Monday, 25 May 2015

Pageviews by Countries

Graph of most popular countries among blog viewers
EntryPageviews
United States
12164
Australia
4756
United Kingdom
2796
Russia
1924
France
1154
China
948
Germany
706
Ukraine
663
Canada
232
Latvia
209

Tuesday, 7 April 2015

David Rose On The Relations Between Grammar, Semantics and Text

That said, there is an interesting ambivalence in recent IFG editions about the relations between grammar, semantics and text, both realisational and instantial. … 
In fact IFG explicitly models ‘text’ both as the unit of analysis of the semantic stratum, consistent with discourse semantic theory, and as instantiating grammatical systems. It also discusses domains of instantiation of semantic systems as stretches of discourse, also consistent with discourse semantic theory. What it doesn’t admit is the discourse semantic systems described in English Text, Working with Discourse, and a considerable body of other scholarly work. 
My own view is that this omission has as much to do with personal institutional politics within the SFL leadership, as it does with the relative merits of the theory.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] In SFL, the word 'text' is used to refer to the highest semantic unit and to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.  Its valeur depends on what it is contrasted with.  It is misleading to call this 'ambivalence', which means:
  • uncertainty or fluctuation, especially when caused by inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two opposite or conflicting things.
[2] The notion of text as a semantic unit was imported, unaltered, by Martin into 'discourse semantic theory' from Halliday's Systemic Functional linguistics; hence the "consistency".

[3] Each text is an instance of systemic potential — whatever the linguistic stratum; just as, above the linguistic strata, at the level of context, situation is an instance of culture.

[4] IFG (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), as the name suggests, is an introduction to functional grammar, not 'discourse semantic systems'.  Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 550-1):
for a systemic description of this [cohesive reference] as a semantic system, see Martin (1992).
Martin's English Text and Martin and Rose's Working With Discourse and 'a considerable body of other scholarly work' are also listed in the References.  

Considering how inconsistent 'discourse semantic theory' is with the core architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistics (e.g stratification and metafunction), its citing in IFG is an act of great generosity, especially in face of bullying insults, such as those of Rose quoted above (appraisal analysis here).

For a rigorous assessment of the "relative merits" of 'discourse semantic theory', including the degree to which it is consistent with (a sound knowledge of) Systemic Functional linguistic theory, see here.

Monday, 6 April 2015

David Rose On 'Semantics Instantiating Grammar'

The main problem with your argument is that it hinges on this partial quoting of me
in (b), semantics is 'merely instantiating grammar systems in text’
This section of my analysis actually discussed ‘discourse semantic systems’ not ‘semantics'
The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal 
In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions, in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata

Blogger Comments:

[1] Semantics does not instantiate grammar, regardless of whether Rose is discussing semantics or 'discourse semantic systems'.  Instantiation is the relation between system and instance, not the relation between strata, such as semantics and grammar.

Using the verb 'instantiate' is problematic, because it does not serve as an attributive Process, and instantiation is an attributive relation.  Rose's use of the verb results in a construal of discourse semantic systems as less abstract, a lower stratum, than grammar systems:


discourse semantic systems
merely
instantiate
grammar systems
in texts
Token

Process: identifying
Value
Location


[2] The 'discourse semantic systems' conjunction and ideation are Martin's (1992) rebranding of two of Halliday's lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion: conjunction and lexical cohesion (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 524ff).  Martin took Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical systems and reconstrued them as ideational systems — conjunction is logical, ideation is experiential — on a higher stratum of content.  Doing so violated the meaning of both stratification and metafunction.

[3] Appraisal is a genuine interpersonal semantic system realised in, and construed by, the lexicogrammar.  Viewed from below, it lies within evaluation, between grammar and lexis.  Halliday (2008: 49):
With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”) or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated options within the general region of evaluation.

Sunday, 5 April 2015

Tom Bartlett On Function And Structure

The comment you pick up on (and run with, if I may say so...) simply made the point that the two because stretches in the speech  [the one a phrase, the other a clause] perform a similar function with regard to the utterance as a whole in providing alternative causes for the event described and this is why they can coordinate despite their different structures (and the different kinds of meanings these structures construe as structures). As far as models are concerned, there is nothing in what I said that posits a stratal rather than realisational relationship between function and structure;


Blogger Comments:

There are several interwoven confusions here.

There is no realisational relation between function and structure.
There is no stratal relation between function and structure.
The stratal relation is one of realisation.

There is a realisational relation between strata; e.g. the lower stratum of content realises the higher stratum of content.

There is a realisational relation between system and structure; this is the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.

There is a realisational relation between function structure at a higher rank and the syntagms (forms) of the lower rank, as when a Process (clause rank) is realised by a verbal group complex (group rank).

What Bartlett said construes two levels of symbolic abstraction on the content plane, two strata related by realisation, even though the technical terms he uses — "stretches of speech" and "the utterance as a whole" — construes them as if in a part-whole relation.

It is this stratal relation that allows us to speak of the same meaning (semantics) being realised by different wordings (lexicogrammar), as when the meaning 'cause' is variously realised as a dependent clause or as a prepositional phrase.

Saturday, 4 April 2015

David Rose On Grammatical Metaphor As Stratal Tension

Another thing that’s interesting in both the ‘re-mapping’ and ‘stratal tension’ models, is the role of lexis. For example, in IFG 10.5.2 there are many examples of ideational metaphors ‘unpacked’ to congruent clause complexes. Like Obama's example…
America has carried on | Circ:cause not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office
-> America has carried on || not simply because those in high office are very able || or see clearly
Recognising lexical relations such as skill-able and vision-see is necessary to interpret the metaphors, but lexical relations tend to be backgrounded in discussions of grammatical metaphor. To me they indicate that discourse semantic systems like ideation are in tension with grammatical systems like transitivity. It is the lexical item ‘vision’ that construes the process of seeing, and ‘skill’ that construes the quality able, while the grammar construes them as possessions of those in high office.


Blogger Comments:

[1] Lexical relations are a resource of the textual metafunction (the text-forming resources), so it's hardly surprising they are "backgrounded" in discussions of ideational metaphor (incongruent construals of experience).

[2] The relation between lexical relations (cohesion: non-structural textual grammar) and transitivity (structural experiential grammar) is not one of 'stratal tension', since both are construals of the same stratum: lexicogrammar.

Regarding the rebranding of Halliday's cohesion as 'discourse semantics', I have just started a new blog called Discourse Semantic Theory (here) which demonstrates how and why 'discourse semantics' is inconsistent with the theoretical architecture of SFL.  This will be done by paying close attention to its major exposition, page by page, in Martin's English Text.

Friday, 3 April 2015

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Grammatical Metaphor

The models also differ in their treatment of grammatical metaphor
In c) as ‘stratal tension’ between discourse semantic and grammatical systems (both contributing to meaning of metaphors), so conjunction is realised congruently as clause complexity, and incongruently as transitivity or circumstantiation 
In b) as ‘re-mapping’ between semantic meanings and their grammatical realisations, prompting the treatment of an ideational metaphor as clause rank complexing (‘not simply because the vision…') 
In a) Tom’s comment suggests that the transferred meaning is treated as function, and the grammatical realisation as structure.

Blogger Comments:

Rose presents the difference between how Martin's derived model (c) and Halliday's original model (b) treat grammatical metaphor as a distinction between a 'stratal tension' and a 'remapping' between content strata, but since both involve the distinction between congruent and incongruent grammatical realisations of semantic features, 'stratal tension' is largely Martin's rebranding of Halliday's idea in less precise terms.  In this regard, there is the question of what a model of semantics needs to provide in order to be able to distinguish congruent from incongruent realisations in the grammar and whether the 'discourse semantics' model satisfies those requirements.

However, Rose implies, by inclusion vs omission, that it is only in Martin's derived model (c) that both strata contribute to the meaning of metaphors.  Of course, given that grammatical metaphor, like all semogenesis, involves a realisation relation between strata, it is nonsensical to say that one stratum does not "contribute".

More importantly, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 283) point out, the metaphorical form is junctional: it also embodies semantic features deriving from its own incongruent lexicogrammatical properties.  That is, grammatical metaphor is a means of simultaneously construing the meanings of both the congruent and incongruent grammatical realisations.

These two meanings are themselves in an elaborating token-value relation within the semantic stratum, with the metaphorical Token realising the congruent Value (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 288).

Thursday, 2 April 2015

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Discourse Semantic Systems

The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal
In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions
in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, and 
in c) they are distinct systems, where grammar and discourse both contribute to meaning


Blogger Comments:


[1] These 'discourse semantic' systems could easily be incorporated in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, as systems (functions) on the higher stratum of context, and as structures (forms) on the lower stratum.  Given that some of them derive from Halliday's grammatics (textual cohesion), this may already be the case. 

[2] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of instantiation with realisation (see elsewhere on this blog).  Semantic systems do not instantiate grammar systems ('in texts' or anywhere else).  Semantic systems are realised by lexicogrammatical systems.

Regarding the systems Rose mentions, while 'appraisal' is a genuine interpersonal semantic system, construed by the interpersonal grammar — the word 'discourse' is redundant — the others are a mixed bag. For example, Martin's logical 'discourse semantic' system of conjunction derives, at least in part, from Halliday's textual grammatical system of conjunction, and Martin's experiential 'discourse semantic' system of ideation derives both from Halliday's (non-structural) textual grammatical system of lexical cohesion and his (structural) experiential grammatical system of transitivity.

[3] As [2] indicates, integrating these diverse systems as Martin's 'discourse semantic' systems creates theoretical inconsistencies in terms of both metafunction and level of symbolic abstraction.

[4] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of semogenesis with stratification (see elsewhere on this blog).  All strata make meaning, in the sense of semogenesis, but stratification is a means of parcelling out the complexity of language as a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction, in which meaning (semantics) is realised by wording (lexicogrammar).  Does discourse "contribute" to meaning, or is it a semogenic process?

Wednesday, 1 April 2015

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Structure And Function

This pointed to some major theoretical differences between 3 SFL models (that "make different and often opposing assumptions”)
In model a) structure and function are treated stratally, structure as grammar and function as semantics 
In b) structure and function are treated by rank - grammatical structures realise functions at higher ranks, and semantics is the meanings realised by grammar 
In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata


Blogger Comments:

[1] The 3 SFL models that Rose has in mind are Halliday's original model (b), and two variations derived from it: Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar (a), and Martin's Discourse Semantics (c).


[2] 'Structure' and 'function' are each one half of two separate dichotomies, each involving the relation of 'realisation'.  On the one hand, 'structure' contrasts with 'system' — this is the relation between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes.

On the other hand, 'function' contrasts with 'form' — this is the relation of symbolic abstraction that obtains between strata, and, in the rank scale, between elements of function structure, such as Senser^Process, and syntagm that realises them, such as nominal group^verbal group.


[3] In Fawcett's derived model, content system and structure are distinguished stratally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):
In Fawcett’s model, there is only one system–structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a “realisational component” to form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically…

[4] In Halliday's original model, system and structure are modelled at both strata of the content plane.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):
…in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

[5] Grammatical 'structures' do not "realise higher rank structures".  Syntagms (forms) of a lower rank realise function structures of a higher rank.


[6] Rose's claim that only Martin's derived model posits "structure and function" on both content strata is demonstrably false.  For structure on both strata in the original model, see [4]; for function on both strata, consider, inter alia, the metafunctional organisation of both semantics and grammatics.

Tuesday, 31 March 2015

Tom Bartlett On Disjunct Choices

But my main point is that we shouldn't be surprised at this and we shouldn't base our objections on purely structural grounds. In our systems networks we have a disjunct choice at a node where a desiderative process can be followed by a Phenomenon (realised be an ngp) or can project an idea (realised by a TO-clause). As this is a single choice in functional terms, despite the different structural means of realisation of the potential choices, it should hardly be surprising that we could potentially have recursion and hence coordination here. Similarly, returning to Annabelle's original question, as we can add enhancing information to a clause either through a Circumstance or a subordinate clause it's hardly surprising that we can do both consecutively. Functional choice at a single rank, structural realisation at two. Tension. Living language.

Blogger Notes:

[1] "Our systems networks" presumably refers to Fawcett's derived 'Cardiff Grammar', because the disjunct choice Bartlett mentions is not a feature of Halliday's original model.  The choice of (insert) Phenomenon is a feature of mental clause systems (experiential metafunction) — see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 209) — whereas the choice of projecting an idea clause from a mental clause is a feature of logico-semantic systems (logical metafunction).

[2] Again, to say "this is a single choice in functional terms" is presenting Fawcett's derived 'Cardiff Grammar' model in which systems are located on a higher stratum of the content plane that structures. In Halliday's original model, semantic stratum choices can be realised by different lexicogrammatical stratum choices.

[3] Again, to say "functional choice at a single rank, structural realisation at two" is presenting  Fawcett's derived 'Cardiff Grammar' model in which systems are located on a higher stratum of the content plane that structures. In Halliday's original model, semantic stratum choices can be realised by different lexicogrammatical stratum choices.

I am not sure why you assume I am taking a Cardiff perspective.

Monday, 30 March 2015

Tom Bartlett Mistaking A Clause For A Clause Complex (inter alia)

Jing Fang - thanks very much for the grammatically reasoned response. I agree with your method but, at the risk of sounding pig-headed, I would say both the following sound absolutely fine to me (I'll also try and find corpus examples* before Aachen!):
All he wants in life is an enjoyable job and to earn a good wage.

What do you want in life? An enjoyable job and to earn a good wage.

The Google gods were smiling on me! I googled "all he wants is a" + "and to" and at the top of just page two I found:
All he wants is a bit of cover and to attack late.
(I will only accept adding "to have" if you ALWAYS analyse the structure this way, thereby eliminataing [sic] WANT + Phen altogether - which I think mirrors the Cardiff approach once again - Robin?).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Bartlett's two clauses are encoding identifying clauses in which the Token is realised by an extending nominal group complex involving a nominal group and a rankshifted clause functioning as nominal group.  They do not involve a logical relation across ranks between a nominal group and a ranking clause, as Bartlett seems to believe.  See analysis here.

[2] Here Bartlett presents himself — rather than the theory or logically valid reasoning — as the arbiter of theory-consistent  or otherwise arguable analyses.

[3] Bartlett's 'WANT + Phenomenon' analysis demonstrates that he has mistaken these identifying relational clauses for desiderative mental clauses.  The mental clause he wants (in life) is rankshifted and functioning as Qualifier in a nominal group all [[he wants (in life)]] functioning as Value.

[4] Adding "to have" and eliminating "want(s)" — there is no Phenomenon to eliminate — yields the nonsensical:
All he in life is to have an enjoyable job and to earn a good wage
All he is to have a bit of cover and to attack late 

Sunday, 29 March 2015

Tom Bartlett On Ellipsis And Paratactic Extension

1 Do you want this jacket
+ 2 or [do you want] to try another
This is a possibility, agreed. But in general, I'm very dubious about using ellipsis as a way of explaining coordination, especially if the posited ellipted material is substantial (as here). It begins to look very like underlying deep structure.... And it can be used to explain just about anything, not only troublesome examples. For example, why not analyse the following coordinations as ellipsis instead?
I saw Tom and Mary
I would like a bat and a ball.
I saw Tom and I saw Mary
I would like a bat and I would like a ball.
Why only invoke ellipsis when we are in theoretical trouble, as a kind of verbum ex machina? What Alice's alternative/agnate examples show, in my opinion, is the functional similarity between the two strings following "Do you want" - both encode a desired change of state. As either way [of] representing the change of state can structurally follow from "would you like" then the speaker can "choose" to coordinate them even though one option is an ngp and the other a to-clause. Got to trust the data!

Blogger Comments:

[1] Interpersonally, the clauses I saw Tom and Mary and I would like a bat and a ball each enact a single proposition, whereas the clause complexes I saw Tom and I saw Mary and I would like a bat and I would like a ball each enact two propositions.  Logically, the distinction is between two nominal groups related by paratactic extension, and two clauses related by paratactic extension.

[2] Ellipsis is not invoked to get out of theoretical trouble; it is a theoretical means of systematically explaining the textual choices that speakers and writers use in creating cohesion in their texts.

[3] A grammatical analysis of Bartlett's invented example Do you want this jacket or to try another? can be found here.  Both clauses can be interpreted as a material process, in which the Process is realised by a hypotactic verbal group complex of desiderative projection.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 515-9).

[4] Only forms of the same rank can be related tactically and logico-semantically.  A nominal group can only be related logically to a clause if the clause is rank-shifted so as to be functioning at group rank.

[5] Theorists encode the theory by reference to the data, and text analysts decode the data by reference to the theory.  In each case, the linguist is a cognitively projecting Assigner participating in an identifying process.  Trust, on the other hand, is a matter of faith.

Saturday, 28 March 2015

Tom Bartlett On Facts


Sorry David, 
You are confusing a projected clause and an embedded clause. Clauses with embedded facts can be prefaced by "the fact/idea that"; they are not Complements of verbal processes but of processes of affect:reaction and the like.

He regretted (the fact) that he had lied. [affective process and embedded clause as Complement]

and then on the sys-func and sysfling lists at 21:51:
It's actually slightly more complicated than in my last as "the fact that he had lied" is not an embedding either. In this case the clause "that he lied" is projected by "the fact/idea" which is the (ellipted) Complement of the process of affect etc. So in such processes the Complement is an ngp.  
In verbal processes with projections (cf. Verbiage), the projected clause is projected directly by the verb as process. In such processes there is not an ngp Complement.



Blogger Comments:

[1] 'Complement' is an interpersonal function, not an experiential one.  The experiential function that corresponds to Complement is Verbiage/Range in verbal clauses and Phenomenon/Range in mental clauses.

[2] In SFL, the term 'affect' is used for interpersonal meaning, as a type of Attitude, from Appraisal Theory.  The experiential function in Bartlett's clause is Process: mental: emotive.

[3] The fact that he lied is embedded — rankshifted — since it is a clause that functioning as an element of the structure of another clause He regretted (the fact) that he had lied.  See analysis here.

[4] Here Bartlett is confused by the distinction between fact nouns and projection nouns, discussed in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 468ff).

Friday, 27 March 2015

David Rose Mistaking A Locution For A Fact

Sorry Tom 
What’s coordinated in your example are two nominal groups, a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage 
What’s confusing is that one nominal group is an embedded clause 
Did he tell you / his real name or [[that he was called Hot Lover Boy?]]
Embedded facts can be found in section 7.5.7 of IFG 
The rank scale is a central component of systemic functional theory. Its description is developed throughout Chs 1 and 2 of IFG 
To help untangle these confusions see section 8.9 Logical organization: complexes at clause and group or phrase rank, and groups 
For the students
David


Blogger Comments:

[1] The projection that he was called Hot Lover Boy is not embedded, and so: not a fact, and not forming a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage.  See analysis here.  It does not come pre-projected, but is projected into semiotic existence by the clause did he tell you, just as in did he tell you that he was called Hot Lover Boy?, did he tell you that he tends to arrive early? etc.  If it were a fact, it would be possible to render it as did he tell you the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

Cf. fact as circumstance of Matter: did he tell you about the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

In a recent post — here — Rose made the opposite blunder, mistaking an embedded fact for a projected locution.

[2] Rose would do well to take his own advice and consult the references he provides for Bartlett so that he can 'read to learn' — "for the students".

Thursday, 26 March 2015

Tom Bartlett On Complexes

The following example clearly coordinates a nominal group with a clause, using SFL definitions:
Did he tell you his real name or that he was called Hot Lover Boy?
As a functional theory SFL needs to follow the data. And a functional theory should be able to handle the idea that similar functions (here Verbiage and projected clause as "information transmitted") are complexed even if they are structurally at different ranks.


Blogger Comments:

[1] Bartlett's example does not involve a relation of paratactic extension between a clause and a nominal group.  It is a clause complex in which a projecting verbal clause is omitted as a textual choice.  That is, the said clause complex is a textual agnate of 
Did he tell you his real name or did he tell you that he was called Hot Lover Boy? 
The agnates differ only textually — not experientially or interpersonally.  See analysis here.

For there to be a logical relation between a group and a clause, the clause would have to be rankshifted to group/phrase rank, in this case as an embedded fact, and the complex would realise an element of clause structure, in this case Verbiage.

[2] Theorists encode the theory by reference to the data, and text analysts decode the data by reference to the theory.  Following data can result in wild goose chases.

[3] Functions are not complexed — forms are.  That is, clauses, group/phrases and words form complexes, but a function such as Verbiage does not.  A function may be realised by a complex, as when Verbiage is realised by a nominal group complex, or when a Process is realised by a verbal group complex.

[4] The SFL term for clause projected by a verbal Process is a locution.

Wednesday, 25 March 2015

David Rose On "Register"

At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

[see grammatical analysis here.]




Now from register (axiologised field)… 
'America has carried on’ is the outcome of 2 factors ‘leading’ and ‘following’  
You may simply think leading is the main factor, but following may be more significant  
What is faithfully followed are the principles of the US constitution… ‘We the People’ implies principle of democracy  
But 'vision of those in high office’ and 'ideals of our forbears’ are co-classified, (vision for future, ideals from history) implying legitimate leadership 
All massively, tightly conspiring to legitimate the tangle of contradictions that is America in crisis


Blogger Comments:

[1] Given that registers are functional varieties of language, Rose says nothing here about this register differs from other registers.

[2] Even though field refers to the ideational dimension of context, 'what is going on' contextually, Rose in this section focuses on the language that realises the context, instead of focusing on the context itself.

[3] Here Rose totally misinterprets the context in which the language was spoken, mistaking the inauguration of a U.S. president for what he terms 'America in crisis'.

Tuesday, 24 March 2015

David Rose Misrepresenting Lexicogrammar As Discourse Semantics: Interpersonal Metafunction

At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

[see grammatical analysis here.]




Now from discourse semantics… 
4. interpersonally 
‘America’ and ‘We the People’ are modally responsible


Blogger Comments:

[1] The notion of the Subject as the modally responsible element is from the grammar, not discourse semantics.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 59):
A clause has meaning as an exchange, a transaction between speaker and listener; the Subject is the warranty of the exchange.  It is the element the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying.
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 194):
Thus while a Goal readily becomes Subject … it is unusual to make a Scope element ‘modally responsible’ in this way …