David Rose On How Halliday's Marxism Influenced The Various Dimensions Of His Model

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 2 June 2022 at 7:01:

It would be intriguing to know just how MAKH’s Marxism influenced the various dimensions of his model, as politics prevented him from making it explicit.

For example, he often describes grammar in terms like the ‘engine’ or ‘powerhouse’ in which ‘meanings are made’. The image is of industrial production, of labour and machines. The meanings produced are then ‘exchanged’, as Kieran discusses here.

The Marxian image of an economic base of production and exchange becomes more sharply outlined in the grammar/semantics relation. H&M’s 1999 Construing Experience is a description of the ideational meanings made by the grammar. It construes semantics as an ideational superstructure emerging from the production processes of the grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the first two editions of IFG (1985, 1994), Halliday characterised the grammar in terms of computer technology: as the central processing unit of language. Halliday (1985: xxxiv-v):

In the two editions of IFG edited by Matthiessen (2004, 2014), the word 'powerhouse' was added as an elaboration of the computer technology metaphor. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 22):

Grammar is the central processing unit of language, the powerhouse where meanings are created;

[2] This misleading, because it is untrue. The image of central processing unit is simply that of computer hardware performing functions; and the image of a powerhouse is a thing or person of great energy, strength or power.

But more importantly, an image 'of industrial production, of labour, of machines' is not Marxism. Such phenomena are data that can be analysed in terms of any socio-economic ideology.

[3] Following from the previous point, the mere exchange of commodities, information or goods-&-services, is not Marxism, as demonstrated by the exchange of Christmas greetings and presents.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. The relation between base and superstructure in Marxian theory is one of extension (composition) at the same level of symbolic abstraction. The relation between grammar and semantics, on the other hand, is one of elaboration at different levels of symbolic abstraction. That is, base does not symbolise superstructure, but grammar does symbolise semantics.

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's Distinction Between Value And Meaning

David Rose wrote to Kieran McGillicuddy on sys-func on 30 May 2022 at 17:34:

I too have wondered about this for 30 odd years since MAKH proposed this thumbnail phylogenesis of complexity.

But chatting with a colleague recently about MAKH’s Marxism it hit me that his social value/semiotic meaning contrast is just good traditional Marxist theory, contrasting material base and superstructure. It also helps to explain why ‘situation’ is contrasted with ‘text’ in his model from 1961 onwards.

Perhaps ironically, Marx’s whole theory of value is (I reckon) a semiotic theory of social relations, that demolishes the exploiters’ biological one.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Halliday's linear taxonomy of systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 507):

We are treating language as a semiotic system, and it may be helpful to locate this concept within the context of the history of ideas, albeit in a very sketchy fashion. As we conceive of it, the term "semiotic" is framed within a linear taxonomy of "physical — biological — social — semiotic"; and the term "system" is a shortened form of "system-&-process"…

[2] To be clear, Halliday's "social value/semiotic meaning contrast" is not the Marxian contrast between material base and superstructure. Halliday's distinction is between value (social systems) and symbolic value (semiotic systems). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

… a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value"… . A [social] semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. Meaning can only be construed symbolically, because it is intrinsically paradigmatic, as Saussure understood and built in to his own definition of valeur. Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.

Halliday's example of a social system organised by the exchange of value, but not symbolic value, is a eusocial insect colony.

In stark contrast, in Marxian theory, material base refers to the production forces, or the materials and resources, that generate the goods (human) society needs, and superstructure describes all other aspects of (human) society.

[4] To be clear, in Halliday (1961), 'text' means observed language events, whereas 'situation' means the nonlinguistic context in which language operates. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 38-9):

The data to be accounted for are observed language events, observed as spoken or as codified in writing, any corpus of which, when used as material for linguistic description, is a “text”.

…non-linguistic features of the situations in which language operates…

Importantly, Halliday's distinction between text and situation is not explained by the Marxian distinction between material base and superstructure. It is merely the distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic: between an instance of language (text) and an instance of culture (situation).

[5] To be clear, semiotic and biological explanations of (human) social relations are complementary perspectives, neither of which, therefore, can "demolish" the other. On the other hand, the unique identification of a biological approach with "exploiters" requires clarification, evidence and supporting argument.

David Rose On Ontogenesis And Stratification

David Rose wrote to David Kellogg on sys-func on 27 May 2022 at 7:00:

Where Halliday in the 1970s saw grammar emerging ontogenetically between phonology and semantics, with the appearance of metafunctions, another perspective has the content plane bifurcating into LG and DS to enable extended exchanges.

Rose, D. (2006). A systemic functional approach to language evolution. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 16(1), 73-96.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday (1975), in ontogenesis a child moves from a two-level system to a three-level system, where lexicogrammar "interpolates" between meaning and sounding, and it is this that creates the semantics and phonology of language. Halliday (2004 [1975]: 28):

The paper suggests a sociosemantic interpretation of language development, based on the intensive study of one child, Nigel, from 9 months to 21/2 years. Nigel first developed (Phase I) a two-level system, having sounds and meanings but no words or structures, in which the meanings derived from the elementary social functions of interaction with others, satisfaction of needs and the like. This continued to expand for six to nine months, at which time the child entered the stage of transition to the adult language (Phase 11, corresponding to what is generally taken as the starting-point). This was characterised by the interpolation of a lexicogrammatical level between meaning and sound, and by the mastery of the principle of dialogue, the adoption and assignment of speech roles. It was also marked by a generalisation of the initial set of social functions to form a basic opposition between “language as learning” and “language as doing”.

The transition was considered complete when the child had effectively replaced his original two-level system by a three-level one and moved horn monologue into dialogue; he then entered the adult system (Phase 111). He could now build up the meaning potential of the adult language, and would continue to do so all his life.

[2] This is seriously misleading. The false implication here is that "extended exchanges" are not already a feature of Halliday's model. This is countered by the quote above. This also relates to Martin's conceit that only his model accounts for 'meaning beyond the clause'. In fact, for Halliday, 'meaning beyond the clause' is realised by the systems of cohesion, and it is these grammatical systems that Martin (1992) misunderstands and rebrands as his own systems of discourse semantics. The evidence for this conclusion is presented here.

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Realisation, Instantiation And Individuation

David Rose wrote to David Kellogg on sys-func on 27 May 2022 at 7:00:

 ... further from

Martin, J. R. (2009). Realisation, instantiation and individuation: some thoughts on identity in youth justice conferencing. DELTA: Documentação de Estudos em Lingüística Teórica e Aplicada, 25, 549-583. 

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's Figura 13 above is almost identical to a Figure 5 in an earlier publication that was previously examined here. The only difference is the addition of the terms logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis in Figura 13.

Consequently, the theoretical inconsistencies previously identified in Martin's Figure 5 also apply to Figura 13.

Firstly, it presents instantiation and individuation as if they were internal dimensions of meaning potential like stratification. However, the clines of instantiation and individuation model different perspectives on meaning potential as a whole, rather than scales within meaning potential.

Secondly, it misrepresents text as an instance of context (culture) as well as language. In SFL Theory, it is situation that is an instance of context. This relates to Martin's misunderstanding of context as varieties of language, genre and register (which accounts for the superfluous stratum in the figure).

Thirdly, by its vertical dimension, it misrepresents the cline of individuation as applying to text as well as potential. This makes the nonsensical claim that every text is common to all language users, varying according to user.

To these inconsistencies can be added a further theoretical inconsistency created by Martin's inclusion of the terms logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis in Figura 13. This inclusion has the effect of setting up the following proportionalities:

instantiation : logogenesis ::

individuation : ontogenesis ::

realisation : phylogenesis

Now, while the instantiation of the system in text occurs in logogenesis, and the individuation of the system occurs in ontogenesis, the realisation of the system does not occur in phylogenesis. The fundamental inconsistency here derives from the fact that realisation is an internal dimension of the system, whereas instantiation and individuation are perspectival clines on the system as a whole.

David Rose On Jim Martin's 'All Strata Individuate' And 'All Strata Instantiate'

David Rose wrote to David Kellogg on sys-func on 27 May 2022 at 7:00:

Re your desire for ‘yet another dimension--the ontogenetic’, all strata also individuate!

and to Lexie Don on 28 May 2022 at 12:55:

A text instantiates systems in all strata

Systems in all strata instantiate as text

Repertoires individuate reservoirs in all strata

Reservoirs in all strata individuate as repertoires

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'all strata X' is the formula that Martin uses in trying to understand the architecture of SFL Theory:

• 'all strata make meaning' is his attempt to understand stratification;
• 'all strata instantiate' is his attempt to understand instantiation; and
• 'all strata individuate' is his attempt to understand individuation.

The first of these confuses semogenesis (making meaning) with stratification (meaning realised by the realisation of wording in sounding/writing).

The second of these misunderstands the attributive relation between system and instance as something that strata do.

The third of these misunderstands the relation between some unspecified collective meaning potential (reservoir) and an individual meaning potential (repertoire) as something that strata do.

[2] To be clear, in Martin's model, which Rose is here promoting, varieties of language, genres and registers, are context as opposed to language when stratified, but return to language when instantiated, since text is an instance of language, not context. In some academic fields, such self-contradictions would be sufficient grounds to invalidate the model.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands individuation as something that repertoires do to reservoirs, which contradicts the previous misunderstanding of individuation as something strata do. To the extent that the process of individuation is the development of an individual repertoire of meaning potential, the relation between this and a collective reservoir of meaning potential is created by ontogenesis. In Rose's terms, it is ontogenesis that individuates (meaning potential).

[4] To be clear, this contradicts the previous two misunderstandings by misunderstanding individuation as something that reservoirs do. See [3] above.

David Rose On 'Affect' As Exclusively Discourse Semantic

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 26 May at 14:42:

Check out Clare Painter’s work on interpersonal lg development, from a discourse semantic perspective 

http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/textspecial/painter-ontogenic.pdf 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, in the above cited paper, Clare Painter applies the notion of AFFECT to human protolanguage. The fact that this is possible demonstrates that such a system is not even restricted to language, let alone discourse semantics. The semantics of human language is but one manifestation of a basic distinction that precedes and transcends language: inclination (attraction) vs disinclination (aversion).

Most fundamentally, this distinction is a feature of perceptual semiotic systems. On Edelman's model of brain function, the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, the experience of an animal is perceptually categorised on the basis of inherited values that have proved adaptive to its ancestors, such as the positive or negative value of the perception of a light source. So, depending on the inherited value, an animal will be inclined to ("like") or disinclined to ("dislike") a perceived light source, and its (non-semiotic) behaviour accordingly satisfies the specific value in its perceptual system.

Further, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in non-semiotic social systems — on Halliday's linear taxonomy of systems (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 507-9) — such as those of eusocial insects: bees, ants and termites. In such cases, the context-specific exchange of (perceptual) like vs dislike values, via pheromones, is a means of co-ordinating behaviour, and so is a means of social organisation.

Furthermore, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in social semiotic systems, such as the protolanguage of social semiotic species, including humans, in giving positive or negative value to the symbols being exchanged.

The like/dislike distinction in human language, then, is just the latest manifestation of a more general phenomenon. Its application to human protolanguage, therefore, is not taking a specifically discourse semantic perspective.

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Instantiation And Stratification

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 24 may 2022 at 18:56:

All strata instantiate!

Martin, J. R. (2009). Realisation, instantiation and individuation: some thoughts on identity in youth justice conferencing. DELTA: Documentação de Estudos em Lingüística Teórica e Aplicada, 25, 549-583.

Martin, J. R. (2010). Semantic variation: Modelling realisation, instantiation and individuation in social semiosis. New discourse on language: Functional perspectives on multimodality, identity, and affiliation, 1, 34.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, instantiation is the relation of system to instance. The process of instantiation is the selection of features, and the activation of realisation statements, in logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[2] To be clear, Martin's Figure 3 misunderstands the cline of instantiation in three ways. Firstly, in misrepresenting the cline as a hierarchy of generality, it blurs the distinction between delicacy (type of x) and instantiation (token of x). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 15):

Note that it is important to keep delicacy and instantiation distinct. … The difference is essentially that between being a type of x (delicacy) and being a token of x (instantiation). Both may be construed by intensive ascription.

Secondly, it misrepresents different perspectives on the same scale of diatypic variation, genre/register and text type, as different points on the cline. To be clear, register is diatypic variation viewed from the system pole of the cline, whereas text type, and genre in this sense, is diatypic variation viewed from the instance pole of the cline.

Thirdly, it misconstrues reading variation as instantial of text variation. Importantly, a reading is not an instance of a text, because, viewed from the system pole, a reading is not a subpotential of a text, and viewed from the instance pole, a text is not a 'reading type'.

[3] To be clear, Figure 4 presents Martin's misunderstanding of stratification. Put most succinctly, Martin mistakes the content plane of Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic for the entire connotative semiotic, and fills his connotative with varieties of a denotative semiotic: register and genre. 

That is, Martin misconstrues functional varieties of language as the context of language, and thereby distinguishes varieties of language from language. (This is analogous to distinguishing functional varieties of cattle — dairy, beef — from cattle.)

However, this distinction is contradicted in Figure 4, where the two systems of context, genre and register, are nevertheless both instantiated as text, an instance of language. (Figure 4 conceals this self-contradiction by not labelling genre and register as context.)

Martin's model becomes more explicitly nonsensical when the instantiation clines of genre and register in Figure 4 are filled out in the detail provided in Figure 3, yielding:

• genre system >> genre/register of genre >> text type of genre …
• register system >> genre/register of register >> text type of register …

In sharp contrast, Halliday (2005 [1995]: 254) provides the original coherent model:

David Rose On Hjelmslev's Connotative And Denotative Semiotics

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 21 March 2022 at 1:48 pm:

The beauty of Hjelmslev’s interpretation is that ‘context’ can be described as a connotative semiotic (i.e. as systems of meanings), using the theoretical tools developed in SFL for describing language. This has enabled the description of field, tenor and mode as semiotic systems, whose options are configured (more abstractly) by selections in genre systems, and are realised by semiotic systems of language and other modalities. In Hjelmslev’s model the latter are denotative semiotics, as their expression planes are not separate semiotics (e.g. phonology in language). In contrast, connotative semiotics (e.g. genre and register) have other semiotics as their expression plane (e.g. language, image etc).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Hjelmslev (1969 [1943]: 114) actually says is:

In the last section, despite a considerable broadening of the perspective, we have still acted as if the unique object of linguistic theory were the denotative semiotic, by which we mean a semiotic none of whose planes is a semiotic. It still remains, through a final broadening of our horizon, to indicate that there are also semiotics whose expression plane is a semiotic — and semiotics whose content plane is a semiotic. The former we shall call connotative semiotics, the latter metasemiotics.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. As the quote above makes plain, it is not just context that constitutes a connotative semiotic, but both context (content plane) and language (expression plane).

[3] To be clear, this is Martin's model of context, which mistakes varieties of a denotative semiotic (register and genre) for connotative semiotics (misunderstood as context only).

[4] This misunderstands Hjelmslev's notion of a denotative semiotic. As the quote above makes plain, a denotative semiotic is a semiotic where neither the content nor expression plane is itself a semiotic (i.e. stratified into content and expression).

[5] To be clear, this confuses variety with stratification. Genre and register are varieties of language, and as such, are at the same level of symbolic abstraction as language, not a higher level that is realised by language. Because both genre and register are at the same symbolic level as language, neither conforms to Hjelmslev's notion of the content plane of a connotative semiotic.

∞

Summary of Rose's misunderstandings of Hjelmslev:

David Rose On Voice And Notional Reasoning

David Rose replied to David Banks on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 22:20:

… ‘reversible’ means operative/receptive:

[identifying] ‘a happy mother is made by a happy baby’

[attributive] ‘a mother is happy’/*’happy is a mother’ (except poetically)

‘Notional reasoning’ here means deriving grammatical categories from lexical notions. …

and to Tom Bartlett on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 22:43:

… Features like [identifying] and [attributive] are defined in relation to each other (eg by your examples), not by dictionary-like glosses. Notional reasoning imagines such glosses.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the agnation here is in terms of thematicity, not voice. What Rose presents as the poetic 'receptive voice' agnate is actually a 'marked thematicity' agnate:

Even in assigned attributive clauses, which do admit a voice contrast, Attribute can never conflate with Subject:

[2] This misunderstands the meaning of 'notional reasoning'. In grammatical analysis, 'notional reasoning' means arguing for a analysis solely on the basis of the meanings being construed, without grounding the analysis in the lexicogrammatical systems of the wording, as exemplified by the previous two posts by David Banks. As Halliday (1985: xx) explains:

If we simply took account of differences in meaning, then any set of clauses or phrases could be analysed in all kinds of different ways; there would be no way of preferring one scheme over another. The fact that it is a 'functional' grammar means that it is based on meaning; but the fact that it is a 'grammar' means that it is an interpretation of linguistic forms. Every distinction that is recognised in the grammar — every set of options, or 'system' in systemic terms — makes some contribution to the form of the wording.

David Banks On Process Type Criteria

David Banks replied to David Rose on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 20:40:

With all due respect:

A happy baby makes a happy mother.

You say this must be identifying, so the baby and the mother refer to the same entity - that can't be right.

It's simple present — I see no reason why a simple present cannot be material: physical actions are material whether they are habitual or not.

"'I walk on the beach every day".

And you say it's reversible: this is perhaps true in the pragmatic sense that if the mother is happy the baby probably will be too, but that's not what the clause says, and "A happy mother makes a happy baby" is not the same thing as "A happy baby makes a happy mother". What about 

"A sunny day makes a happy tourist"?

What have I missed?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 276):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, some thing has an identity assigned to it. What this means is that one entity is being used to identify another: ‘x is identified by a’, or ‘a serves to define the identity of x’. Structurally we label the x-element, that which is to be identified, as the Identified, and the a-element, that which serves as identity, as the Identifier.

Cf. the identifying clauses:

• Peter owns the house and 
• asbestos dust causes mesothelioma

[2] This misses the point. It is not a question of whether or not the simple present tense can be used in material clauses, but whether or not it is the marked or unmarked option. Because the simple present tense is the marked option for material clauses, but the unmarked option for relational clauses, it is one diagnostic tool for distinguishing these two process types.

[3] To be clear, the 'reversibility' is one of voice:

• A happy baby makes ('produces') a happy mother [operative]
• A happy mother is made ('produced') by a happy baby [receptive]

and it distinguishes (reversible) identifying relational clauses from (non-reversible) attributive relational clauses. 

[4] See above.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Meaning

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote to SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 16:00:

Right, so here’s where I’d like to push us to think beyond clause constituents and up to circumstantial meaning, which can be realised a cross a range of grammatical structures. For example:

On the table (circumstance location place) there is a book

The book on the table (Qualifier) is mine

The book is on the table (Participant in relational clause – not going to argue about which)

How does one explain how this meaning can move around like this? By thinking of it as more than a clausal constituent. 

H&M and JRM point to this in different places but Jing Hao I have a paper on this if anyone is interested. 

It makes SO much more sense to think like this (sorry if that’s notional Jim) and helps students NOT make the errors of analysing beta enhancing clauses (eg when the book was on the table, I spilt my tea on it) and Qualifiers etc as Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does far more than merely "point" to this — it is his model. Circumstantiation constitutes one domain of manifestation of the transphenomenal fractal types of expansion and projection — transphenomenal because they operate across various categories of phenomena, and fractal because they are organising principles across different scales; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268).

That is, the meanings that are realised as circumstances are also realised across a range of other grammatical domains, as outlined by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-3), who exemplify this for 'cause' as follows:

[2] To be clear, this type of variation can be explained by the fact that a prepositional phrase that realises the meaning 'spatial location' can serve as a circumstance or circumstantial participant of a clause, or be rankshifted to serve as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

[3] To be clear, these types of student errors reflect an inability to analyse formal constituency, since:

• mistaking a β clause for a circumstance is mistaking a clause for a prepositional phrase, and
• mistaking a Qualifier for a circumstance is mistaking a rankshifted prepositional phrase for a ranking one.

David Rose On Ideational Metaphor

David Rose wrote to Johanna Salomonsson on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 09:52:

My apologies, I missed this example, "A happy baby makes a happy mother" 

This can only be identifying, as it is simple present (so not material) and reversible (so not attributive). 

It seems odd because of the ‘cause-in-the-clause’ logical metaphor (‘if a baby is happy, then a mother is happy’). The identifying grammatical meaning is in tension with a consequential discourse semantic meaning. 

A fuller account would ask the function of the metaphor in the discourse sequence. The consequential meaning is a link in a chain of reasoning. The identifying meaning is non-negotiable. It reads like a wise old proverb. 

The sequence as a whole realises the ‘grounds’ for a proposal at register level...

Grounds...

Your child will thrive on Glaxo

when all else fails

because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

(now we all know) A happy baby makes a happy mother

(so) Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

Conclusion...

(You should buy Glaxo)

(Another point for your readers – realisation between strata)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose didn't "miss" the example, he misanalysed it as an assigned attributive clause, as his own words make plain:

your second examples are caused attributive relations, in which Attributor is additional Agent from ergative perspective

[2] This misunderstands the grammatical metaphor. This instance is not a contrast between 'identifying grammatical meaning' and 'consequential semantic meaning', not least because both the identifying relation and the cause-conditional relation feature on both strata. 

Grammatically the cause-conditional relation is construed metaphorically as a Process of an identifying clause, instead of congruently as a relator of clauses in a clause complex.

Semantically, the clause both congruently realises an identifying figure of being and incongruently realises a sequence of figures in a cause-conditional relation. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243, 244, 272, 278, 283) on ideational metaphor as a 'junctional' construct.

[3] To be clear, Rose has here invented an imaginary text. The original query (here) presented three separate instances, with no suggestion that they formed a continuous text:

Your child will thrive on Glaxo when all else fails because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

A happy baby makes a happy mother

Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. The presence of a Mood element in this declarative clause opens it up for negotiation:

A happy baby makes a happy mother

— Yes, it does.

— No, it doesn't.

[5] To be clear, as explained elsewhere, Rose follows Martin in misunderstanding register as a stratum of context rather than a sub-potential of language. In Martin's model, functional varieties of language are not considered language, which is analogous to functional varieties of dog — cattle dog, sheep dog — not being regarded as dogs.

David Rose On The Realisation Of Process Type

David Rose replied to Johanna Salomonsson on Sysfling on 4 Mar 2022, at 09:58:

Two points about SFL that could help your readers…  

1. It differs from traditional grammars that gloss each word and morpheme. In SFL, process type is a clause rank system realised by relations between lower rank units, such as verbs. The whole clause is material or relational. (This is sometimes confused by labelling verbal groups as process types.)

2. Analyses are multiperspectival. In Halliday’s model, process type is a transitive perspective on a clause, and the ergative perspective is complementary.

As you show, your second examples are caused attributive relations, in which Attributor is additional Agent from ergative perspective. The complementary perspectives help to show why clauses such as Tom’s ‘We painted the wall red’ look similar in agency, but differ in process type.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is nonsense. Systemically, PROCESS TYPE is a system of the clause, and a clause consists of groups, including the verbal group, each of which is the entry condition to its systems. Structurally, the Process of a clause is realised by a verbal group.

"Relations between verbs", on the other hand, refers to relations between lexical items, each item being specified by the most delicate lexicogrammatical features. Rose's misunderstanding, therefore, is that a grammatical system is realised by a lexical set.

[2] To be clear, what Rose refers to here is the widespread practice of classifying verbal groups in terms of  PROCESS TYPE, instead of considering the function of each group in a clause. 

But, on the other hand, 'Process' is the function label of a verbal group in a clause.

[3] To be clear, the "second examples" in the discussion were:

A happy baby makes a happy mother

Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

but only the second of these is an attributive clause with an Attributor. The first is an identifying clause, with no agency:

That is, the clause identifies a happy baby with a happy mother; it does not construe a happy baby as a member of the class a happy mother, as would an attributive clause.

This is a fact that escaped all interlocutors in this Sysfling discussion, including Jim Martin.

Postscript:

Ten hours after this post was published, David Rose correctly reanalysed the clause in question as identifying. See the next post.

David Banks On Process Types

After Wendy Bowcher wrote to SYSFLING on Thu, 3 Mar, 21:08:

I wonder if anyone can help out with the following:

(1) identifying what type of process 'thrive' is in the following clause. It seems to me to be Relational, but it's also kind of Material with a dash of Behavioural. :)I've given the clause within its cotext. And the clause comes from an historical advertisement.

"Your child will thrive on Glaxo when all else fails because it is a natural substitute for breast milk"

(2) And I just want to check the process type of 'make' in the following clauses - I have analysed these as Relational (attributive, intensive) ('cause to be something'), but I'm not 100% sure:

"A happy baby makes a happy mother"

"Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother"

David Banks replied to SYSFLING on Thu, 3 Mar, 21:16:

I would have no hesitation in analysing your first example (thrive) as material: it's about growing and increasing in good health, so about physical change. 

And I would have analysed your second example (make) as material too: it's causal, concerned with making the mother better, so again to do with physical change.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Transitivity analyses of these clauses are provided here.

[2] To be clear, 'physical change' is not an exclusive feature of material processes, as demonstrated by the attributive clause the baby turned into a pig. Halliday (1994: 120):

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 159-165) provide a helpful discussion on material doing and relational being as complementary perspectives on change; (op. cit.: 161):

David Rose On Axial Realisation, Metaredundancy And Connotative Semiotics

David Rose replied to David Kellogg on sys-func on 25 Jan 2022 at 17:51:10:

… SFL’s position is that a notion of ‘mind’ outside of meaning is misleading.

Solving the linguistic puzzle is not much helped by the short-hand formula ‘sounding realizes wording realizes meaning’, which foregrounds metaredundancy but elides the axial dimension of each stratum, that is central to SFL theory, along with rank. In fact, features in systems at each stratum are meaningful in relation to each other, realized axially by structures. So within lexicogrammar, structures of wordings already realize meanings of wordings (i.e. features in LG systems). Within discourse semantics, features in DS systems are realized by DS structures. The same holds for structures of soundings at the rank of tone group, but less obviously at ranks of foot and syllable.

Lemke’s point about metaredundancy was that these axial relations at each stratum are not isolated from each other, but constitute ‘patterns of patterns of patterns’ that conspire to realize unfolding meanings as text. 

Hjelmslev then allows us then to treat ‘context’ as connotative semiotic systems realized by denotative systems of language and other modalities. Not only is there no need for ‘mind’, but neither for ‘context’ outside of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the notion of 'mind' becomes unnecessary when biological, social and semiotic systems are brought into close relation. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 603):

These suggest that the concept of 'mind' should be brought into close relation with other phenomena — biological, social, or semiotic. … But once this has been done, the mind itself tends to disappear, it is no longer necessary as a construct sui generis. Instead of experience being construed by the mind, in the form of knowledge, we can say that experience is construed by the grammar; to 'know' something is to have transformed some portion of experience into meaning. To adopt this perspective is to theorise "cognitive processes" in terms of semiotic, social and biological systems; and thus to see them as a natural concomitant of the processes of evolution.

[2] To be clear, the short-hand formula 'sounding realises wording realises meaning' — which Kellogg did not use — does not foreground metaredundancy, because it ignores metaredundancy. As Halliday explains, metaredundancy is a 'redundancy of redundancies', which can be represented by bracketing: sounding realises (the realisation of meaning in wording).

[3] To be clear, Kellogg's "linguistic puzzle" is that posed by Halliday's application of metaredundancy to the realisation relation between strata. That is why metaredundancy is rightly foregrounded by Kellogg, and why Rose's inclusion of axis and rank is irrelevant.

[4] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL theory. The relations of features to each other in systems are paradigmatic, and paradigmatic relations are not realised axially by syntagmatic structures. For example, within lexicogrammar, the disjunctive relation of the features [mental] and [existential] in the system of PROCESS TYPE is not realised by the structure of a clause.

[5] For some of the theoretical inconsistencies in the modelling of discourse semantic structures, see:

• here and here (English Text), and
• here (Working With Discourse).

[6] To be clear, the claim here is that the structures of soundings realise the meanings of soundings. This is a serious misunderstanding on two counts. Firstly, phonological structures (e.g. Pretonic^Tonic) do not realise relations between features in phonological systems (e.g. between [tone2] and [tone4]); see [4] above. 

Secondly, the meanings of soundings are located on the content plane, not on the expression plane, where phonological systems are located. This relates to Martin's misunderstanding of stratification, in which, from a statement of semogenesis 'all strata make meaning' he falsely concludes that all strata are meaning — including phonology!

[7] To be clear, the discussion was not concerned with "Lemke's point about metaredundancy" but with Halliday's application of Lemke's metaredundancy to the realisation relation between strata, to which the relation between axes is irrelevant.

More importantly, the view that Rose falsely attributes to Lemke is theoretical nonsense. For example, Rose claims that the relation between system and structure, on all strata, together "conspire to realise" text during logogenesis.

To translate this into coherent SFL Theory: the instantiation of the system during logogenesis involves the selection of features and the activation of realisation statements that specify structures. The different strata on which this occurs are different levels of symbolic abstraction; different angles on the process of instantiation.

Most importantly, Rose follows Martin in confusing metaredundancy with the cline of instantiation. In SFL Theory, 'pattern' refers to a pattern of instantiation in the logogenesis of a text; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 593ff). A pattern of such patterns is what some texts may have in common, so it represents a move up the cline of instantiation from text to text type.

Metaredundancy, on the other hand, is not a patterns of patterns. It is, for example, the realisation of a semantic pattern by the realisation of lexicogrammatical pattern in a phonological pattern.

[8] To be clear, here Rose again repeats Martin's misunderstanding of Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic system. For Hjelmslev, a connotative semiotic is one that has a denotative semiotic system as its expression plane. Applied to the stratificational hierarchy of SFL Theory, a connotative semiotic consists of context with language as its expression plane. Martin misconstrues a connotative semiotic as just its content plane, his context, and compounds the error by locating varieties of a denotative semiotic, register and genre, in his connotative semiotic.

[9] To be clear, these are non-sequiturs, since neither claim has been supported by argument in the preceding text. Moreover, since 'context' is meaning construed of experience, the notion of context being outside meaning is, in any case, nonsensical.

However, it is likely that Rose meant that there is no need for a material order context, given that he follows Martin in miscontruing context as varieties of language, genre and register, which they model as semiotic but not language. The problem here, though, is that it removes the possibility of exophoric reference to the material order in both cohesive REFERENCE (Halliday & Hasan 1976) and Martin's rebranding of it as discourse semantic IDENTIFICATION. For example, the exophoric reference of this laptop computer is not to either register or genre, but to the material order in which this post is being typed.

∞

It can be seen from the above that it takes an enormous amount of work to demonstrate that Rose does not understand SFL Theory. His ability to pack so many misunderstandings into so few words still astonishes me.

David Rose Repeating Jim Martin's Misunderstanding Of Hjelmslev's Connotative Semiotic

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 2 Dec 2021, at 09:56:

If formal logic is derived from ‘natural' logic of language, then this kind of symbolism may be useful for a ’natural’ philosophy of language. It frees us to re-interpret choices we are given, beyond simply either/or. Are simultaneous choices possible? Are there more general or more delicate choices we can make?

For example, if we choose the metalinguistic feature [functional], then [systemic], must we then choose between lexicogrammatical or discourse semantic analysis, or are both possible? If we choose a [solidary] relation between language and social context, must we choose between a denotative or connotative perspective, or are both possible?

Selections from these metalinguistic systems are continually instantiated as linguistic fields unfold, and always couple features from both field and tenor systems. As with language systems, 'users share attitude and ideation couplings…to form bonds’ , to affiliate with one or another group (or both:)…

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the choice of stratum for analysis is a choice of level of symbolic abstraction: wording (lexicogrammar) or meaning (semantics). But as Halliday (1985: xvii) points out:

A text is a semantic unit, not a grammatical one. But meanings are realised through wordings; and without a theory of wordings — that is, a grammar — there is no way of making explicit one's interpretation of the meaning of a text.

Martin's discourse semantics, however, is another matter entirely. For evidence that the model of discourse semantics is, inter alia, rebrandings of Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday & Hasan's COHESION (textual lexicogrammar) and Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION (interpersonal semantics) see the close examination of English Text (Martin 1992) here, and the close examination of Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) here.

Importantly, in SFL Theory, lexicogrammar is interpreted in terms of the meaning it realises — e.g. verbal group as Process — and in the absence of grammatical metaphor, lexicogrammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) are in agreement (congruent). Martin's discourse semantics, however, as a rebranding of COHESION, cannot provide a congruent relation between wording and meaning, because it actually models textual lexicogrammar rather than multifunctional semantics. This, in turn, undermines the systematic description of grammatical metaphor: the incongruent relation between wording and meaning.

[2] To be clear, 'solidary' is Martin's term — taken from Barthes (1977: 101) — for what he claims (1992: 20) is the 'natural' relation between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar. (The word 'solidary' actually means of a group or community: characterised by solidarity or coincidence of interests.)

However, in SFL Theory, the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar actually refers to the non-arbitrary relation between experiential meanings and grammatical form, such as that between process and verbal group, participant and nominal group, circumstance and adverbial group. It is this natural relation that makes a functional grammar possible. See Halliday (1985: xvii-xx).

Here Rose applies 'solidary' to the relation between language and social context, where social context is misunderstood, in Martin's model, as varieties of language (register and genre). The reader is invited to identify a linguistic theory that models the relation between language and context, whether understood as culture, or misunderstood as varieties of language, as 'unnatural'. 

[3] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Martin's stratified model, which identifies the context plane with a connotative semiotic system and the language plane with a denotative semiotic system. However, this is a serious misunderstanding of Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic, which Martin (1992: 493) claims to be using.

Importantly, for Hjelmslev, a connotative semiotic is a semiotic system that has a denotative semiotic system as its expression plane. Martin (1992), however, misunderstands the connotative semiotic to be merely its content plane, context, excluding its expression plane: language. 

Moreover, Martin compounds the error by locating register and genre, varieties of language, a denotative semiotic — the expression plane of the connotative semiotic — in the content plane of the connotative semiotic. That is, in Martin's stratification hierarchy, varieties of language are not modelled as language. This is analogous to claiming that varieties of dog — terriers, poodles etc. — are not dogs.

[4] To be clear, what Rose refers to as 'metalinguistic systems' are systems that classify linguistic theories. In SFL Theory, these are systems whose entry condition is the FIELD feature 'linguistics', where 'field' means the ideational dimension of context; that is: the culture as semiotic system. Rose, on the other hand, follows Martin in misunderstanding FIELD as a system of register. In SFL Theory, register is a subpotential of language, not a system of context.

[5] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the claim here is that selections from linguistic FIELD systems ("metalinguistic systems") are continually instantiated as linguistic fields unfold. Firstly, this misunderstands instantiation. Selections from systems are not instantiated; the selection of features is the instantiation.

Secondly, there is no "continual" instantiation of FIELD system features. The instantiation of the context of culture as a context of situation is the selection of a specific configuration of FIELD, TENOR and MODE system features. If a different FIELD system feature is selected, a different context is instantiated.

Rose's misunderstanding here derives from the misunderstanding of field in Martin's model. Although, Martin misunderstands field as a dimension of register, he further compounds the problem by confusing field with ideational semantics; see the evidence here. So, from the perspective of SFL Theory, what Rose is actually concerned with here is the instantiation of ideational semantic features in the logogenesis of a text.

[6] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the claim here is that selections from linguistic FIELD systems ("metalinguistic systems") always couple features from both field and tenor systems. Clearly, this is incoherent when expressed this way, since it is not the selection of FIELD features that causes the "coupling" (co-selection of features across FIELD and TENOR systems). More coherently, any situation involves the instantiation of a configuration of contextual features (from the systems of FIELD, TENOR and MODE).

[7] To be clear, this bears no relation to any of the text that precedes it. The terms 'coupling', 'bonding' and 'affiliation' are from Martin and his students, and the unremarkable claim here is simply that people form social alliances on the basis of shared values. The same might be said of social insects; see also:

David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic

David Rose Positively Judging Jim Martin's Empire Building.