic nature of linguistic systems.

That is, according to Halliday, it was not axis, but giving priority to the view 'from' above (meaning and function over form), and to system over structure, that opened up the development of Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[3] To be clear, the notion of axis, system vs structure, has appeared in Halliday's work since his first paper Some Aspects of Systematic Description and Comparison in Grammatical Analysis (Halliday 1957), though the term 'axis' was not used until Class in Relation to the Axes of Chain and Choice in Language (1963). 

That is, there is no Hallidayan model that predates the notion of axis, and the model that predates the term 'axis' is not Systemic Functional Grammar, but a different theory: Scale & Category Grammar, expounded in Categories of the Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961). Any supposed tension then, is between a discarded theory and its replacement.

[4] This bare assertion bears no relation to the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows it as its support. The quote makes no mention of axis, and merely specifies how the term 'meaning potential' will be used, relative to traditional usages of 'meaning' (interpreted in terms of Hjelmslev's model).

[5] To be clear, the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows this misrepresentation of the previous quote as a 'historically nuanced conditional formulation' is not a reduced "catchphrase" of it. Where the previous quote is concerned with the term 'meaning potential', the quote that follows is concerned with the distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics, explaining that lexicogrammar is what can be verbally projected (say), semantics is what we can mentally project (mean), and the former realises the latter.

[6] To be clear, there is no "cementing" here, and these folk terms also cover phonology (sounding), which is not mentioned in the quotes that precede.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday (1972) On Semantic Systems

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 29/7/22 at 8:29:

MAKH explains here (1972) why it’s unnecessary to postulate semantic systems that restate grammatical systems...axis makes them already ‘semantic’...

The combination of system and structure with rank leads to a fairly abstract grammar (fairly 'deep', in the Chomskyan sense) and enables us to specify fairly accurately in theoretical terms - though not or course in rule-of-thumb terms - just how abstract it is. In principle, a grammatical system is as abstract (is as 'semantic') as possible given only that it can generate integrated structures; that is, that its output can be expressed in terms of functions which can be mapped directly on to other functions, the result being a single structural 'shape' (though one which is of course multiply labelled).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, this is an extract from Halliday's very early paper which considers arguments for and against the theoretical value of including semantic structure in the model. In the time since then, semantic structure has been part of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

On the other hand, Halliday does not simply postulate 'semantic systems that restate grammatical systems'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 26):

Thus when we move from the lexicogrammar into the semantics, as we are doing here, we are not simply relabelling everything in a new terminological guise. We shall stress the fundamental relationship between (say) clause complex in the grammar and sequence in the semantics, precisely because the two originate as one: a theory of logical relationships between processes. But, as we have shown, what makes such a theory (i.e. an ideation base as the construal of experience) possible is that it is a stratal construction that can also be deconstructed, every such occasion being a gateway to the creation of further meanings which reconstrue in new and divergent ways. Thus a sequence is not 'the same thing as' a clause complex; if it was, language would not be a dynamic open system of the kind that it is.

[2] To be clear, this misunderstands the extract from Halliday (1972). Halliday is here explaining that the system-structure relation (realisation) enables a systemic grammar to be more abstract — where 'more abstract' means 'more semantic' — since system is more abstract than (is realised by) structure.

Importantly, a functional grammar interprets grammatical form (e.g. verbal group) in terms of it function in realising meaning (e.g. Process). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 48-9):

We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective. But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise. … Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning – it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices.

David Rose On Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection

David replied to Kieran McGillicuddy on sys-func on 28/7/22 at 17:27:

Re circularity, generalising seems to be a basic capacity of any organism: ‘food/not-food’, and later ‘food/mate’

Edelman explains how it happens neurologically in animals, as perception, and in larger brained animals as perception of perception.

and at 21:22:

To mansplain what [Edelman] means by perception of perception I’d have to drag up his whole theory of neuronal group selection.

Aside from his books there’s a bunch of papers that summarise it. You could start here which is free to download...

Edelman, G. M. (2003). Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(9), 5520-5524.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, ‘food/not-food’ and ‘food/mate’ are (linguistic) discriminations, not generalisations. 

[2] On Edelman's model, a perceptual category is established through instances being determined as alike in terms of both value-weighted perceptual features and adaptive motor response. This is achieved neurally through repeated value-guided firings of neuronal groups in global mappings for each instance. Each firing strengthens the synaptic connections within the group, making the group more likely — selecting it — to fire again under similar conditions in the future.

[3] To be clear, Edelman (2003) makes no mention of "perception of perception", but in Edelman's model, the brain further categorises its own categorising performances. For example, in categorising perceptual categorising, the brain creates what Edelman terms 'concepts', but what SFL Theory would interpret as perceptual systems (perceptions organised into systems).

[4] For interpretations of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection in terms of SFL Theory, see the 72 posts here.

David Rose Endorsing A Contradiction Of His Own Claim

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 28/7/22 at 15:20:

Note that generalisation increases down strata (not up), Martin & Matthiessen 1991...

The most powerful generalisation is, arguably, that there is a tendency towards generalisation as we move down either the stratal organisation or the rank scale. That is, to put it crudely, a given number of semantic systems is realised by a smaller number of corresponding lexicogrammatical ones; similarly, a given number of lexicogrammatical systems is realised by a smaller number of phonological ones. And the same holds for the rank scale; for example, a given number of clausal systems is realised by a smaller number of verbal group systems. The reason for this state of affairs is easy to see. A stratal descent or a rank descent always entails a generalisation across contexts and this generalisation is reflected in the relatively smaller number of realising systems.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Rose unwittingly provides further evidence against his own previous claim (here) that 

[Halliday's] grammatico-semantic model assumes a bijective or one-to-one relation between LG features and semantic features…

David Rose Continuing To Misrepresent The Semantic System Of Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 27/7/22 at 8:07:

Rather than a ‘semantic system of modality’, Martin & Matthiessen 1991 explain such motifs as topologies, or ‘fractal principles’ that recur across ranks and strata. They are generalisations of types of meanings that complement the typological generalisations of systems. Crucially they are not more abstract than the systems they generalise across. So does postulating a ‘semantic system of modality’ above the grammatical systems of modality, confuse abstraction with generalisation?

In any case these ‘semantic systems’ were not proposed in IFG1/2 but have been added to IFG3/4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Martin & Matthiessen (1991) are concerned with the semantic system of modality and the diverse ways it is realised in lexicogrammar. Martin & Matthiessen (1991: 376):

With MODALISATION, POLARITY in propositions is used to bound the semantic space under consideration, with degree of usuality and probabilily defining parameters between 'it is' (yes) and 'it isn't' (no). Similarly, obligation and inclination are used as parameters grading the semantic space in proposals between 'do' and 'don't'.

[2] This is misleading. Martin & Matthiessen (1991) don't explain 'such motifs' as topologies. The paper contrasts two perspectives in modelling: the typological and topological.

[3] This is misleading. The one instance of the word 'fractal' (p376) refers only to the system of EXPANSION.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. With regard to expansion, Martin & Matthiessen (1991: 375) write:

All we can do at present is posit a generalised system that we 'abstract' from the specific grammatical environments in which it is manifested.

To be clear, logically, for there to be congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations of MODALITY, MODALITY must be a more abstract system at the level of semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar, since congruent vs metaphorical relations obtain between strata.

[5] No. The confusion here is entirely Rose's. See [4].

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1994: 356):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

David Rose Misrepresenting IFG On Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 25/7/22 at 17:44:

Thanks Chris, for another opportunity to compare the models.

Again, MODALITY is a described grammatical system, at clause rank in English, but the same term is used below for a semantic ‘domain’. And again, the account in IFG 1/2 differed from the account in IFG 3/4. In IFG1/2, MAKH described the implicit/explicit: subjective/objective orientations topologically, as interpersonal metaphors of modality. But in IFG 3/4 they are presented instead as features in the MODALITY system, within the MOOD system (Fig 4-13, Fig 4-23). The entry condition for this system is [clause], but the metaphorical realisations of subjective and objective orientations are projections and embedding (I think.../it is likely that...), blurring the line between grammar and semantics.

The described discourse semantic system is APPRAISAL: ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss, for which MODALITY is one resource to introduce additional voices into a discourse, alongside PROJECTION and CONCESSION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading. Halliday (± Matthiessen) explicitly describes MODALITY as a semantic system. Halliday (1994: 356) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

The fact that it is construed as a semantic system is also demonstrated by it having both congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Less importantly, it is only the explicit ORIENTATION that is metaphorical (Halliday 1994: 362). More importantly, the topological representation in IFG1/2 (and IFG3/4) does not describe MODALITY systems, but the relation of modality to polarity and mood. Halliday (1994: 367):

[3] This is misleading, because MODALITY is presented as a system network in IFG1/2 as well as IFG3/4. Halliday (1994: 358, 360):

Cf. Figure 4-23 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 182):

[4] This is misleading. By including the system of MODALITY in his grammatical network of MOOD — Figure 4-15 in IFG3, Figure 4-13 in IFG4 — Matthiessen is interpreting grammatical form (modelled as a rank scale) in terms of its function in realising meaning, consistent with the modus operandi of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Contrary to Rose's claim, the rank of clause is the appropriate entry condition for clause rank complexing (projection) and  clause rank elements realised by embedded clauses.

[5] For some of the misunderstandings in Working with Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) in this regard, see:

• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Importantly, projection is not included as a logical system in discourse semantics (Martin 1992, Martin & Rose 2007). This is because the original intellectual source of Martin's CONJUNCTION is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and projection does not function cohesively. So, not only does discourse semantics fail to account for the semantics of projection, it also disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which projection is featured.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Semantic Structure

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 19/7/22 at 10:24:

Re semantics/grammar relations and axis...

Halliday (1972), cited in Hasan, Cloran, Williams, & Lukin (2005), is a key document in the history of SFL, as it is the foundational text for the semantic network research project, and excuses semantic networks from the axial realisation statements required for grammar and phonology. The key discussion on semantics/grammar relations are extracted here (p21-24). It concludes by suggesting approaches to describing semantic system and structure, but this was ‘a matter of speculation’. This conclusion could also be taken as foundational for the study of discourse semantics.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1972). Towards a sociological semantics. Urbino: Università di Urbino.

(cited as Halliday 1973b in...

Hasan, R., Cloran, C., Williams, G., & Lukin, A. (2005). Semantic networks: The description of linguistic meaning in SFL. In Continuing discourse on language: a functional perspective (pp. 697-738). Equinox Publishing.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. In this very early paper from 1972, Halliday is considering arguments for and against the theoretical value of including semantic structure in the model. In the time since then, semantic structure has been part of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, in the model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992), the system networks do not include realisation statements that specify discourse semantic structures. On the other hand, in the model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992), the notion of structure is deployed inconsistently. 

For NEGOTIATION, the system derived from Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, structure is the internal syntagmatic dimension of a unit, which is consistent with the notion of structure within and beyond SFL Theory. 

However, for IDENTIFICATION, IDEATION and CONJUNCTION, the systems derived from the lexicogrammatical systems of COHESIVE REFERENCE, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, units do not have internal structure, but instead link up to each other to form structures. This anomaly arises from the fact that cohesive relations are not structural relations.

David Rose Misrepresenting Axis As Key To Semantics-Grammar Relations

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 18/7/22 at 21:11:

Axis is key...

Michael Halliday is the only linguist who has given priority to the paradigmatic axis and organised the theory and description of language around this axis... but at the same time, he maintains the connection with the syntagmatic, by means of realisation statements specifying fragments of structure, and the account of structure he developed is a sophisticated unification of different metafunctional strands of organisation.

Matthiessen, C. M., Wang, B., Ma, Y., & Mwinlaaru, I. N. (2022). Systemic Functional Insights on Language and Linguistics. Springer

...two very basic theoretical concepts in SFL, metafunction and rank, are in fact based on the even more fundamental dimension of axis... stratification, alongside metafunction and rank, is based on way in which systems bundle together with one another - axis in other words is key.

Martin, J. R., Wang, P., & Zhu, Y. (2013). Systemic functional grammar: a next step into the theory–axial relations. Beijing: Higher Education.

In broad terms, a system is a set of relations of abstraction and generality. Its features are generalisations based on recurrent similarity of function at higher strata. From this instantial perspective, a system is an accumulation of instances over time scales of phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Rose, D. in press. Designing pedagogic registers: Reading to Learn. In J.R. Martin, D. Caldwell & J. Knox (eds.) Developing Theory: A Handbook in Appliable Linguistics and Semiotics. London: Bloomsbury, 103-125

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this quote from Matthiessen et al. (2022) is a statement on how SFL gives priority to the paradigmatic axis, with metafunctional structures of the syntagmatic axis specified by realisation statements associated with features in systems.

[2] To be clear, this quote from Martin et al. (2013) makes the false claims that stratification is based on the way systems bundle together, and that axis is fundamental to stratification, metafunction and rank.

On the first claim, stratification is based on the principle of realisation. Different strata constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction.

On the second claim, axis, stratification, metafunction and rank are distinct dimensions, each with distinct ordering principles, independent of those of the other dimensions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20,32):

[3] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[4] To be clear, this quote from Rose (in press) presents several misunderstandings. Regarding the first sentence, it is delicacy that is the ordering principle of system, whereas (symbolic) abstraction is the relation between systems of different strata.

The second sentence confuses instantiation ('recurrent') with stratification ('higher strata'). To be clear, the features of a system represent the potential choices of instantiation for a specified entry condition.

Regarding the third sentence, a system is built up at all three timeframes, including that of logogenesis, 'the creation of meaning in instantiation, maintained as a changing instantial system'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384-5):

If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/ writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/ reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We can call this an instantial system. … the instantial system is built up successively by the generation process; but as it is developed, it in turn becomes a resource for further instantiation.

David Rose Misrepresenting The Semantic Systems Of Expansion And Figuration

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 18/7/22 at 16:05:

it’s always good to read IFG closely (and critically)...

It’s interesting that the terms FIGURATION and EXPANSION in Figure 10-2 below are printed in small caps, as though they are systems. It’s noteworthy that Halliday 1985/1994 (IFG 1/2) didn't describe expansion in general as a system, but as a ‘semantic motif’ that is dispersed across the grammar. A system in SFL is defined by axial relations between features and their realising structures. expansion is such a system in the grammar, at clause rank within clause complexing (IFG 7.4), and at group/phrase rank within verbal group complexing (IFG 8.6). But it is not a described semantic system.

‘Figuration’ on the other hand corresponds to a described semantic system, of lexical relations within figures, entitled nuclear relations in ET 5.3, WWD 3.3. Figures are typically realised as clauses (IFG 5.1.1)...

The canonical description of nuclear relations, and their stratal relations to grammar and field, is

Hao, J. (2020). Analysing scientific discourse from a systemic functional linguistic perspective: A framework for exploring knowledge building in biology. Routledge.

Jing also carefully relates the discourse semantic ideation systems to the ideational semantics in Construing Experience.

Rose soon qualified this at 17:24:

Correction...

Hao, J. (2020), re-analyses nuclear relations as the systems of FIGURE and ENTITY, to clearly distinguish systems of LG, DS and field.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even a casual glance at IFG reveals that the caption of Figure 10-2 identifies FIGURATION and EXPANSION as semantic systems.

[2] This is misleading. Halliday (1985, 1994) describes expansion as a type of logico-semantic relation, along with projection, that has three subtypes: elaboration, extension and enhancement. The term EXPANSION appears in small capitals (e.g. 1994: 219), the convention for representing system names. This constitutes a verbal description of a system rather than a diagrammatic representation of a system as a network. Halliday (1985, 1994) did not feature any system networks.

Moreover, a close reading reveals that the term 'semantic motif' does not appear until Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 72, 223, 562, 612), where it explicitly refers to systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223):

[3] This is misleading because a system is not 'defined by axial relations'. in SFL Theory, system constitutes the dimension of paradigmatic order (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20). This a distinct dimension from structure, the dimension of syntagmatic order (ibid.), and axis is the dimension whose orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (op. cit.: 32).

[4] To be clear, Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985, 1994) is focused on grammar, not semantics, which means modelling grammatical form in terms of its function in realising meaning. A focus on semantics, mainly ideational, is provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As Figure 10-2, above, makes clear, FIGURATION is the semantic system that is congruently realised by the grammatical system of TRANSITIVITY. Martin's discourse semantic system of IDEATION, which is a rebranding of lexical cohesion, but within which 'nuclear relations' are modelled, does not feature the figure as either a system or structural unit. 

For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin (1992), see the close examination here. For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin & Rose (1992), see the close examination here.

[6] Clearly, any "canonical" description of 'nuclear relations' lies not in the work of Martin's student, Hao, but in her source: Halliday & Mathiessen (1999). For the source of Hao's system of FIGURE, see Chapter 4 Figures (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 128-76), and for the source of Hao's system of ENTITY, see Chapter 5 Elements (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 177-226).

David Rose On Martin Crediting Hasan

David Rose replied to Annabelle Lukin on sys-func on 14/7/22 at 20:58:

My only interest is to understand relations between the models, which I suggested below may be complementary.

The MESSAGE system was quoted from Hasan 1983, in your paper with RH, Geoff and Carmel, that I promoted as ‘a useful history and synopsis’. I thought it was interesting to see how the MESSAGE and MOOD features presented as bijective differ in their systemic valeur, and how the MESSAGE features presage later developments.

The NEGOTIATION system wasn’t published until 1992, extensively credited to Margaret Berry. The APPRAISAL system was published a decade later. So it was impossible to know in 1983 that the features described as MESSAGE options were also features in NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL systems. So certainly not a re-run.

On the other hand, the whole of discourse semantics is extensively credited to RH, including 197 mentions in ET. … 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. What Rose actually claimed (here) was that Hasan's semantic system attempted to synthesise the complementarity of two discourse semantic systems:

In sum, the MESSAGE system attempts to synthesise the complementarity of two discourse semantic systems, NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated here, Hasan's network allows for multiple grammatical realisations of a semantic feature.

[3] To be clear, the source of Berry's model, as well as Martin's rebranding of it as his discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION, is Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[4] To be clear, if there are any "reruns", they are necessarily in the later discourse semantic systems.

[5] This is misleading. What is true is that Cohesion in English (Halliday & Hasan 1976) is the data that Martin (1992) uses to theorise his discourse semantics, rebranding their REFERENCE as his IDENTIFICATION, their LEXICAL COHESION as his IDEATION, and their cohesive CONJUNCTION as his CONJUNCTION (now CONNEXION); evidence here. Given this, it is hardly surprising that Hasan should be referenced in Martin (1992).

However, the term 'credited' here is potentially misleading. See, for example:

• Misrepresenting Hasan's Work On Speech Function
• Misrepresenting Halliday & Hasan On Reference
• Misidentifying The Main Differences Between Martin And Hasan
• Misrepresenting Hasan And Confusing Strata And Metafunctions
• Confusing Text Type With Text Structure And Misrepresenting Hasan's Work On Cohesive Harmony
• Misrepresenting Hasan's Work On Cohesion
• "One Apparently Unresolved Problem With Hasan's Technique"
• Misrepresenting Hasan's Cohesive Harmony
• Presenting Misunderstandings Of Hasan's Cohesive Harmony As Deficiencies In The Model
• Misrepresenting Hasan's Work On Coherence As Formalist
• Misrepresenting Hasan On Text Structure
• Not Acknowledging Hasan As Intellectual Source
• Under-Acknowledging Hasan As Theoretical Source
• Misinterpreting Hasan And Proposing Theoretical Inconsistencies
• Strategically Misrepresenting Hasan
• Misrepresenting Hasan

Mick O'Donnell On The Stifling Of Work In SFL

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 14/7/22 at 9:16:

… But in moving forward, we cannot apriori know which aspects of the established model are ones that need to change.

We cannot assume SFL as developed by MAKH or by Ruqaiya Hasan or by Jim Martin is God's Truth, immutable for all time. History has shown that models are always superseded as we apply the model to reality.

To me, too much work in SFL has been stifled by the need to stay within the bounds of the establishment. We have been trying to grow the theory outwards, or in complexity, without touching the Hallidayan core.

Jim Martin has always impressed me as someone who, while respecting the whole, is willing to change core assumptions, when the needs of linguistic modeling require it. In the late 1970s, trying to handle genres within the established model, and failing, he and others broke out functional tenor as a stratum above, which I for the most part buy as necessary. But whether you accept this modification or not is not important, what is important is that Jim has been (and continues to be) willing to throw out established ideas (even his own) if they don't fit new data. And anyone who is not willing to do similarly is kidding themselves if they think they are doing linguistic science.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The internal self-consistency of a model can be assessed purely by deduction, without reference to empirical data, and any model that is internally inconsistent, such as Martin's (evidence here)or Fawcett's (evidence here), is one that needs to change.

[2] On the one hand, this is deployment of the 'straw man' logical fallacy, since it postulates an absurd position as the one that is to be invalidated. On the other hand, this is O'Donnell once again invoking a religious stance that he attributes to others.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, models are semiotic systems, and as such, evolve as the environment in which they function changes, with semiotic systems being one source of that environmental change.

[4] To be clear, SFL Theory was devised by Halliday, and everyone else is using his theory. What gives the "Hallidayan core" its value, is, inter alia, its internal consistency as a theory, and its explanatory potential in modelling language. It "stifles" work in SFL in just the same way that Quantum Theory and General Relativity "stifle" work in physics.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Ignoring the motivation of personal ambition, Martin's models do not arise because they better fit the data, but because Martin misunderstands Halliday's model; evidence here.

[6] To be clear, this would be true, if this was, in fact, what Martin has actually done.

David Rose On The Need For (Discourse) Semantics As A Separate Stratum

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 21:36:

Re your earlier comment about ‘the need for Semantics as a separate stratum’... I think that takes us back to two first principles...

One is that features in systems are no more substantial than the probabilities of their realising structures being re-instantiated... more so for more general and less so for more delicate features.

The other is that the content planes of lg and other modalities have evolved to semioticise social relations, for which semiosis is a necessary condition. So the social and semiotic are two sides of the same coin.

The semiotic systems of most species are reproduced genetically. In some species these are augmented by learnt systems, i.e. culturally reproduced.

Lg evolved in humans in tandem with the complexity of our social relations. It required on one hand sufficient flexibility to manage variability in our ancestors’ sociality, and on the other a mechanism for replication fidelity to ensure its reproduction across multiple generations (on the model of genetic reproduction).

The tension between these selection pressures produced a bifurcation in lg’s content plane, still recapitulated in the transition from protolg to mother tongue in infants.

On one hand, LG systems provided the replication fidelity for reproduction over deep time (analogous with the reproductive role of DNA). Their features cement untold millions of re-instantiations, more so at higher ranks. One result is their more general features remain common across lgs (as humans share 85% of our DNA with mice, 60% with insects, and 50% with plants). It is probably also why grammatical systems encode such stable models of experience and exchange.

While stability is essential for cultural reproduction, it is insufficient for negotiating unfolding contingencies in human social relations. That is the task for which DS systems evolved (analogous with the role of RNA in managing intracellular functions).

Both LG and DS systems are necessary for human semiosis on phylogenetic and logogenetic timescales, but their functions are complementary. The fact that we are still trying to model the semantic stratum on what we known of LG systems is, I think, an accident of history. From 2500 years of grammatics, cryptogrammatics has struggled to emerge in the last 80, and DS systems are another order of covert reactances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) identify grammatical metaphor as the primary motivation for a semantic stratum:

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] To be clear, features in systems are defined by their relations to other features, and each has a probability of being instantiated, varying for register, and actualised as frequencies in texts.

[3] It is undoubtedly true that semiosis is a necessary condition for semiotising social relations.

[4] To be clear, not all semiotic systems are social semiotic systems, as demonstrated by perceptual semiotic systems, which are somatic, not social. 

[5] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The difficulty here lies in being able to distinguish, in Halliday's terms, systems that involve the exchange of value (social systems) from systems that involve the exchange of symbolic value (semiotic systems).

[6] To be clear, it is language that enabled the enactment of social relations to complexify beyond those of the other chimpanzees.

[7] To be clear, if it were these factors that produced the stratification of the content plane, then they should have done so for all species' protolanguages, not just human protolanguage.

[8] This is a false analogy, since it correlates generality with proportion (%).

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, it misunderstands evolution: systems do not evolve in order to perform tasks (purpose); they evolve because they successfully perform tasks (reason). On the other hand, it is the grammar (MOOD) that construes the semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) that makes symbolic negotiation possible.

[10] This a false analogy, since RNA is at the same level of abstraction as intra-cellular functions, whereas semantics is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than lexicogrammar.

[11] To be clear, the sense in which semantics and grammar are complementary is as complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon, the content plane of language, varying in terms of symbolic abstraction. With regard to the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[12] This is misleading. On the one hand, it is the grammar that construes the semantics. On the other, the false implication is that Martin's discourse semantic systems are not 'modelled in terms of what we know of lexicogrammatical systems'. To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic systems derive from non-structural textual grammar (cohesion) and from SPEECH FUNCTION, which is construed by the interpersonal grammar of MOOD and KEY. Evidence here.

David Rose Misrepresenting Hasan's System As A Synthesis Of Martin's Systems

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 9:14:

What differs between the MESSAGE features in Figure 24.4 below and the mood features that realise them is their systemic valeur. The valeur of MOOD features is shaped by similarities and contrasts in the mood structures that realise them, exemplified in Table 24.4.

The valeur of message features is shaped by three factors as far as I can see. System G features by their position in exchange structures: verify/enquire etc. System F features by appraisal: precise/tentative; by field: specify/explain; again by exchange structure: prompted/unprompted; and again by field: global/particular...

In sum, the MESSAGE system attempts to synthesise the complementarity of two discourse semantic systems, NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the critical distinction between the semantic features of the SPEECH FUNCTION system and the lexicogrammatical features of the MOOD system is that each system of features is located at a different level of symbolic abstraction.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the valeur of each MOOD system feature is its relations to other features in the system; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 96, 509). This misrepresentation of 'valeur' serves as a pretext for the misrepresentations that follow.

[3] To be clear, the valeur of each of Hasan's SPEECH FUNCTION system features is its relations to the other features in the system, and as such, they are not "shaped by" other systems such as APPRAISAL or FIELD, the latter being Martin's misunderstanding of ideational semantics as register misunderstood as context.

[4] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents Hasan's (earlier) system as an attempt to synthesise Martin's (later) systems, one of which, NEGOTIATION, is Martin's rebranding of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Mick O'Donnell Confusing Stratification With Instantiation And Delicacy

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:07:

David Rose wrote: The semantic networks appear to re-systemicise the LG systems.

But that is exactly the role of semantics, a more abstract representation of the utterance. I also note the "systemicisation" in the semantics may reflect a totally different way choices are realised in the grammar. For instance, the choices in the speech functional network reflect lexicogram choices in clause mood and mood-tag, but also in intonation, and in one case the clause complex. So, the SEMANTIC NETWORK generalises over various forms across the grammar, which is what one would want.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the hierarchy of stratification with the cline of instantiation. To be clear, the semantic stratum is more abstract than lexicogrammatical stratum, whereas the utterance is the text, an instance of the system.

[2] This confuses the hierarchy of stratification (symbolic abstraction) with the scale of delicacy (generalisation).