David Rose On 'Systemic Intonation Work'

On November 10 2014, Gerard O'Grady wrote to the sysfling list:

I'm looking for references for systemic intonation work on languages other than English. Please note I am not looking for references on intonation on languages other than English in other frameworks.

To which David Rose replied on November 11:

I believe a key work is... Cléirigh, C. 1998. The Genesis Of Phonic Texture. Ph.D. Thesis. Sydney University

Blogger Comment:

 The thesis contains no investigation of the intonation of any language in any framework.

Beatriz Quiroz On Notational Conventions And The Rank Scale

Beatriz Quiroz wrote on 5 November 2014 to sys-func:

I think another issue adding to the confusion in relation to theoretical vs descriptive categories in SFL is the rather loose use of notational conventions for descriptive categories. While (type of) processes (material, relational, etc.) refer to experiencial classes of clause (and they are thus expected to be written in lowercase), labels such as Actor, Process, Phenomenon (or more generic Participant, Circumstance) are elements in functional configurations of structure (and they should be written with initial uppercase). Too often in English descriptions and SFL literature such conventions are overriden, causing serious misundertandings. […]

Of course, the discussion on theoretical categories such a as class, rank, function and structure leads us in turn to the question of whether the theoretical notion of rank-scale and its general bias towards constituency relations (at least in most SFL English descriptions) is indeed productive when looking at languages other than English. There is also very little discussion in SFL on this issue, although Fawcett 2000a, 2000b, 2000c does challenge the idea of a rank scale in English accounts (from the point of view of the Cardiff model), and Martin 1996 deconstructs the constituency bias in relation to the theoretical notion of structure (inspired by Halliday, 1979).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The notational convention in SFL is to use lower case for the terms 'participant' and 'circumstance', since these are classes to which elements of function structure (Actor, Location etc.) belong.

[2] The rank scale isn't "biased" towards constituency; it is a theoretical means of construing language in terms of constituency — but one that goes beyond mere constituency, since it builds the function-form relation into the hierarchy, with function structures of a higher rank realised by syntagms at the lower rank.  That is, the rank scale embodies not just composition, a type of extension, but also elaboration (and symbolic identity) through the realisation (intensive identifying) relation between ranks.

As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146) make clear:

… in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.

The theoretical utility of the rank scale includes not only modelling the compositional relation from clause to morpheme, but also, for example, distinguishing embedding from taxis, and, most importantly, the unpacking of grammatical metaphor.

Mick O'Donnell On Transitivity Criteria

Mick O'Donnell wrote on 31 October 2014 to sysfling:

It all comes down to which criteria you put as primary in defining process types: the notional or the grammatical. You [David Banks] are saying meaning is first (processes of communication) and grammar (projection) second. 

Others put grammar first, dealing with verbs which project on one side, then splitting these into verbal and mental subsets. 

I argue elsewhere that the lack of clarity as to the priority between the notional and grammatical criteria is the reason behind much of the different classification decisions made within our community.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Transitivity criteria do not boil down to the opposition between 'notional' and 'grammatical'; the relevant theoretical dimension is stratification.  As already clarified here — where O'Donnell advocates following the 'grammatical principles that Halliday established' — SFL was theorised by taking a trinocular perspective, which means also looking at the grammar 'from above' (what meaning is being realised) and 'from below' (how the wording is realised) — as well as 'from roundabout' (the level of grammar). As Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 31) make clear:

We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective. But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise. 

[2] A functional grammar gives priority to the 'view from above' — that's what makes it functional rather than formal, since function (Value) is realised by form (Token).  As Halliday & Matthiessen (ibid.) clarify:

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

The motivation for this priority is explained by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 6) as follows:

But to show that a grammar is a theory of experience we use a functional, semantically motivated grammatics, since this allows us to seek explanations of the form of the grammar in terms of the functions to which language is adapted. 

David Rose Confusing Rank With Delicacy And Realisation With Instantiation

David Rose wrote at 01:14 on 31/10/14 to the sys-func and sysfling email lists:

1. Isn't part of the notional problem a confusion of word rank lexical items with clause rank grammatical functions? E.g. a quoting verbal/mental process may be instantiated by a verb denoting behaviour, but does that make the clause a behavioural process? 

Is this a classification of lexical verbs or of clause rank process types? What does this mean for the "lexis = delicate grammar" hypothesis? 

2. What is the epistemological value of the behavioural process category? Some posts such as Yaegan's point to the value for students of distinguishing 'blurred' categories in text analysis, although Mick points to the cost in pedagogic labour. Other posts suggest its value for negotiating authority in the field, by defining the criteria for the category (or its absence). Is part of its value a relatively safe theoretical cul de sac for a good SFL argument?

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL terms, Rose's nominal group 'word rank lexical items' confuses two distinct theoretical dimensions: the rank scale and delicacy.  This is because it conflates the grammatical (word rank) with the lexical (lexical item).  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568):

The folk notion of the “word” is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical [lexical item] and one grammatical [word rank].

[2] The relation between a clause rank Process and a word rank verb is realisation (via group rank), not instantiation.  Higher rank functions are realised by lower rank forms.  Instantiation is the relation between the system as potential and a specimen of the system in an actual text.

[3] Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin, Matthiessen & Painter 2010) advises treating such quoting clauses as behavioural, despite the grammatical reactances; see discussion here.

[4] Epistemology is branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity.

Tom Bartlett On Material Processes

Michael O'Donnell wrote at 00:07 on 31/10/14 to sysfling:

Tom: my hand hit the cat" which I use in class as the prototypical material process but which surely needs at the very least an animate (and probably sensate) Actor??? 

Mick: And in "the shit hit the fan", are you implying sensateness of the Actor?

And Tom Bartlett replied at 00:11 on 31/10/14 to sysfling:

No, Mick, that's why I contrasted "I hit the cat" with "my hand hit the cat"! 

The first does not mean "came into contact with" but something more animate/sensate; the second one does mean come into contact with, as with the shit hitting the fan.  

It's "I hit the cat" that I use as prototypically material but which would fail the animation test.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] Bartlett's claim is that the material process in I hit the cat does not mean came into contact with.  This claim can be tested by a dictionary definition of 'hit':

hit. verb. bring one's hand or a tool or weapon into contact with (someone or something) quickly and forcefully.

"Marius hit him in the mouth"

[2] Bartlett's claim is that the process in I hit the cat means "something more animate/sensate" (rather than 'came into contact').  While both participants in the clause are animate beings, the process is as material as they get, and material clauses are not restricted to participants endowed with consciousness (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 135).

It may be that Bartlett is here attempting to apply the traditional intransitive distinction of action/event to transitive clauses.  This is the distinction between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and the unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell) (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 148).

[3] Despite saying in a previous post (quoted by O'Donnell) that he uses the clause my hand hit the cat to exemplify "the prototypical material process", here Bartlett says it is actually the clause I hit the cat that he uses for this purpose.  He also says this clause "would fail the animation test" despite claiming that it "does not mean 'came into contact with' but something more animate/sensate".

Even if Bartlett had written the alternate clause in the final paragraph, the argument would still amount to nonsense, relying as it does on the untenable — to put it mildly — claim that the process 'hit' in I hit the cat does not mean came into contact with.

David Banks On The "Non-Existence" Of Behavioural Processes

David Banks wrote at 18:27 on October 30 2014 to sysfling:

The simple (but brutal, and with all due respect to all the other contributors) is that there are no distinguishing criteria because behavourial process does not exist. What is usually discussed under this heading is a rag-bag of unrelated phenomena that do not form a coherent category. The phenomena in question are better dealt with at a more delicate level than that of process types. My article on this question is forthcoming in a book edited by Donna Miller and Paul Bayley.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6) provide some grammatical reactances which distinguish behavioural from other process types and which thus identify what they have in common:

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental clauses) the unmarked present tense in behavioural clauses is present-in-present (he is watching) rather than the simple present (he watches).

• Behavioural clauses include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing).

• Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones.

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing.

• Behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon;

• Behavioural clauses can not accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left).

Criteria for distinguishing process types are listed in Table 5(45) in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 301).

[2] The existence, or not, of metalinguistic distinctions depends on whether or not they are projected into semiotic existence as ideas and locutions by linguists.  This depends, in the short-term, on whether or not they prove useful, and in the long term, on whether they are consistent with the other distinctions on which they depend.

[3] As Halliday & Matthiessen make clear:

• '‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum' (2004: 255), and
• 'these can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental' (1999: 136).

Tom Bartlett On Behavioural & Mental Processes

Tom Bartlett wrote on the sysfling list on 30 October 2014 at 17:34:

While we're on the subject, Halliday (139 in IFG2) says that "watch" is anomalous amongst behavioural processes in taking a phenomenon-like Complement rather than a prepositional phrase (and by IFG4:302 the claim is upped to say that this is "restricted to "watch"):

I am watching you. (Cf. I (can) see you, which is mental:perceptual)
I am looking at you/listening to you.

But can anyone suggest any reason why the following control-over-perception examples would not also be behavioural processes with Complements, if we follow the same reasoning?

I was smelling the roses when a bee stung my nose. (Cf. Careful, I (can) smell gas!)

Taste this soup and tell me what you think. (Cf. Do/can you taste the saffron in it?)

Never mind the quality, feel the width. (Cf. She felt/could feel the cold snow beneath her feet.)

 Or even the control-over-cognition one I cited earlier:

She was contemplating her future.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The reason the verb watch is anomalous is because it can serve in clauses such as I am watching Inside No. 9 which feature a Phenomenon, like mental clauses, but which, in all other respects, are behavioural.  This is not the case with the clauses Bartlett provides — they are all simply mental clauses of perception in which the Range is a Phenomenon (not a Behaviour).  [See transitivity analyses here.]  They can be checked against the grammatical reactances of behavioural vs mental clauses here.

[2] In this clause, the verb contemplate serves as a cognitive mental Process whose Range is a Phenomenon (not a Behaviour).  This verb also serves in mentally projecting nexuses such She was contemplating whether she should report his misdemeanour.  As Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 450-1) note:

… mental clauses representing an ‘undecided’ state of mind are used to project indirect questions. These include clauses of wondering and doubting, finding out and checking, and contemplating, which tend to be characterised by special lexical verbs such as wonder, ascertain …

Jim Martin On Phrasal Verbs As Behavioural

Jim Martin wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

My rule of thumb, when worrying if a phrasal verb is behavioural or mental/verbal, is that it is behavioural.

Blogger Comment:

As a caveat to this rule of thumb, it's worth noting some of the phrasal verbs that commonly serve as mental (or verbal) processes:

• figure out
• find out
• get over
• give away
• hold onto
• look forward to
• look into
• look up
• look up to
• make up
• mix up
• put up with
• sort out

Sample clauses featuring these verbs can be viewed here.
An alphabetical list of more than 1,000 phrasal verbs can be found here.

Tom Bartlett On Verbal Processes

Tom Bartlett wrote on 30 October 2014 to sys-func & sysfling:

Prototypical verbals take present in present: Right now he's telling her that he can't find the key.

They shift towards present simple when they are on the way to relational processes: The rules state that that's illegal. The clock says five o'clock. The big hand at the 12 and the little hand at the 5 says five o'clock.

Blogger Comment:

 The unmarked present tense for prototypical verbal processes is of course the simple present, as in

He says there is a lot of nonsense posted on sysfling.

 This does not mean that the present-in-present is not also used, only that it is marked in comparison with the simple present:

He is saying there is a lot of nonsense posted on sysfling.

Jim Martin On Behavioural & Verbal Processes

Jim Martin wrote 30 October 2014 to sys-func & sysfling:

It is hard to get beyond notional reasoning here. 

One possibility is to try to restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing, giving minimal pairs such as look/see, listen/hear, smile/like, shudder/fear, ponder/think… etc. This would seem to fit with what Mick reports from Thompson below, and with a suggestion in the Deploying Functional Grammar workbook. 

As a reactance, although in general behaviourals don't project (better to say 'don't report'), and this helps distinguish them from mentals and verbals, many can quote, in 'narrative' discourse, especially when following a quoted locution or idea… to describe the manner in which something is said or thought.

'I better get out of her', he shuddered.
'I think so', she smiled.
'You're wrong', they accused. 

But not:

*'They've arrived', he listened.
*'She's responsible', they gossiped. 

The 'accused' example above raises the classification of clauses of judgement as verbals in IFG (with a Target function) even though they take present in present tense and can't report.

I'm accusing you of forgetting.

Not

*I accuse you that you forgot.

Another issue.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6) provide some useful grammatical reactances of behavioural processes which can be viewed here.

[2] "To restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing" would ignore the fact that the processes of physiological behaviours pattern grammatically like the processes of psychological behaviours; eg the Medium is endowed with consciousness, as in mental clauses, but the unmarked present tense is 'present-in-present', as in material clauses, and the Range is restricted to behaviours, unlike the Range in material clauses.

[3] The treatment of behavioural processes in Deploying Functional Grammar is problematic, as argued here.

[4] In such cases of quoting, the effect is to attach a behavioural feature to a verbal or mental process.  That such cases are verbal or mental, and not behavioural, is shown by the unmarked present tense, the simple present — the same as verbal and mental — in contradistinction to behavioural and material processes; eg

'I don't understand' he frowns.

not

'I don't understand' he is frowning. 

[5] 'She's responsible', they gossiped seems fine enough, especially with the tonic on she's (or with the more obviously judgemental irresponsible as Attribute).

[6] If we consider a less unlikely clause, we see that the unmarked present tense for these targeting verbal processes is indeed the simple present, like other verbal processes:

you flatter/insult me

not the present-in-present of behavioural processes:

you are flattering/insulting me

[7] Projection is not a prerequisite for verbal clauses, any more than it is for mental clauses (emotion, perception).  The verbal clauses that take a Target are those in which the order of saying is activity, rather than semiosis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 302), which locates them topologically nearer the behavioural (and material) processes.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Behavioural Processes

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

I think this is the sensate Subject that I recall Carmel Cloran talking about. So to summarise (and add):

• Is the Doer a sensate being?

• Does it seem like a mental (or verbal) process but can't project eg speak and listen

• Is it a process of physiological or psychological behaviour (both conscious and unconscious) eg cough, sneeze etc (but not think Mick – isn't think mental, cos can project)

Blogger Comment:

This exemplifies the widespread and persistent error of classifying verbs in terms of process types.  The same verb can serve as different process types, because the Process is a function of the clause.  For example, the verb breathe can serve as  Process in a behavioural clause, as in she breathed a sigh of relief, where the Range of the clause, a sigh of relief, is a Behaviour, and it can serve as Process in a material clause, as in they breathe oxygen, where the Range of the clause, oxygen, is not a Behaviour, but the Scope of the breathing process.  See related analyses here.

Sysfling Discussion Of Behavioural Processes

The following links might be helpful:

Behavioural Processes: Grammatical Reactances

Behavioural Processes

Some Phrasal Verbs Serving As Mental (Or Verbal) Process

Behavioural Processes

Behavioural & Material Processes

Behavioural Processes

Robin Fawcett On Why Hypotaxis Is Unnecessary

Robin Fawcett wrote to the sysfling list on 30 June 2014 at 09:57:

Just consider the concept of Hypotaxis" for a moment. It models a relationship between, let us say, two clauses, such that one clause is said to be "dependent" on another, but without functioning as an element of it - so without "filling`' it, in Cardiff Grammar terms.

An IFG analysis of "She knows his name" would show that "his name" is a nominal group that fills a Complement/Phenomenon, whereas an analysis of "She knows that he is called Peter" would show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it. But that misses out a central aspect of the functional analysis. i.e. that "that he is called Peter"Is a Phenomenon in the Process of "someone knowing something". Moreover, this analysis asks us to accept that "She knows" is a main clause. I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take, because we recognize it - don't we? - as an incomplete clause that requires its Complement/ Phenomenon to complete it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the case of mental projection, the distinction between embedded clauses and dependent clauses is a very useful and important one.  It is the distinction between a pre-projected fact (embedded clause) and a reported idea (dependent clause).  It is the distinction between a metaphenomenon that is the Range or Agent of the mental Process (embedded clause) and a metaphenomenon that is projected into semiotic existence by the mental Process.  See sample analyses here, and Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 441-482).

However, contrary to claim made by Fawcett, an IFG analysis of She knows that he is called Peter would not

"show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it".  

The clause that he is called Peter is here an embedded fact, not a dependent clause — She knows (the fact) that he is called Peter — and as such, functions as the Phenomenon of the clause, thereby "filling an element" or "completing the clause" in Fawcett's terms.  See analysis  here.  Cf agnate receptive clause: (the fact) that he is called Peter is known by/to her; agnate theme predication clause: it is (the fact) that he is called Peter that she knows.

In other words, Fawcett has misunderstood and misrepresented the IFG analysis of this clause and then "argued" against his own misunderstanding/misrepresentation in favour of the default SFL analysis.

[2] Unlike Halliday & Matthiessen (2004), Fawcett provides no actual reasoned grammatical argumentation for his unintentional agreement with them, merely:

… the central aspect of the functional analysis …
I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take …
… we recognise it — don't we? — as …

This might be compared to what Fawcett wrote on the Sysfling list at 02:32:43 (GMT) on 9/1/12:

Not all readers will be comfortable with my next point, which is that I suggest that contributions to sysfling that relate to how a given piece of text should be analysed should be expressed in the framework of the assumption that we are scientists of language, i.e. scholars who are seeking, using scientific methods appropriate to our subject of investigation, to understand the nature of language. But this means that we should regard it as inadequate to simply say "I would analyse Text X as follows: ....", without giving reasons for preferring that analysis to others that might be proposed.

David Rose On Theme

David Rose wrote to the Sysfling list on 24 June 2014 at 21:07:

If theme is a clause rank system, whose textual function is point of departure for a message, and a message is realised by a finite ranking clause +/- dependent clauses, and an unmarked Theme is realised (in English) by the Subject of a clause, then a prepositional phrase or dependent clause preceding the Subject of the primary clause functions textually as a marked Theme of the message (if the duke gives anything to my aunt, it'll be that teapot; from the duke, my aunt received a teapot). An embedded (downranked) clause may function as Subject (what the duke gave my aunt was that teapot). (IFG editions notwithstanding:)

Blogger Comment:

Themes may be unmarked or marked, but not both; i.e. marked^unmarked is not a structural configuration of (topical) Theme.  When a marked Theme — Adjunct or Complement — is chosen in a declarative clause, the Subject does not function as (unmarked) Theme.  For example:

from the duke	my aunt	received	a teapot
Adjunct	Subject	Finite/Predicator	Complement
Theme	Rheme

David Rose On What Counts As Grammar And What Counts As Discourse Semantics

At 09:33 on 9/5/14, Margaret Berry asked David Rose on sys-func:

how do you decide what counts as grammar and what counts as discourse semantics?

To which David Rose replied at 09:37:

What a great question! And what counts as discourse semantics or register?

and later at 12:50:

Technically, entry conditions for grammatical systems must be a grammatical rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] It's an obvious and fundamental question, and one that should yield a ready answer, since it would have formed the basis of theorising discourse semantics as a stratum of language; yet Rose gives the impression, through his initial exclamation and ultimate inability to answer the question, of never having considered it before.

Since Martin (1992) proposes discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar on the content plane, and strata represent levels of symbolic abstraction, "what counts as discourse semantics" is linguistic content that is more symbolically abstract than "what counts as lexicogrammar".  Because the relation between strata is one of realisation, "what counts as discourse semantics" is realised by "what counts as lexicogrammar", and "what counts as lexicogrammar" realises "what counts as discourse semantics".

This means that the systems of each stratum have to be accounted for with respect to those of the other.  This includes specifying congruent lexicogrammatical realisations of discourse semantic features and distinguishing them from metaphorical realisations.

It also means that relations between grammatical units, such as clauses, need to be first specified at that level of abstraction, that is: lexicogrammar, and such relations then be related to the discourse semantic features they realise.  It is not sufficient to model the relations between clauses only at the level discourse semantics.

[2] What counts as discourse semantics or register only becomes problematic when register, a functional variety of language, is misconstrued as a stratum of context above semantics (Martin 1992), and thus, misconstrued as being more symbolically abstract than semantics (as argued elsewhere on this site).  The problem is further compounded by misconstruing context as language — Martin's register and genre — instead of as a semiotic system that is realised in language (as argued elsewhere on this site).  One potential pitfall of this latter misconstrual is that discourse analysts, in dealing with texts, run the risk of confusing field and tenor, the ideational and interpersonal dimensions of the situational context, with the ideational and interpersonal meanings of the text itself.  This confusion is one source of Rose's difficulty of distinguishing "what counts as discourse semantics" from "what counts as register".

[3] This raises the issue of entry conditions for discourse semantic systems.  It is a theoretical requirement that the entry conditions for all systems be specified.

David Rose On "Metalanguage"

At 11:44 on 8/5/14 David Rose wrote to sysfling:

One reason I think why children can readily recognise clauses from an experiential perspective, is the tacit metalanguage in their own grammar… who or what it's about, what they're doing, where, when, how. But these are not directly related to transitivity categories, which are specified by process type or ergativity. Rather they are discourse semantic elements, that Ruqaiya Hasan has referred to as 'message parts', and Jim Martin as nuclear relations. 

From this existing intuitive knowledge of children it is a simple step to consciously recognise a clause as a process involving people and things in places and times.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The elements Rose talks about — 'who or what it's about, what they're doing, where, when, how' — are not "the tacit metalanguage in their own grammar".  Metalanguage is not "in their own grammar".  Metalanguage is language about language.  In this instance, the metalanguage is Rose's language about the language of children, not the language of children.

[2] On the SFL model, these are experiential meanings, and as such, are indeed directly related to  the "transitivity categories" of the lexicogrammar; as meanings, they are of a higher stratum of symbolic abstraction, semantics, and thus related to lexicogrammar by realisation.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Relational Processes

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 5 May 2014 to sys-func:

… I can't, (for some reason to do with what feels like ignoring the grammar to make way for the semantics, though perhaps that's not quite it) come at a circumstantial relational process (perhaps only because I have never heard of one – excuse my ignorance – point to them to read about please) …

Blogger Comment:

Circumstantial relational clauses are discussed in An Introduction To Functional Grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 240-4).  Relational clauses are:

• either attributive or identifying (MODE OF RELATION), and
• either intensive, possessive or circumstantial (TYPE OF RELATION).

A system network for relational clause systems appears on page 217.

Context Vs Cotext

Halliday (2007 [1991]: 271):

Originally, the context meant the accompanying text, the wording that came before and after whatever was under attention. In the nineteenth century it was extended to things other than language, both concrete and abstract: the context of the building, the moral context of the day; but if you were talking about language, then it still referred to the surrounding words, and it was only in modern linguistics that it came to refer to the non-verbal environment in which language was used. When that had happened, it was Catford, I think, who suggested that we now needed another term to refer explicitly to the verbal environment; and he proposed the term “co-text”.

For the difference between material setting, context and co-text, click here.
For material setting vs context see here.