David Rose Repeating Jim Martin's Misunderstanding Of Hjelmslev's Connotative Semiotic

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 2 Dec 2021, at 09:56:

If formal logic is derived from ‘natural' logic of language, then this kind of symbolism may be useful for a ’natural’ philosophy of language. It frees us to re-interpret choices we are given, beyond simply either/or. Are simultaneous choices possible? Are there more general or more delicate choices we can make?

For example, if we choose the metalinguistic feature [functional], then [systemic], must we then choose between lexicogrammatical or discourse semantic analysis, or are both possible? If we choose a [solidary] relation between language and social context, must we choose between a denotative or connotative perspective, or are both possible?

Selections from these metalinguistic systems are continually instantiated as linguistic fields unfold, and always couple features from both field and tenor systems. As with language systems, 'users share attitude and ideation couplings…to form bonds’ , to affiliate with one or another group (or both:)…

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the choice of stratum for analysis is a choice of level of symbolic abstraction: wording (lexicogrammar) or meaning (semantics). But as Halliday (1985: xvii) points out:

A text is a semantic unit, not a grammatical one. But meanings are realised through wordings; and without a theory of wordings — that is, a grammar — there is no way of making explicit one's interpretation of the meaning of a text.

Martin's discourse semantics, however, is another matter entirely. For evidence that the model of discourse semantics is, inter alia, rebrandings of Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday & Hasan's COHESION (textual lexicogrammar) and Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION (interpersonal semantics) see the close examination of English Text (Martin 1992) here, and the close examination of Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) here.

Importantly, in SFL Theory, lexicogrammar is interpreted in terms of the meaning it realises — e.g. verbal group as Process — and in the absence of grammatical metaphor, lexicogrammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) are in agreement (congruent). Martin's discourse semantics, however, as a rebranding of COHESION, cannot provide a congruent relation between wording and meaning, because it actually models textual lexicogrammar rather than multifunctional semantics. This, in turn, undermines the systematic description of grammatical metaphor: the incongruent relation between wording and meaning.

[2] To be clear, 'solidary' is Martin's term — taken from Barthes (1977: 101) — for what he claims (1992: 20) is the 'natural' relation between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar. (The word 'solidary' actually means of a group or community: characterised by solidarity or coincidence of interests.)

However, in SFL Theory, the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar actually refers to the non-arbitrary relation between experiential meanings and grammatical form, such as that between process and verbal group, participant and nominal group, circumstance and adverbial group. It is this natural relation that makes a functional grammar possible. See Halliday (1985: xvii-xx).

Here Rose applies 'solidary' to the relation between language and social context, where social context is misunderstood, in Martin's model, as varieties of language (register and genre). The reader is invited to identify a linguistic theory that models the relation between language and context, whether understood as culture, or misunderstood as varieties of language, as 'unnatural'. 

[3] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Martin's stratified model, which identifies the context plane with a connotative semiotic system and the language plane with a denotative semiotic system. However, this is a serious misunderstanding of Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic, which Martin (1992: 493) claims to be using.

Importantly, for Hjelmslev, a connotative semiotic is a semiotic system that has a denotative semiotic system as its expression plane. Martin (1992), however, misunderstands the connotative semiotic to be merely its content plane, context, excluding its expression plane: language. 

Moreover, Martin compounds the error by locating register and genre, varieties of language, a denotative semiotic — the expression plane of the connotative semiotic — in the content plane of the connotative semiotic. That is, in Martin's stratification hierarchy, varieties of language are not modelled as language. This is analogous to claiming that varieties of dog — terriers, poodles etc. — are not dogs.

[4] To be clear, what Rose refers to as 'metalinguistic systems' are systems that classify linguistic theories. In SFL Theory, these are systems whose entry condition is the FIELD feature 'linguistics', where 'field' means the ideational dimension of context; that is: the culture as semiotic system. Rose, on the other hand, follows Martin in misunderstanding FIELD as a system of register. In SFL Theory, register is a subpotential of language, not a system of context.

[5] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the claim here is that selections from linguistic FIELD systems ("metalinguistic systems") are continually instantiated as linguistic fields unfold. Firstly, this misunderstands instantiation. Selections from systems are not instantiated; the selection of features is the instantiation.

Secondly, there is no "continual" instantiation of FIELD system features. The instantiation of the context of culture as a context of situation is the selection of a specific configuration of FIELD, TENOR and MODE system features. If a different FIELD system feature is selected, a different context is instantiated.

Rose's misunderstanding here derives from the misunderstanding of field in Martin's model. Although, Martin misunderstands field as a dimension of register, he further compounds the problem by confusing field with ideational semantics; see the evidence here. So, from the perspective of SFL Theory, what Rose is actually concerned with here is the instantiation of ideational semantic features in the logogenesis of a text.

[6] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the claim here is that selections from linguistic FIELD systems ("metalinguistic systems") always couple features from both field and tenor systems. Clearly, this is incoherent when expressed this way, since it is not the selection of FIELD features that causes the "coupling" (co-selection of features across FIELD and TENOR systems). More coherently, any situation involves the instantiation of a configuration of contextual features (from the systems of FIELD, TENOR and MODE).

[7] To be clear, this bears no relation to any of the text that precedes it. The terms 'coupling', 'bonding' and 'affiliation' are from Martin and his students, and the unremarkable claim here is simply that people form social alliances on the basis of shared values. The same might be said of social insects; see also:

David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic

David Rose Positively Judging Jim Martin's Empire Building.

Beatriz Quiroz Misunderstanding Halliday On Thematic Equatives

 

Beatriz Quiroz wrote to SYSFLING on 22 Nov 2021, at 01:58:

Just a follow-up: 

I couldn't find any grammatical argumentation for specifically treating the nominalised clause in thematic equatives as Value in IFG (across editions), nor in Deploying functional grammar (Martin, Matthiessen and Painter, 2010). What I did find is Davidse (1992)'s claim, based on Halliday (1967b), that all thematic equatives are encoding identifying clauses (as opposed to decoding ones). If one goes back to Halliday (1967b, p. 230), on the other hand, he says the nominalised bit (in English) is always the Identified in an Identifier/Identified structure; he then assimilates (tentatively) encoding clauses to 'true' identifying with Token + Value structure, ergo 'the nominalisation [in such clauses] is always the Value'. Would from this follow that the nominalised clause 'is always' the Value in identifying clauses?. To begin with, "[w]hether the coding option, if admitted, is present in all equatives is very questionable." (Halliday, 1967b, p. 229). So not sacred word.

Anyhow, further below Halliday adds:

'The tentative conclusion would be that the 'identifying' option is a way of representing any clause as an encoding equative, with the nominalisation representing the function complex 'value' and 'identified'; a decoding equative, even if it has a nominalisation as the identified element, not being regarded as identifying since it has no non-identifying (non-equative) equivalent- or only one that is thematically incongruous... Alternatively, decoding equatives of this type could still be regarded as identifying but with identification as the unmarked option' (p. 231)."*

So even if we admit the coding option for ALL identifying clauses, not necessarily the nominalised bit in all equatives is the Value (in English). BUT even if we COULD say the value is 'always' the nominalised clause in (English) identifying clauses, does it follow we can extend such generalisation across languages?

As far as I know, nothing close to Halliday's (1967a, 1967b, 1968) and Davidse's (1991, 1992) fine-grained and reactance-based argumentation has been provided on this topic for languages other than English. In fact, the distinction between thematic equatives and predicated Themes, which is in turn based on the distinction between clefts/pseudoclefts, is rather problematic beyond English. As extensive descriptive literature in Spanish has shown, the 'cleft/pseudocleft' distinction emerged from the description of the English clause, and does not apply in the same way to Spanish. This has not been closely studied from a SFL perspective, yet (again, as far as I know).

The point of all of this is: can we just assume everything that is said in IFG, without any further argumentation, should be follow obediently? What is the nature of our enquiry, then? Is it restricted to applying (or even forcing!) ready-made analyses to texts? Not that there's anything inherently wrong with application, if it's helpful. It's just I thought we could always do more, including challenging received knowledge when evidence suggests we should probably revise our generalisations. Even the generalisations available in English descriptions.

Beatriz

*If we follow Davidse's own argumentation closely, Identifier/Identified and Token/Value are treated as independent variables (in English), and the different combinations lead to the encoding/decoding distinction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the nominalised clause in thematic equatives serves as the Qualifier of a nominal group:

Quiroz clearly mistakes what we can notice for a clause; cf. what can we notice:

[2] To be clear, in an encoding identifying clause, Value conflates with Identified, whereas in a decoding identifying clause, Value conflates with Identifier. So the claim here is that in all thematic equative clauses, Value conflates with Identified.

[3] The adversative conjunctive Adjunct on the other hand is misleading here, because this claim is consistent with the previous claim, since the nominalisation serves as Value, which conflates with Identified.

[4] To be clear, what follows (tautologically) from the claim 'the nominalisation [in such clauses] is always the Value' is the claim that the nominalisation (not nominalised clause) is always the Value in thematic equative identifying clauses (not all identifying clauses).

[5] To be clear, the 'coding option' is the choice between encoding and decoding. Halliday's point, back in 1967, was that it is questionable as to whether decoding is an option in thematic equative identifying clauses. That is, Halliday thought, back then, that all thematic equative identifying clauses are necessarily encoding.

[6] This is a non-sequitur. It would seem that Quiroz is under the false impression that she has found inconsistencies in the quotes she has tendered, but failed to understand. More importantly, it commits the logical fallacy of attacking a straw man by misrepresenting Halliday's theorising as religious dogma ("sacred word").

[7] This is a false inference. In a thematic equative clause, the nominalisation serves as Value regardless of whether the direction of coding is encoding or decoding. In the case, of encoding, the nominalisation serves as Value/Identified, and in the case of decoding, it serves as Value/Identifier.

[8] To be clear, this is an hypothesis to be tested empirically by analysing data.

[9] See Theme Identification vs Theme Predication.

[10] To be clear, IFG illustrates SFL Theory by applying it in a description of English. There is no claim that descriptions of other languages will conform with its description of English. That is, Quiroz is again attacking a straw man. Importantly, SFL Theory is a scientific theory, and as such, warrants continuous hypothesis-testing on language data.

[11] To be clear, this is Halliday's model, not Davidse's argumentation, as Davidse would readily admit. See, for example, Halliday (1985: 112-28).

∞

For those unfamiliar with the political games that are played out in the SFL community, this and the previous post by Quiroz constitute an attempt by one of Jim Martin's faction to critique Halliday's analysis of thematic equative clauses, and to use the critique to cast doubt on the credibility of IFG as a whole — which she misrepresents as dogma to be obeyed. However, as Quiroz has demonstrated, she does not realise that her clause actually does conform to Halliday's analysis, and does not realise that the quotes that she tendered as inconsistent are, in fact, consistent both with each other and with Halliday's analysis.

Beatriz Quiroz On Value In Thematic Equatives

Beatriz Quiroz wrote to SYSFLING on 20 Nov 2021, at 02:28:

Could any one explain why 'nominalised' clauses in thematic equatives should be analysed always as Value, as Halliday an Matthiessen (2014) say on p. 285? Is there any lexicogrammatical pattern substantiating such analysis? Somewhere in the SFL literature?

and then on 21 Nov 2021, at 10:58:

I'll give you a full translation of the original example in Spanish:

"What we can notice when we follow this path is a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation".

The original example in Spanish appears in a pedagogic text in high-chool Biology. It's the last clause, serving as a hiperNew in a paragraph that explains the different characteristics of nervous systems in various species, going from intertebrates to vertebrates, scaffolding (without saying it until the very end) 'the tendency towards centralisation' as we move from simpler to more complex nervous systems. The paragraph itself is the macroTheme in a section on the nervous systems in the animal kingdom.

We've been discussing a simplified version of this example off list with Tom Barlett, trying to use 'represent' and 'exemplify as an agnate verb, with rather weird results! So here it goes:

"What we can notice when we follow this path is (represented by/exemplified by) a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation", and therefore "A clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation represents/exemplifies what we can notice when we follow this path" (!?)

Apart from the fact the agnations sound weird to me both in English and in Spanish, semantically (I mean, in the wider context of the whole paragraph and within the text), I think the previous clauses in the paragraph are the ones serving as examples of 'a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation', rather than the other way around. But perhaps the 'what we can notice ...' clause makes the difference?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the lexicogrammatical pattern that substantiates the analysis is that, in every instance of a thematic equative clause, it is always the Value participant — rather than the Token — that is realised by the nominalisation. That is, the question is poorly conceived. See also here.

[2] To be clear, this instance conforms to the claim (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 285) that 

in a thematic equative, the nominalisation is always the Value. 

That is, what we can notice is expressed by a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation — not what we can notice expresses a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation.

Significantly, Quiroz did not provide any alternative analysis of her own.

[3] To be clear, other clauses in the co-text are irrelevant to the question of whether the nominalisation serves as Value or Token in the identifying clause. The clause relates these two participants, and nothing else.

[4] To be clear, any perceived semantic "weirdness" here can be attributed to the very technical grammatical metaphor in the Token participant, combined with the fact that Quiroz and Bartlett have not distinguished the nested dependent clause when we follow this path from the dominant thematic equative clause what we can notice is a clear evolutionary tendency towards centralisation.

Robin Fawcett On 'Forget' + Location

Using the alias 'Dmytro Poremskyi', Robin Fawcett wrote to sys-func on 23 Sept 2021, at 05:13 and on 25 Sept 2021, at 02:42:

I'm curious to know your (functionally grounded) opinion regarding the following usage recommendation:

(taken from Oxford American Wordpower Dictionary for Learners of English)

It is obvious that one may find quite a few instances of 'forget' + location: place across oral and written corpora, but do you think SFG could shed some light upon the reason behind the (prescriptive?) preference here? I wonder if it can be somehow linked to process type analysis, perhaps involving the comparison with 'leave' ...

… However, quite a few native speakers of different varieties of English would maintain that it is perfectly normal to forget something somewhere:

Do you think SFL can account for this seeming deviation?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's first extract distinguishes four usages of 'forget':

1. forget about something
2. fail to remember to do something
3. fail to bring something with you
4. stop thinking about something

and the claim that a Location cannot be construed with 'forget' applies only to the third usage.

In Fawcett's second extract, on the other hand, the writer mistakenly assumes that the claim applies to all usages of 'forget'. Of course, other usages of 'forget' can be construed with a Location, as exemplified by:

However, in the third usage, above, 'forget' serves the same function as the verbal group complex 'forget to bring', and so serves as a material Process:

The reason why at home cannot be added in this usage of 'forget' is that such a 'rest' Location (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 317) is inconsistent with the directed motion of 'bring'. Cf He is bringing his passport at home. However, when directional 'bring' is made explicit, with or without 'forget', directional Locations can be construed:

In Fawcett's Systemic Functional Syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, there is no verbal group, and so, no verbal group complex. This is one reason why Fawcett is unable to answer his own question.

David Rose Endorsing Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Structure ("Subjacency Duplexes")

 David Rose wrote to sys-func on 13 Aug 2021, at 20:35:

Thank you to Jim for challenging our thinking again. Although you downplay it as just ‘relaxing’ the associations of multivariate and univariate structures, the idea of subjacency actually looks like a pretty big claim that could resolve a lot of conflicts, contradictions and blindspots in lg description. When I looked at Pitjantjatjara again recently, it was everywhere at group and word ranks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the seminar (13/8/21), Martin falsely claimed that Halliday (1965) associated recursive systems with univariate structures and non-recursive systems with multivariate structures, despite producing a diagram from Halliday (1965) that associated recursive systems with both multivariate and univariate structures:

[2] In the seminar, Martin presented a new type of structure, a subjacency duplex, which he claimed is a univariate structure that realises a non-recursive system, thus violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. However, the claim does not survive close scrutiny.

To be clear, the term 'subjacency' is from Chomsky (1973), and the term 'duplex' is from Matthiessen (1995: 161) and simply means a univariate complex of two units. In his talk, Martin attributed 'duplex' to Rose (2001), instead of Matthiessen, and although Rose (2001) acknowledges Matthiessen, Rose did not correct Martin on the point during the seminar, or in this public response.

Martin presented the following as an example of a duplex structure:

Here Martin interprets the structure marker, of, as a clitic, and interprets the clitic and the preceding nominal group as a hypotactic duplex. Martin provided no argument in support of this interpretation. The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relation between nominals (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 394). In this instance, it marks a structural relation between the nominals two litres and water. In Martin's analysis, however, of is misinterpreted as a Modifier of just one of those two nominal groups.

Secondly, the preposition of does not function as a Modifier, because it does not subcategorise the nominal group two litres; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389). Nor does of hypotactically expand the nominal group in terms of any other subtypes of elaboration, extension, or enhancement.

Thirdly, the nominal group two litres and the structure marker of do not form a duplex (a 2-unit complex). That is, they do not form a nominal group complex, a structure marker complex, a clitic complex, or any other type of complex.

In short, the reason why this type of univariate structure is not generated by a recursive system, is simply that it is not a univariate structure in the first place.

Martin then went on to compound the error by interpreting both the multivariate structure of prepositional phrases and paratactic nominal group complexes in terms of his subjacency duplexes:

∞

In the same seminar, Martin claimed that a nominal group with multiple Epithets is a multivariate structure realising a recursive system, thus also violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. His supporting argument was that each Epithet is independently related to the Thing:

The major theoretical problem here is that, in SFL Theory, recursive systems specify an iterative relation between formal units (e.g words), not functional elements (e.g. Epithets). The logical structure of the nominal group construes it as a group of words, rather than as an organic configuration, such that α is modified by β, which is modified by γ, which is ... , where the α word serves as the Head of the nominal group, and the series of subcategorisations of the Head serves as its Modifier. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389):

However, there are also problems in using Martin's model of structure to make the argument:

The problem here is that Martin's structural distinction between experiential and logical meaning actually construes the distinction between unequal status (of nucleus vs satellite) and equal status (of multiple nuclei). That is, Martin's structure typology misconstrues the metafunctional distinction between experiential (multivariate) and logical (univariate) as the interdependency distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis.

So, in interpreting the nominal group as an orbital structure, Martin is not actually interpreting it as a multivariate structure, but as a univariate structure, with each Epithet hypotactically related to the Thing.

A final internal inconsistency is that, in applying his model of orbital structure, Martin reverses the direction of the relation from nucleus to satellites to satellites to nucleus (Epithets to Thing), because it suits his argument to do so.

David Rose On Phonology And The Origin Of Words

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 29 Jul 2021, at 15:06:

Not a lot of ideational potential in phonology

Why our ancestors came up with words

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if there were not "a lot of ideational potential" in phonology, the ideational content of language could not be expressed phonologically. If what Rose claims were true, it would be necessary to use another medium, such as writing or sign, to express ideational meaning.

What is true is that, in English, the systems of the tone group realise interpersonal and textual distinctions, while the systems of syllable and phoneme realise all metafunctional distinctions.

[2] To be clear, Rose's argument is:

• Reason: because there's "not a lot of ideational potential in phonology"
• Result: consequently "our ancestors came up with words"

Clearly, a stratum of lexicogrammar ("words") is no solution to an ideational deficiency on the stratum of phonology, because it still leaves no means of realising the ideational content of lexicogrammar in phonology. In short, this is a false conclusion invalidly reasoned from a false premiss.

On the other hand, it is amusing to imagine human ancestors intoning interpersonally and textually before they "came up with" words.

∞

The Dangers Of Phonology Not Realising Ideational Content

Tom Bartlett On Cognition And "Intentionality"

Tom Bartlett replied to John Bateman on SYSFLING on 6 Jul 2021, at 17:37:

Cheers for this John, and yes I was "confusing a description of grammar (for some subset of human languages) with a metalanguage for talking about semiotics?" - in the sense that I was mixing them up together - deliberately, but probably very ill-advisedly in such a brief post and when I am still in the middle of teaching and marking. I'll take the coward's way out for now and not elaborate on my underdeveloped words, but tbc....

One point only (I can't resist):

curiously cognitive I found: surely it depends, as with all semiotic systems of any interest, on the community of practice?

Yes and no, my intended point was that cognition from this perspective is simply embodied associations and responses and intentionality is just our post-hoc reflection on this (itself a material process......), so that the line between symbolising and saying is in the language of the construer (hence the blurring of the lines in the first part). 

A discussion (on my part at least) to be continued once teaching and marking have ended, preferably IRL and with a pint/cup of tea : )

Back to the virtual chalkface....

Blogger Comments:

[1] Bartlett's acceptance of Bateman's misunderstandings of his post as valid, and his reluctance to engage with Bateman on the issue, might reasonably be taken as evidence that Bartlett has only a very superficial understanding of the method he was deploying (using metalanguage to theorise).

[2] To be clear, the portion of Bartlett's original post that Bateman was commenting on is:

at what point does this move from an identifying relation to a verbal process? Does it depend on the intention of the speaker, the understanding of the hearer, or both?

[3] Here Bartlett has abandoned the SFL metalanguage perspective first taken in his original post, according to which cognition is the type of mental process through which propositional ideas are projected.

[4] Here again Bartlett has abandoned the SFL metalanguage perspective first taken in his original post. On this model, 'intention' is the type of mental process, which the grammar construes as either desiderative at clause rank (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 257), or cognitive ('resolving'/'considering') in projecting verbal group complexes (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 587).

On the other hand, Bartlett's claim that 'intentionality is just our post-hoc reflection on' 'embodied associations and responses' is a bare assertion, unsupported by argument or evidence. Moreover, the claim runs counter to the association of intention with planning and forethought. (It is reasonable to assume that, by 'intentionality', Bartlett actually means 'intention', since his original post was on intention, not intentionality.)

[5] From the perspective of SFL metalanguage, 'reflection' is a cognitive process, which the grammar construes as either mental or behavioural, but not material.

[6] To be clear, this is trivially true, since symbolising and saying are metalinguistic categories of language. However, the 'so that' here is unwarranted, because it does not logically follow as a conclusion from the two propositions that precede it, since it is unrelated to them; see [3] and [4] above.

[7] To be clear, the 'hence' here is unwarranted, since, as demonstrated above, none of the preceding clauses provide an argument regarding the blurring of "a description of grammar (for some subset of human languages) with a metalanguage for talking about semiotics", which, as explained in the previous post, is actually the distinction between using metalanguage to theorise and using language to theorise, respectively.

If it is not clear, here Bartlett was bluffing in an attempt to maintain his perceived status. The intellectual shortcoming of public dialogue MODE is that TENOR is more salient than FIELD.

John Bateman Failing To Understand Tom Bartlett On The Origins Of Language

John Bateman replied to Tom Bartlett on SYSFLING on 6 Jul 2021 at 16:53:

OK, Tom, I'll bite! ... was extremely confused by your post actually...

What is the vervet monkey, for example. doing with its call - making an instinctive noise or saying something? If its call says danger - to those who are conditioned to recognise this - at what point does this move from an identifying relation to a verbal process?

.... isn't this confusing a description of grammar (for some subset of human languages) with a metalanguage for talking about semiotics? 

Or is the use of 'identifying', 'verbal' stand-ins for indexical and symbolic? (or something else?). …

And at what point in our linguistic evolution and development (phyologenesis and ontogenesis) do semiotic noises as minor clauses (including holisms) develop the systemic regularities that index mood?

Similarly here: "semiotic noises as minor clauses"? 'minor clause' is a grammatical (systemic) feature (of a language)... why should there be a 'point' that indicates that a grammatical system is indexing speech functions... And 'semiotic noises' (you mean materiality shaped as a realisation of the forms of a semiotic system?) can only be 'minor clauses' when the said semiotic system include an alternation with 'minor clause' as one of the alternatives...

I suspect what is confusing me throughout is the conflation of specific grammatical terminology with intendedly general semiotic vocabulary without explicit marking in your text. So you mean whatever it is that the interpersonal semantics of 'minor clauses' is taken to be as what the 'semiotic noise' might be doing with respect to the semiotic system at issue? …

I guess this is all why they banned discussion of the origins of language way back :-) They were probably on to something ...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the confusion here is entirely Bateman's, as he rightly acknowledges. On the one hand, a semiotic theory is not a metalanguage unless the semiotic system being theorised is language. A metalanguage is language turned back on itself, not language turned onto some other semiotic system. So Bateman's "metalanguage for talking about semiotics" is actually the use of language to theorise semiotics.

On the other hand, using metalanguage to theorise semiotics is precisely what Bartlett was trying to do.  Moreover, in this he was following the example set by this blogger, most obviously on Informing Thoughts. 

Importantly, just as language can be used to theorise any domain of experience, so too, obviously, can metalanguage. One advantage of using SFL metalanguage to theorise phenomena is that its architecture is explicitly defined, and inconsistencies in theorising can be identified and dismissed on the basis of reasoned evidence.

[2] Clearly not, since 'identifying' is the relation of symbolic abstraction and projection ('verbal') the relation between different orders of experience, whereas by 'indexical' and 'symbolic', Bateman means the distinction in Peircean semiotic theory, whose fundamental assumptions are incompatible with the social semiotic model of SFL Theory.

[3] See the previous post Tom Bartlett On The Origins Of Language.

[4] On the other hand, as Thomas Babington Macaulay said:

Men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely.

and as Niels Bohr said:

The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of a democracy should be the weapon of openness.

Tom Bartlett On The Origins Of Language

Tom Bartlett wrote to: SYSFLING on 6 Jul 2021, at 15:02:

Following from Christian's explanation of the connections between symbolisation and projection and Bea and David's further comments, I'd say it's an example that relates beautifully to the origins of language. What is the vervet monkey, for example. doing with its call — making an instinctive noise or saying something? If its call says danger — to those who are conditioned to recognise this — at what point does this move from an identifying relation to a verbal process? Does it depend on the intention of the speaker, the understanding of the hearer, or both? In other words, at what point to we transition from instinctive reactive noise to shared symbolism and then from the call saying something (identifying) to the speaker saying something (verbal)? And at what point in our linguistic evolution and development (phyologenesis and ontogenesis) do semiotic noises as minor clauses (including holisms) develop the systemic regularities that index mood?

Maybe some of these questions are hinted at in the Mapudungun tale?

Blogger Comments:

The instance under discussion is from Mapudungun mythology: And the serpent chanted: 'kay, kay, kay'. In the story, this verbal projection creates (the existence/happening of) flooding rain.

[1] To be clear, this is the connection between 'x realises y' (symbolisation) and 'x says y' (projection).

[2] To be clear, this mythic symbolism is concerned not so much with the origins of language, but with the deep epistemological observation that what humans construes as 'reality' is actually meaning created of experience by the lexicogrammar of language. A similar point is made in Abrahamic mythology:

[3] To be clear, what is "instinctive" is the biological reaction to the threat, which, according to Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, is the firing of neurones correlating specific perceptual categorisations with specific inherited values. This is distinct from the choice of call, according to situation, which is socio-semiotic, not biological.

[4] To be clear, confusingly, the wording its call says danger construes symbolisation with a verb that prototypically construes verbal projection.

[5] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, there is no such move, because vervet protolanguage does not involve verbal processes. This is because verbal processes prototypically project locutions, which are lexicogrammatical, and protolanguage does not have a lexicogrammatical stratum. It is only in language that verbal processes can project protolanguage and non-semiotic sounds.

[6] To be clear, in terms of Halliday's taxonomy of system-&-process (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 507-10), this is the evolutionary trajectory from biological systems ("instinctive reactive noise") to socio-semiotic systems, and within the latter, from protolinguistic systems ("shared symbolism" = "call meaning something") to linguistic systems ("speaker saying something"). What's missing here are social systems, located between biological and socio-semiotic systems. For Halliday, these involve the exchange of value, but not symbolic value, such as those mediated through the exchange of pheromones in eusocial insect species. These might also be said to include phenomena that induce mental processes in conspecifics without symbolising meaning, such as a peacock's tail inducing, in a peahen, a desire to mate. (This is virtually Darwin's interpretation; for Wallace, a peacock's tail symbolises fitness, and so would be deemed socio-semiotic, not social).

[7] To be clear, on the SFL model, systems are established and altered, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, by instances. Instances of "semiotic noises as minor clauses" establish the systemic opposition with major clauses, and different functions of instances of minor clauses establish contrasts within the minor clause system. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

After Wendy Bowcher asked on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 19:15:

I am wondering why (semantically/contextually) the advertisers might chose to use the 'not fail to' form. Why not just use sentence (2) in the headline?

(1) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD NOT FAIL TO SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

(2) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

Mick O'Donnell replied on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 20:32:

I think the real difference between the alternative wordings can be brought out by an alternative transitivity analysis:

In the first, the mother construes herself either as a failer or succeeder, depending which polarity she chooses to produce by her action.

In the second, she is a perceiver or a non-perceiver (or more in line with a material interpretation, a visitor or non-visitor):

Our society invests a lot more personal judgement in failure/success than it does in perceiving/ignoring (as Bradley commented, bring in the Appraisal angle).

Adding in "should", Australians are more likely to accept an admonition to succeed than an admonition to visit something. Admonitions are more acceptable when the recommended action is to the benefit of the addressee (e.g., imperatives are fine in a recipe but less so from student to teacher), and telling someone to success could be seen as working for their benefit).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the difference between the two wordings is that, in the first wording, should not fail to see, the Process is realised by a verbal group complex, and so by two Events, whereas in the second wording, should see, the Process is realised by a verbal group, and so by just one Event.

The verbal groups in the complex are related hypotactically, and the semantic relation between them is conation: trying and succeeding (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 572)

[2] To be clear, these are not alternative analyses of the original wordings; see [1]. Moreover, they are not consistent with SFL Theory, since the first misinterprets the secondary verbal group as part of the Goal, and the second misinterprets the mental clause as material (as if it were Mother visited something):

[3] To be clear, it is not the mother, but the speaker/writer, who construes experience as Mother, and construes her as an Actor of a material Process which was unsuccessful.

[4] To be clear, the mental interpretation of the clause, which forms one thread of O'Donnell's argument, is inconsistent with his analysis of the clause as material.

[5] To be clear, this is meant to explain why the advertisers chose the first wording over the second, but instead of making use of SFL Theory, it just makes generalisations about reader reactions.

Using SFL Theory, the use of should in both wordings can be explained by reference to context and semantics. In terms of context, the rhetorical mode of the text is one of exhortation, since its function is to urge readers to take a particular course of action. For Matthiessen (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 34), this (textual) mode is oriented to (interpersonal) tenor, rather than (ideational) field. The unmarked interpersonal semantic realisation of exhortation mode is the speech function 'command', and in both wordings, the command is realised metaphorically by a modulated declarative. This interpersonal metaphor is itself motivated by the tenor relations between advertiser and reader, including their relative status and contact.

Moreover, the rhetorical mode of exhortation also provides an explanation for why the first wording was used by the advertisers, since should not fail ramps up the exhortation to coercion: every mother who visits the show should not fail…, which might be taken to imply that readers would be failing their children as mothers if they were not to see (the) Glaxo exhibit.

Also relevant here is the double negative (grammatical not and lexical fail) of the primary verbal group, which might be taken as an emphasis of positive polarity.

See also (The) Glaxo Exhibit: Theme, Transitivity & Mood.

Jim Martin On Process Types

Jim Martin replied to Mick O'Donnell on SYSFLING on 10 Apr 2021 at 08:58:

It would be unusual to have a ‘process type’ which in effect crossclassifies the others:

They allowed us to leave/chat/ask/believe/be/have…

A case would need to be made.

When not involved in what IFG treats as a verbal group complex, these verbs typically take a complement realising a figure (or one of Hao’s activity or semiotic entities):

They allowed the application/petition/objection/extradition/extract…

I have tried to make a case for Tagalog relationals crossclassifying material, verbal and mental processes, most clearly perhaps in this in this paper:

Relational processes in Tagalog: A Systemic Functional perspective. (J.R. Martin & P. Cruz) in K. Rajandran & S.A. Manan (eds.), Systemic Functional Linguistics: South East Asian perspectives. Universiti Sains Malaysia Press. 2019. 225-251.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin misunderstands O'Donnell (see previous post). O'Donnell interpreted these types of instances as projection nexuses — clause complexes — not as clause simplexes in which one type of process "cross classifies" another type.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, the Complements of Martin's examples are nominalised processes, and as as such, realise elements not figures. On the other hand, apart from its function in verbal group complexes, and such metaphorical variants, the verb allow typically serves as a verbal Process, as in 

She allowed ['admitted'] that the penalty appeared too harsh for the crime

Bush allowed ['conceded'] that he himself could never support Trump

or a material Process, as in

I'll allow ['allocate'] you just ten minutes.

[3] To be clear, the reason why Martin introduces the irrelevant notion of cross classification here is simply to provide a pretext for promoting his own paper, in which he claims to provide the "case that needs to be made". The function of not clarifying the notion of 'cross classifying process types' is to bamboozle the theoretically naïve.

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types

Michael O'Donnell wrote to SYSFLING on 9 Apr 2021 at 21:35:

In my own practice, I have added a 7th process type modal-process, to cater to this type of process. For example, in English:

He allowed me to smoke.

They required us to teach long hours.

Verbs such as allow/permit/authorise, require/oblige, all allow projection. Yet they are not verbal in the sense that they do not necessarily involve communication, no addressee, etc. They are not mental, in that they are externalised in the real world, not just mental activity.

One could say that these last exclusion criteria are notional, while process type classification should be based on grammatical reactance. But in practice, our process type classification has always been somewhat of a hybridisation of semantic classification linked to common grammatical reactance. Halliday actually groups together various subtypes of verbal process, such as "she blamed him ..." (which do not project), the central verbals (say/tell etc,) which do project, and sometimes the non-projecting verbs such as talk/grumble etc. which in some issues of IFG are verbal. The only thing these all have in common is the shared notional involvement of verbal activity, or expanding out, communicative activity. But in the case of these "modal" processes, there is no necessary explicit communicative activity.

I haven't seen Halliday dealing with these verbs explicitly, but I may have missed it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here O'Donnell mistakes allowed and required for Processes of a clause in a clause complex, and on the basis of that misunderstanding proposes a new 'modal' PROCESS TYPE. In SFL Theory, each of these is the primary verbal group of a verbal group complex that serves as a material Process:

In hypotactic verbal group complexes, it is the (last) secondary verbal group that realises the PROCESS TYPE. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 568):

It is the secondary group, or last secondary group if there is more than one, that realises the process type of the clause, e.g. [material:] she seemed to mend it, [behavioural:] she seemed to laugh, [mental:] she seemed to like him, [verbal:] she seemed to tell us, [relational:] she seemed to be nice.

[2] To be clear, there is no projection in either of O'Donnell's examples, both of which are clause simplexes, not complexes. The relation between the verbal groups in each nexus is enhancement. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 580, 582-4) on modulation in enhancing causative verbal group complexes.

[3] To be clear, this argumentation is irrelevant to the analysis of the two examples; see [1] and [2] above.

[4] To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Analysis requires taking a trinocular perspective, while giving priority to the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 48-9):

We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective (Halliday, 1978: 130–131; 1996). But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise. …

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

[5] This is misleading, because it is not true. In the first edition of IFG (1985), the verbs talk and grumble do not feature at all. In the second edition (1994), these verbs are explicitly listed as exemplifying 'near verbal' behavioural processes. Halliday (1994: 139):

The two verbs are again listed as exemplifying behavioural processes in both the third edition (2004: 251), and the fourth (2014: 302).

[6] To be clear, what (genuine) verbal processes have in common is the symbolic exchange of meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303, 304):

‘Saying’ has to be interpreted in a rather broad sense; it covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning … verbal processes might more appropriately be called ‘symbolic’ processes.

[7] To be clear, O'Donnell's notion of "modal" processes derives from a misunderstanding; see [1] above.

[8] When subsequently alerted to Halliday's (1994: 285Iff) analysis by Bartlett, O'Donnell replied:

Totally right, Tom. p287 actually gives examples of force/oblige/allow as causative structures.

Not that I will give up on my own approach.

Tom Bartlett On Criteria For Deciding Between Verbal And Relational Processes

Tom Bartlett responded to Akila Baklouti on SYSFLING on 27 Jan 2021 at 22:27:

When showing is construed as a temporal act of revealing, and hence can take the present in present, the construal is as a verbal process with the idea revealed as a projection.

However, if this showing/signification becomes reified as an index and is no longer a time-bound process, this is now construal as relational, as a permanent representation. Hence you can say "a smile shows happiness" where a smile is reified as a Token of the Value happiness. You could also have "a smile shows that you are happy" where we have a Fact clause as Value.

So the question is whether the Subject is demonstrating a phenomenon (verbal) or has come to stand for it (relational).

The second example from Martin et al is interesting as it captures a bit of borderlinearity between revealing the relationship and coming to stand as a proxy for it - so we have a timebound process (shown by the past) suggesting that the results came to be a Token of the Value at the time they were produced - and still are - they still show this.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not a matter of whether a Process can be expressed by the 'present in present' tense, but whether the choice of tense is marked or not. And the markedness of the tense is not criterial in distinguishing verbal from relational processes, because the unmarked present tense for both verbal and relational process types is the simple present (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 354).

[2] To be clear, this claim is invalidated by every relational clause whose Process is realised in the 'present in present' tense. For example:

[3] Trivially, the projection of a verbal clause is a locution, not an idea. An idea is a projection of a mental clause.

[4] To be clear, this confuses Process ('signification/showing') with Token ('index') and deploys the logical fallacy known as petitio principii (begging the question), since it assumes the point (signification, Token) it is trying to prove (that the clause is relational).

[5] To be clear, these are not criteria for identifying relational processes, because the relations construed can be both "time-bound" and impermanent, as shown by Donald Trump is the U.S. President.

[6] To be clear, both of these clauses can also be interpreted as verbal, if the word shows is taken to express the meaning 'says':

[7] To be clear, the question, in this instance, is whether the clause is construing 'a symbolic exchange of meaning' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 303) or a relation of identity.

A verbal clause does not involve a "Subject demonstrating a phenomenon", not least because a Sayer need not be Subject, and a Phenomenon is a participant in a mental Process. In a verbal clause, the verbal Process mediated by a Sayer ranges over Verbiage, or projects a locution.

Likewise, in an identifying relational clause, Subject can conflate either with Token ("stand for it"), as in an operative clause, or with Value ('what is stood for'), as in a receptive clause.

[8] To be clear, 'the second example from Martin et al' (Martin, Matthiessen & Painter 2010: 125) is:

• The result showed (meant, was) [[that the substance was potassium]]

which the authors, like Bartlett, interpret as relational, not verbal. However, on the same page the authors also write (ibid.):

One difference between the two process types is that a verbal clause will usually admit a Receiver whereas a relational one will not.

Ignoring the minor detail that 'Receiver' is not a structural function of a relational clause, it can be seen that the authors' analysis of the clause as relational contradicts their own criterion, since the clause readily admits a Receiver, thereby making it verbal, not relational:

• The result showed us that the substance was potassium

See also Borderline Cases Between Identifying And Verbal Processes: Indeterminacy.