David Rose Misconstruing What Constitutes A "Stratified Account"

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

We could say their meanings are similar (iterated activity), but at what stratum? A stratified account allows for the proportions you have observed, without having to undo rank as the entry point for grammatical systems. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, linguistic meaning is modelled at the level of semantics.  Here Rose follows Martin (1992: 21, 40, 55, 56, 96, 137) in confusing semogenesis ("all strata make meaning") with stratification (meaning–wording–sounding).  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, here, here or here.

[2] In SFL theory, strata represent different levels along the dimension of symbolic abstraction.  Here Rose's notion of what constitutes a "stratified account" follows Martin (1992: 129, 390, 391, 392, 488, 490-1) in misconstruing strata as "interacting modules" of meaning, to which theoretical categories can be allocated, without regard for the level of symbolic abstraction.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, here or here.  Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Accessible Data

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 10 May 2018 at 19:50:

since 'data' does not (accessibly) exist, but is only filtered through observations operationalized according to frames of interpretations (including measurements), will/can/should one always know

(a) that the data fails to fit the theory and

(b) that the particular construction of the data is not what needs changing rather than the 'theory'?

Blogger Comments:

data	does not	(accessibly)	exist
Existent	Process:	Manner	existential

[1] To be clear, here Bateman locates 'data' outside language; that is: as the experience that is construed as meaning by language.  On the SFL model, the data to be modelled as linguistic theory are the construals of experience as language.

[2] To be clear, testing the fit between data and theory is testing the fit between 

• construals of experience as language and 
• construals of language as linguistic theory.

[3] To be clear, a "particular construction of the data" is a construal of language in terms of a linguistic theory.  If the theory is inaccurately applied to the data, then it is the "particular construction of the data" that needs changing.  If an accurate application of the theory to the data reveals a shortcoming in the theory, then it is the theory that needs changing.

For an analysis of a previous example of Bateman's epistemology, see John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Text.

David Rose Endorsing Tom Bartlett's Misunderstandings

David Rose responded to Tom Bartlett on Sysfling at 10 May 2018 at 19:23:

So your description derived from observed proportionalities. It resonates with the topological description of logico-semantic relations across ranks and strata in IFG.

As a typological description it conflicts with long-standing descriptions of complexing co-selected with systems at each rank. That is, rank is the entry condition for all grammatical systems, and units at each rank may be complexed.

That description involves a very large set of empirically tested proportionalities. They are all inherently falsifiable, but would take a lot of labour to do so. So Ockham’s Razor suggests your proportionalities may be of another kind. 

very fruitful example, thanks Tom

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As demonstrated in the previous post, Bartlett's analysis did not derive from "observed" proportionalities, but from theoretical confusion, and from taking a formal, rather than functional, perspective on the grammar.

[2] Trivially, this is doubly misleading, since, on the one hand, there are no topological descriptions of logico-semantic relations (expansion and projection) in any of the four editions of IFG, and on the other hand, logico-semantic relations are only applied there to the one stratum, lexicogrammar.

[3] Here Rose misunderstands and misapplies the meaning of Occam's Razor:

Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor; Latin: lex parsimoniae "law of parsimony") is the problem-solving principle that, when presented with competing hypothetical answers to a problem, one should select the answer that makes the fewest assumptions.

Jim Martin Strategically Confusing 'Polemic' With 'Critique'

Jim Martin wrote to sys-func on 9 May 2018 at 12:58:

“Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored, or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passions, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissable [sic] attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgement and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests, against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated or either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theatre. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting, which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects: Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited, not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics wars, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to truth by such paths, and thus to validate, even if in merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let is imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn't even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debates in the USSR over linguistics and genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all: they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.” [Foucault in Rabinow [Ed.] 1984: 382-383]

Rabinow, P 1984 The Foucault Reader. Penguin.

We could perhaps rephrase Foucault’s question about the productivity of critique…

‘What productive developments in SFL theory, description and/or practice have arisen from the critiques noted in the list discussion?’

And further, how might we weigh the value of these against the costs?

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted here, this quote from Foucault is a polemic against polemics, made without a trace of self-irony.  (Martin previously posted the quote to the Sysfling list on 8 January 2016.)

[2] Here Martin misleads by strategically confusing polemic with critique.

[3] To be clear, the productivity of critiques of SFL theory depends on two general factors:

• the validity of the critiques themselves, and
• the willingness of academics to read, recognise and act on valid critiques.

[4] To be clear, the discussion of critiques of SFL occurred on the international list, Sysfling.  Here Martin has chosen instead to raise the issue on his local list, Sys-func.

[5] To be clear, valid critiques are essential for the development of any theory and the descriptions and practices it affords.  The more crucial question is: what is the cost of the absence of valid critiques to a theory and the descriptions and practices it affords.  What suffers?  Who benefits?

To kill an error is as good a service as, 

and sometimes even better than, 

the establishing of a new truth or fact.

— Charles Darwin

To free a person from error is to give, 

and not to take away.

— Arthur Schopenhauer

It is error only, 

and not truth, 

that shrinks from inquiry.

— Thomas Paine

John Bateman On The Lack Of Engagement Of SFL With Cognition

John Bateman wrote to Sysfling list on 6 May 2018 at 05:26:

there is also Teun van Dijk's ongoing and in many respects well motivated critique of the SFL notion of context, which reflects a lot of frustration with the SFL approach and its lack of engagement with certain issues, such as cognition:

Discourse and Context A Sociocognitive Approach 2009.

Blogger Comments:

See the 600+ page magnum opus:

Halliday MAK and Matthiessen CMIM 1999 Construing Experience Through Meaning: A Language-Based Approach To Cognition

From the Preface (ix-x):

It seems to us that our dialogue is relevant to current debates in cognitive science. In one sense, we are offering it as an alternative to mainstream currents in this area, since we are saying that cognition "is" (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the "mental" map is in fact a semiotic map, and "cognition" is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as a linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes. But at the same time this is an "alternative" only if it is assumed that the "cognitive" approach is in some sense natural, or unmarked. It seems to us that current approaches to neural networks, "connectionist" models and the like, are in fact more compatible with a semantic approach, where "understanding" something is transforming it into meaning, and to "know" is to have performed that transformation. There is a significant strand in the study of language — not only in systemic functional theory but also for example in Lamb's relational networks — whereby "knowledge" is modelled semiotically: that is, as system-&-process of meaning, in abstract terms which derive from the modelling of grammar.

Moreover, contrast the above with the theoretical perspective of Van Dijk in Discourse and Context A Sociocognitive Approach (2014: 281):

Note, though, that since the empiricist Functional Systemic framework explicitly does not have a cognitive dimension (Van Dijk, 2008a), the analysis is presented in terms of meaning  ‘shortcuts’ as allowed by the grammar of English, not really in terms of tacit or implicit knowledge as it is usually dealt with in philosophy or psychology.

Given that Van Dijk is theorising in a different tradition with different assumptions from SFL — most significantly: the separation of meaning and knowledge — it is not surprising that he would expect 'context' to encompass different phenomena, but it is poor (and misleading) scholarship not to recognise that fact in any critique.  Accordingly, Bateman's unsupported claim that any such critiques are 'in many respects well motivated' is not itself "well motivated".

See also Tom Bartlett On "SFL Refusing To Talk Of The Mind".

Postscript

Bateman's claim that van Dijk's (2009) criticism of the SFL notion of context is "well motivated in many respects" does not withstand close scrutiny. Van Dijk's argument is basically that the SFL model needs reworking because he does not understand the metafunctional dimensions on which it is organised. In terms of scholarship, Van Dijk did not bother to consult any edition of IFG, or even Halliday & Matthiessen's Construing Experience Through Meaning: A Language-Based Approach To Cognition.

In truth, Van Dijk's motivation is merely ideological. He misconstrues SFL Theory as anti-cognitive, and this he conflates with behaviourism.

David Rose On Collocation

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 24 March 2018 at 07:30:

It is a loose definition [in Cohesion In English (Halliday & Hasan 1976)] as collocation is an intuitive category, that Halliday took from Firth but did not develop. It was re-conceptualised and systemically described by Martin 1992 as ideational discourse semantics, specifically the taxonomic lexical relations of repetition, synonymy, contrast, hyponymy and meronymy. 

A full account, including history of collocation, is in Ch 5 in

Martin, J R 1992 English Text: system and structure. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

A shorter account is in Ch 3 in

Martin, J.R. & Rose, D. (2007). Working with Discourse: meaning beyond the clause. London: Continuum (1st edition 2003)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is manifestly untrue.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 287-8) define precisely what they mean by 'collocation':

The analysis and interpretations of lexical patterning of this kind is a major task in the further study of textual cohesion.  Here we shall simply group together all the various lexical relations that do NOT depend on referential identity and are NOT … covered by what we have called 'reiteration' and treat it under the general heading of COLLOCATION, or collocative cohesion, without attempting to classify the various meaning relations that are involved.  But it should be borne in mind that this is simply a cover term for the cohesion that results from the co-occurrence of lexical items that are in some way or other typically associated with one another, because they tend to occur in similar environments: the specific kinds of co-occurrence relations are variable and complex …

Rose's use of 'intuitive' may derive from his misunderstanding of Martin's (1992: 287) assessment of Gutwinski (1976):

As collocational thesauri were not available to provide operational definitions of such sets, analysis of items belonging to the same co-occurrence group proceeded on an intuitive basis.

* For Martin's confusion of co-occurrence with lexical sets in this quote, see [4] below.

[2] This is misleading, because it is manifestly untrue.  Halliday developed Firth's original conception  theoretically by relating collocation systemically to repetition, synonymy, hyponymy and meronymy as types of lexical cohesion, and this to the three types of grammatical cohesion (conjunction, reference, substitution–&–ellipsis) as non-structural resources of the textual metafunction within the lexicogrammatics of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory.

[3] As demonstrated in great detail here, as well as being inconsistent with SFL theory in terms of both metafunction and stratification, Martin's "reconceptualisation" of Halliday's lexical cohesion as experiential discourse semantics — poorly named 'IDEATION' — is a confusion of (misunderstandings of) lexical cohesion and (misunderstandings of) 'lexis as most delicate grammar', inter alia.

[4] To "re-conceptualise" collocation as repetition, synonymy, hyponymy and meronymy, is to misunderstand syntagmatic (co-occurrence) relations between lexical items as paradigmatic (lexical set) relations.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644):

 

[5] The system 'contrast' is Martin's invention only.  In Martin (1992: 294), contrast is a system whose entry condition is the feature 'superordination' (i.e. hyponymy), despite the fact that none of its subsystems (1992: 304) — which include antonymic relations — are more delicate choices in superordination.

[6] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 60n) write:

The notion of collocation was first introduced by J.R. Firth (1957) (but note Hoey, 2005), and gained wide acceptance, particularly in work based on corpus analysis, as in the Birmingham tradition, e.g. Sinclair (1987, 1991), Coulthard (1993), Hoey (2005) and Cheng et al. (2009). For further systemic functional accounts of collocation, see e.g. Halliday (1966b), Halliday & Hasan (1976: Section 6.4), Benson & Greaves (1992), Gledhill (2000), Tucker (2007) and Matthiessen (2009b); Matthiessen (1995a) relates collocational patterns to structural configurations such as Process + Medium, Process + Range, Process + Degree; Thing + Epithet (for a corpus-based study of Process + Degree, see Matthiessen, 2009b).

[7] For a thoroughgoing detailed critique of Martin (1992), which demonstrates the extent to which the Martin constructs self-inconsistent misunderstandings of SFL theory, see Martin's Discourse Semantics, Register & Genre.

[8] For an ongoing detailed critique of Martin & Rose (2007), which identifies the extent to which the authors construct self-inconsistent misunderstandings of SFL theory, see Working With Discourse: Meaning Beyond The Clause (Martin & Rose, 2007).

Jim Martin On Lexical Density And "Reference"

Jim Martin wrote to sysfling on 12 March 2018 at 16:04:

The proportion of generic to specific reference as far as participant tracking is concerned is relevant, since with generic reference identity chains re-initiate more often, pushing up lexical density; I’m not sure, never having counted, but where the generic reference involves technical terms, this may push up the repetition and lexical density even further. 

Also, I don’t think the stylistic prescriptive taboo in English against repetition of lexical items holds for specialised or technical terms. 

In terms of mode, it is more sensitive to measure lexical density per ranking clause, rather than depend on context/function work ratios.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the distinction between generic and specific reference is not a distinction in the cohesive system of reference. It is Martin's (1992: 103-10) invention only, and forms a system within his IDENTIFICATION network. Martin's system of identification is his rebranding of Halliday's system of cohesive reference, which he misunderstands and relocates from (non-structural) lexicogrammar to (structural) discourse semantics. Martin's misunderstandings in this regard are identified in explanatory detail here.

In short, Martin confuses the textual system of referring with the experiential meanings of the referred to, the referents, as shown by the (unstructured) unit of this system, the participant.  This confusion also shows up in the distinction between generic and specific reference, where what is presented as a distinction of reference is actually a distinction in the referents.  Martin (1992: 103):

Generic reference is selected when the whole of some experiential class of participants is at stake rather than a specific manifestation of that class.

[2] Martin's 'participant tracking' derives from the notion of participant identification — introduced by the Hartford stratificationalists (Martin 1992: 95).  It is Martin's attempt to integrate their ideas with Halliday's notion of cohesive reference that leads to the confusion of the reference with the referent in Martin's model.  Martin's IDENTIFICATION is concerned with chains of instantial participants, and this naturally leads to confusion between reference chains of participants and lexical strings (documented here), the latter derived from Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday's lexical cohesion (as demonstrated here).

[3] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.  The claim is that chains of a class of participant (e.g. 'human') restart in a text more often than chains of a specific manifestation of a class (e.g. 'Donald Trump').  Readers are invited to test this claim for themselves.

[4] This is another bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.  The claim is that the more often reference chains restart, the higher the lexical density.  It can be seen that the former does not necessarily entail the latter, since the number of lexical items per clause can be entirely independent of how often a chain of participants restarts.

More to the point, the critical factor in increasing lexical density is ideational metaphor.  Halliday (2008: 163):

This [ideational metaphor] is a designed, or at least semi-designed, extension of the “experiential” way of looking at phenomena. It suits the “crystalline”, written mode of being; and in particular, as already said, it suits the elaborated discourses of organised knowledge, because it is good to think with — it enables you to build well-ordered conceptual structures and to spin tangled skeins of reasoning. High lexical density is the price to be paid.

[5] This is speculation based on a non-sequitur.  See [4].

[6] This is another bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.

[7] To be clear, Martin misconstrues mode as a dimension of register, rather than a dimension of context that is realised in texts, registers and language as a whole (the cline of instantiation).

[8] This is a false dichotomy.  Lexical density is a measure of the number of lexical items per ranking clause, and nothing else.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 727):

To measure lexical density, simply divide the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses.

Jim Martin On ‘Subjunctive’

Jim Martin wrote to sysfling on 9 March 2018 at 09:05:

Some queries for those of you introducing the term ‘subjunctive’. 

Are you referring to a word class, a group class or a clause class? 

If a word class, which group class is it realising; if a group class, which clause class is it realising; if a clause class, are there relevant clause complex relations to consider? 

In each case, what is the relevant valeur, specified in terms of the entry condition to the relevant system and agnate features? And what is the realisation of the feature ‘subjunctive’? 

Then, reasoning from above, what is the discourse semantic system that the ‘subjunctive’ class is realising? Are we talking about appraisal engagement [heterogloss: expand: entertain] options? And/or are we talking about connexion [cause: contingency: condition] relations?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the architecture of SFL theory.  In accordance with the principles of SFL theory, the term 'subjunctive' does not refer to a class of word (noun, verb etc.), nor to a class of group (nominal, verbal etc.), nor to a class of clause (adverbial etc.).  The term 'subjunctive' is a potential feature in systems whose entry conditions are the rank of word, group or clause.  Martin's focus here on classes of form, rather than functional features, takes a formal perspective, not a functional perspective.

[2] This misunderstands the architecture of SFL theory.  The relation between word, group and clause is not realisation, but composition: a clause is composed of groups/phrases, a group/phrase is composed of words.  With regard to the rank scale, realisation is the relation between function and form, as where an element of the function structure at clause rank, such as Process, is realised by a unit (simplex or complex) of the rank below, such as verbal group.

[3] According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143n), in Modern English, the subjunctive tends to be restricted to the dependent clause of a hypotactic nexus of condition or projection:

Many languages also have an interpersonal system of the verb(al group) that has been referred to as ‘mood’: it involves interpersonal contrasts such as indicative/subjunctive, indicative/subjunctive/optative. To distinguish these verbal contrasts from the clausal system of MOOD, we can refer to them as contrasts in mode. The subjunctive mode tends to be restricted to the environment of bound clauses — in particular, reported clauses and conditional clauses having the sense of irrealis. In Modern English, the subjunctive mode of the verb is marginal, although there is some dialectal variation.

[4]  On the basis of Halliday & Matthiessen's characterisation, the relevant system is an interpersonal system termed MODE with the features indicative vs subjunctive.  The entry condition includes 'verb' at the rank of word, and the feature 'subjunctive' is realised by a reduced set of forms, relative to the indicative.

[5] On the basis of Halliday & Matthiessen's characterisation, the grammatical feature 'subjunctive' realises the semantic feature 'irrealis'.

[6] The stratum of discourse semantics is Martin's invention only.  As demonstrated in great detail here, it is theorised on fatal misunderstandings of SFL theory, with the result that it is inconsistent with SFL theory — as well as being inconsistent with itself.

[7] For some of the misunderstandings of the feature 'heterogloss' in the appraisal system of ENGAGEMENT in Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007), see the explanatory critiques here.

[8] By 'connexion', Martin means his logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION, which is his rebranding of Halliday's conjunctive cohesion, misunderstood, relocated from grammar to discourse semantics, and applied inconsistently to both logical structures and non-structural textual relations alike, as demonstrated in great detail here.

David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 2]

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 2 December 2017 at 08:39:

We can often categorise lexical items according to grammar or discourse patterns they tend to instantiate (as Michael and Christian like to do in IFG). But these categories are only one dimension of their meaning. Their more specific meanings can only be described in terms of register systems (the function of dictionary and thesaurus). So my instinct is to locate them at the level of register. This is hard to conceptualise because they only manifest as wordings, so we usually talk about them as if they are words. But the items themselves are meanings (at register level), that are realised in language as wordings. In text, they co-instantiate with grammar and discourse features to construe patterns of register. These probabilistic co-instantantions may be the basis of much linguistic description. 

in a nutshell
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that lexical items are categorised according to grammar or discourse patterns.  This is inconsistent with Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014).  In SFL theory, lexical items are specified by bundles of the most delicate features of the systems of lexicogrammar.  The relation between a bundle of such features and a lexical item is symbolic identity: the more abstract Value (feature bundle) is realised by the less abstract Token (lexical item).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, lexical items realise meaning.  That is, wording (lexicogrammar) is construed as a lower level of symbolic abstraction than meaning (semantics).

[3] Rose's argument can be characterised as follows:

Premiss: (reason) the more specific meanings of lexical items — as provided by dictionary and thesaurus — can only be described in terms of register systems.

Conclusion: (result) lexical items are located at the level of register.

Ignoring the theoretical misunderstandings for the moment, the argument itself is an instance of circular reasoning, in this case: the logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii): providing what is essentially the conclusion of the argument as a premiss.  Moreover, the premiss itself is a bare assertion, unsupported by reasoned argument.

Turning to the theoretical misunderstandings, both the premiss and conclusion are inconsistent with the SFL architecture.  In the premiss, Rose does not recognise the stratal differentiation of a lexical item (lexicogrammar) and the meaning (semantics) that it realises.  In both the premiss and the conclusion, Rose misrepresents the SFL notion of register in terms of stratification (context vs language) and instantiation (system vs sub-system).

Stepping back a little, this is what Rose's previous three posts — in which he disingenuously described himself as "perhaps obtuse", "puzzled" and "generally puzzled" — have been leading to: his "instinct" to locate lexical items at the level of register.  Keeping in mind that, for Rose, register means "social context", which he distinguishes from language, his proposal is to locate lexical items outside language.

[4] As mentioned in a previous post, in SFL theory, 'lexical item' is one of two abstractions on the word, the other being a rank unit in the grammar.

[5] This is another bare assertion, made on the assumption that the previous circular reasoning, involving a bare assertion, has established it as true.  It contains the same theoretical confusions about lexical items and register that were identified in [3] above, with the addition of locating linguistic meaning at the level of context (characterised by Rose as 'social context', and misconstrued, following Martin (1992) as 'register').

[6] The claim here is that lexical items, at the level of social context, are realised in language as wordings.  This adds further to the previously identified theoretical inconsistencies by proposing a realisation relation between context and lexicogrammar, thereby skipping the intervening level of symbolic abstraction, semantics.

[7] The claim here is that lexical items are instantiated in text.  On Rose's model, lexical items are located in context, and as such, are not instances of language (text), but of social context, which Rose distinguishes from language.

[8] To be clear, in SFL theory, the relation between features co-selected across different strata is realisation.  On the model proposed by Rose, this means that lexical items (at the level of context) are realised by the realisation of discourse semantic features in lexicogrammatical features.  Here the notion of 'co-instantiation' helps to mask the fact that Rose has not accounted for the discourse semantic features that realise lexical items.

[9] To be clear, in SFL theory, the different probabilities of features being co-selected provide the quantitative means of differentiating registers — where registers are coherently construed: as sub-potentials of language.

[10] From Fawlty Towers (The Hotel Inspectors):

Mr Hutchinson: In a nutshell.
Basil Fawlty: Case, more like.

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04In a nutshell.

Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 1]

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 2 December 2017 at 08:39:

a different but hopefully complementary perspective. I’m interested in social context as a semiotic plane that is organised systemically and realised by language, including grammar and discourse systems. Grammar and discourse construe register (field/tenor/mode) in different ways, partly by configuring lexical items. Eg IDEATION configures items in taxonomies, figures and sequences, TRANSITIVITY in processes, participants and circumstances. Each of these contribute general types of patterns to unfolding construals of a field. Lexical items contribute more specific features of register. …

in a nutshell
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'context' means the culture construed as a semiotic system.  This is distinct from the material setting in which interlocutors create texts.  The context is realised by what the interlocutors say (and think).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, taking metaredundancy into account, context is realised by the realisation of semantics (meaning) in lexicogrammar (wording).

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, language construes context — where construes means intellectually constructs — and field tenor and mode are the metafunctional systems of context.

[4]  To be clear, in SFL theory, register means a functional variety of language, and it is modelled as a  language sub-potential of the content plane (semantics and lexicogrammar).  As sub-potentials of language, different registers realise different sub-potentials of context.  Thus, context and register differ in terms of stratification (context vs language) and instantiation (potential vs sub-potential).

Rose, on the other hand, confuses register with context (field, tenor and mode), and in doing so, misconstrues language as non-language (his "social context"). 

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, lexical items are not configured.  What are configured are functions in structures, whereas lexical items are the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexical systems.  

[6] The experiential discourse semantic system of IDEATION is from Martin (1992).  As demonstrated in great detail here, and summarised here, it is a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction), lexis as most delicate grammar, and misapplied logical relations.

[7] This is seriously misleading.  Figures and sequences are types of phenomenon in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 48ff).  They do not appear in Martin (1992), where 'activity sequences' —misunderstood from Barthes (1977) — are modelled as field (ideational context), which Martin misconstrues as register.

[8] To be clear, the system of TRANSITIVITY does not configure lexical items "in processes, participants and circumstances".  The system of TRANSITIVITY provides the potential for construing experience as a configuration of process, participants and circumstances.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 212, 213):

…experientially, the clause construes a quantum of change as a figure, or configuration of a process, participants involved in it and any attendant circumstances. …

The system of transitivity provides the lexicogrammatical resources for construing a quantum of change in the flow of events as a figure – as a configuration of elements centred on a process.

[9] Here Rose follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing ideational semantics (the meaning construed) during logogenesis as ideational context (the field of culture construed) — which Martin further misconstrues as a dimension of register.  For Martin's misunderstandings of context see here; for Martin's misunderstandings of register, see here.

[10] There is a sense in which the wording of this is consistent with SFL theory, even if it is not the meaning that Rose has in mind (see [Part 2]).  It is consistent in the sense that registers, in the SFL use of the term, differ in terms of the probabilities of systemic features being instantiated, and given that lexical items realise bundles of the most delicate features, the probabilities of these most delicate features being instantiated are the most delicate means of specifying different registers.

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04In a nutshell.

Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

David Rose "Generally Puzzled"

David Rose wrote to sysfling (via Gordon Tucker) on December 1, 2017 at 13:19:

Personally I like co-instantiation for integrating instantiation with stratification 

Only problem I have with Ruquaiya’s [sic] "only lexical item capable of functioning” is absence of probability. Isn’t the item/structure relation probabilistic? I’d be happy with probabilities of co-instantiation of strike (back) with either middle material or 1-Role Process. 

I’m still interested in where people locate lexical items in the architecture. Ruqaiya was trying to prove they could be delicate grammatical options. 

generally puzzled
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the process of instantiation is the selection of features and the activation of realisation statements (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 45) at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation in logogenesis (the unfolding of text).  This necessarily entails the co-selection of features that are related along the dimensions of the theory, including delicacy, rank and strata.  Martin's superfluous notion of "co-instantiation" is merely an acknowledgement that features are co-selected.  In terms of semogenesis, what matters is the relations between the selected features — the place of features in the system.  For some of Martin's misunderstandings of instantiation, see here.

[2] In SFL theory, the cline of instantiation and the stratification hierarchy are distinct dimensions, organised according to different principles: class membership and symbolic identity, respectively.  As distinct dimensions, they jointly define the theoretical spaces in the following matrix:

The notion of co-instantiation "integrating instantiation with stratification" thus demonstrates a misunderstanding of these dimensions and the relation between them.

[3] This confuses the specification of a lexical item by lexical features with the probability of the instantiation of those features.

[4] In SFL theory, at the system pole of the cline of instantiation, features in systems are said to have relative probabilities of being selected (instantiated).  At the midway point on the cline of instantiation, different registers differ by the different probabilities of features being selected.  At the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, texts differ by the different frequencies of selected features.

Rose's notion of an "item/structure relation" is nonsensical, as explained in a previous post here.

[5] Translating this into SFL theory, it becomes: the co-selection probabilities of the features that specify the lexical item 'strike back' and the clause rank features 'material' (PROCESS TYPE) and 'middle' (AGENCY) from the system network of TRANSITIVITY.  Again, following from [3] above, Rose confuses the specification of a lexical item by lexical features with the probability of the co-selection of those features with grammatical features.

[6] The way to find out where lexical items are in the theoretical architecture is to both read about the theory and learn from it.  For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9) are quite helpful in this regard:

The paradigmatic strategy … is typically associated with feature networks: that is, networks made up of systems of features, such that each lexical item (as the name of a thing) realises a certain combination of these features selected from different systems within the network — a particular clustering of systemic variables. … This resource, the construal of systematically related lexico-semantic sets, illustrates well the principle of “lexis as most delicate grammar”. …

Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network.  Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations.  Thus lexis (vocabulary) is part of a unified lexicogrammar; there is no need to postulate a separate “lexicon” as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate.

[7] This is misleading, since it misrepresents the following quote from Hasan (1987: 198):

In English, the only lexical item capable of functioning as the Event in a clause with the above selection expression is 'scatter'. 

Hasan was not "trying to prove" that lexical items "could be delicate grammatical options", as demonstrated by the fact that she distinguishes between 'lexical item' and the bundle of features ('selection expression') that the lexical item realises.

John Bateman Endorsing David Rose's Misunderstandings Of SFL

John Bateman replied to David Rose on sysfling on 30 November 2017 at 21:36:

David Rose wrote:

But it's not just Gordon’s phrasing… it’s normal SF talk, as in your own “the Medium isn't implicit: it's the empire;” which, forgive me, seems to imply the role and lexical item are identical

John Bateman replied:

yup, you're absolutely right. The phrasing is certainly less than unproblematic. It is just that I have difficulty in remembering that the packaging that has to be thought around Medium, Process etc. to have them make any sense at all even could be forgotten. 

So you're right as well to point this out — although language use is always underspecified in these ways: the consequences of the underspecification will depend on audience of course, which on this list is sufficiently diverse as to advise caution I guess.

David Rose wrote:

And how can a grammatical function structure be ‘realized’ by a lexical item? Where in the theory’s architecture is that possible?

 John Bateman replied:

lots of shorthand and slippage ... but I don't think that they are particularly unresolved or unresolvable, if necessary. You raise the more interesting set of issues around relations between information organised lexically and information organised grammatically, and I don't think that particular nut is going to be solved any time soon; there has been little sign of it going away in the past. Here there is more architecture than actual solutions I think.

Blogger Comments:

[1]  As demonstrated in the previous post, Rose is far from right on this matter, since he misconstrues a nominal group the empire as a lexical item, and the phrasing is not problematic, since it encodes a theoretical Value the Medium by reference to a language Token the empire.

[2] Apparently, Bateman has "difficulty in remembering" that something "even could be forgotten".

[3] As demonstrated in the previous post, the notion of a grammatical function structure being ‘realised’ by a lexical item is nonsensical, since a lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features, whereas a grammatical function structure is constituted by the relations between the functional elements.

[4] In SFL theory, the relation between "information" (i.e. content) "organised grammatically" and "organised lexically" is one of delicacy.  As will be seen in a later post, "the more interesting set of  issues around relations between information organised lexically and information organised grammatically" arise not only from confusing lexical items with word rank units, but also from the confusion of lexis as most delicate grammar with lexical cohesion — a theoretical confusion that first occurs in Martin's (1992) discourse semantic system of IDEATION, as critiqued in great detail here.

[5] Leaving aside the conundrum of "solving a nut" and it "going away", any problem here arises from not understanding the theory, and so any solution will necessitate getting to know the theory, especially in terms of its architecture.

David Rose "Puzzled"

David Rose replied to John Bateman on sysfling on 30 Nov 2017 at 20:33:06:

Thanks John But it's not just Gordon’s phrasing… it’s normal SF talk, as in your own “the Medium isn't implicit: it's the empire;” which, forgive me, seems to imply the role and lexical item are identical.  Is it possible our shorthand masks some unresolved slippage? Hence my question about the relation. ‘Filled’ is too syntax and vocab isn’t it? And how can a grammatical function structure be ‘realized’ by a lexical item? Where in the theory’s architecture is that possible? The problem is two distinct construals of field that come together in an instance like 'the hurricane struck the coastal area of Haiti’… lexical and grammatical

puzzled
David 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To say the Medium is the empire does not imply that 'the role and lexical item are identical' — not least because the empire is not a lexical item, but a nominal group.  In construing an element of clause structure (the Medium) and a nominal group (the empire) as higher (Value) and lower (Token) levels of abstraction, the clause is consistent with SFL theory:

the Medium	is	'the empire'
Identified Value	Process	Identifier Token

But this misses the point.  The clause construes an identifying relation between linguistic theory and language data, such that a theoretical value (the Medium) is encoded by reference to a token of language (the empire).

[2] The notion of a grammatical structure being realised by a lexical item is nonsensical.  A lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate features of the lexicogrammatical system, whereas a grammatical structure is constituted by the relations between its functional elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 83-4):

The significance of any functional label lies in its relationship to the other functions with which it is structurally associated. It is the structure as a whole, the total configuration of functions, that construes, or realises, the meaning. … It is the relation among all these [functions] that constitutes the structure.

[3] This heralds a cluster of theoretical misunderstandings that Rose elaborated in a later sysfling post.  See David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 1] and David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 2].

David Rose "Being Obtuse"

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 30 Nov 2017 at 14:05:27:

Perhaps I'm being obtuse, but can I ask if, whether our perspective is transitive or ergative, when we describe items like 'strike' or 'strike back’ in terms like 1-Role Processes or 2-Role Processes (or ergative/transitive or whatever), we are actually classifying lexical items according to grammatical criteria? By the term Process do we mean a lexical item or an element in a function structure, such as Actor+Process? If the latter, then what is the relation between the function structure and the lexical item?

Blogger Comments:

[1] In describing 'strike' and 'strike back' as lexical items, instead of verbs, Rose is taking the lexical perspective on the notion of 'word' and ignoring the grammatical perspective.  As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9) point out:

The folk notion of the “word” is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like. 

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

From a grammatical perspective, 'strike' is a verb and 'strike back' is a phrasal verb, both at word rank.  As verbs, they feature as constituents of verbal groups, where they realise the functional element 'Event'; and verbal groups, in turn, feature as constituents of clauses, where they realise the functional elements 'Process', experientially, and (Finite +) Predicator, interpersonally.

[2] A lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate features of lexicogrammatical systems — just as a phoneme is the synthetic realisation of phonological features.  The relation between lexicogrammatical features and a lexical item is thus one of symbolic identity — lexical item as Token, features as Value — not class membership (attribution).

[3] The architectural dimensions of the theory provide the means of relating any regions within it.  To relate function structure to lexical item, the following path can be taken:

• from structure to system: syntagmatic axis to paradigmatic axis (related by realisation),
• within system, from most general features to most delicate (related by delicacy),
• from bundle of most delicate features to lexical item (related by realisation).

But the question itself arises from taking a lexical perspective on the word instead of the grammatical.  The grammatical question would be 'how do we get from clause structure to word?', and the answer is via the rank scale and realisation, as described in [1] above.

See a related post from 2015 David Rose On Lexical Items.