Thursday, 17 January 2019

Pageviews by Countries

Graph of most popular countries among blog viewers
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Germany
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China
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Ukraine
893
Brazil
758

Sunday, 18 November 2018

Christian Matthiessen On 'In Particular'

Can anyone help me out? …
8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

It’s not an Adjunct; it modifies “when”; cf.:
8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. ~ 
in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes,
8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
But if placed as if it were an Adjunct, it has a different sense, e.g.:
8(1) The Court shall, in particular, have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. ~
Or of course:
in particular, 8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. ~
So it modifies when, just as other adverbs such as particularly, exactly, just can do. This possibility is mentioned in IFG 4 p. 423, Section 6.2.3, but it’s very brief.


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the question here is one of constituency.  Is in particular a constituent of a clause, as Lukin assumes, or a constituent of a conjunction group, in particular when, as Matthiessen argues?

The instance in question involves two clauses:
  1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes 
  2. in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
(Cf. the exemplifying agnate: The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes for example when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes)

If in particular modifies when, then it cannot be moved around the clause, whereas if in particular is a constituent of the clause, it can be moved.  As the following agnates demonstrate, in particular can be moved around the clause, and so is a constituent of the clause, not a constituent of the conjunction group:
  • when, in particular, committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes
  • when committedin particular, as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes
  • when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular
The flaw in Matthiessen's argument is that, although he locates in particular in the second clause (modifying when), his argument against it being a clause constituent assumes that it is part of the first clause.

Saturday, 17 November 2018

Jim Martin On 'In Particular'

Can anyone help me out? …
8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

How about appraisal:graduation:focus:sharpen... as part of a paradigm:
in particular when
particularly when
just when
only when
when
  • The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
  • The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
  • The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
The linking conjunction when would then need to be expanded as a hypotactic complex... beta (in particular) alpha (when)

Blogger Comment:

[1] The reason why the conjunctive Adjunct in particular does not realise 'appraisal: graduation: focus: sharpen' is that, in this instance, there is no appraisal to 'graduate: focus: sharpen'.  For many more of Martin's misunderstandings of Appraisal Theory, see here.

(On the other hand, Martin (1992: 211) analyses the conjunctive function of in particular as comparative: similarity: reformulation: rework: generality: local: particularise.)

[2] The reason why in particular does not modify when is that in particular — like a conjunctive Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 158), but unlike a modifier in a conjunction group (not a hypotactic complex) — can be postponed to the end of the clause as an Afterthought:
The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes — when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular.
See also analysis here

Sunday, 11 November 2018

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:
Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]
Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)


Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third
the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]
has entered
a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is
uneven
across countries]]

Actor
Process: material
?
Attribute
?


[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase
characterised by a recovery
that is proceeding at a faltering pace
and is uneven across countries
α
= β

α
= β


1
+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as
  • locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
  • circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
  • circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.

Wednesday, 24 October 2018

David Rose On The Tension Between Lexis And Grammar

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 21 Oct 2018 on 10:08 a message titled 'Whale snack?':
Headline in Sydney Morning Herald :)
Whale snack stops challenge feast or famine myth: Australian Museum
and on 24 Oct 2018 at 09:46:
... a revealing illustration of tension between lexis and grammar. To make sense of the grammar you have to know the field connoted by the lexis! So you have to read the article. What an ingenious hook :)
https://www.smh.com.au/environment/conservation/whale-snack-stops-challenge-feast-or-famine-myth-australian-museum-20181017-p50a8r.html


Blogger Comments:

[1] The instance does not illustrate tension between lexis and grammar.  A genuine example of "tension" between lexis and grammar would be the use of a lexical item like giggle as a projecting verbal Process, as in:
"You're stupid!" the child giggled.
In such cases, the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to a verbal Process.

[2] In SFL, the way to analyse any clause is to take a trinocular approach, shunting between the grammar and the view 'from above' (the meaning being realised) and the view 'from below' (the realisation of the wording at lower ranks).  The difficulty in this clause lies in its grammatical constituency, even though there is only one possible reading, as shown here.

[3] Here Rose repeats Martin's misunderstanding of the theoretical term 'field'.  In SFL, 'field' refers to the ideational dimension of context: the culture as semiotic system; field is not a dimension of language.  When Martin and his students use the term 'field', they are usually referring to a domain, the semantic correlate of a contextual field (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 323).

This confusion is further complicated by the fact that Rose, following Martin, misunderstands field as a dimension of register, where register, a context-specific subpotential of language, is misunderstood as context, instead of language.

Evidence of Martin's (1992) misunderstandings of SFL theory can be viewed here; evidence of Martin & Rose's (2007) misunderstandings of SFL theory can be viewed here.

Monday, 8 October 2018

David Banks On "Complex Verbal Groups"

In answer to the query:
1. In a structure like: "Honey, don't forget to pay the bill before the week is over" should I say that 'forget to pay' is a complex verbal group? O should I say that 'forget' is a mental process that projects the clause complex 'to pay the bill before the week is over'? 
2. If I compare these two uses of "want":
1. "I want to visit the Vatican"
2. "I want Mary to visit the Vatican"
I'd say that in number 1, 'want to visit' is a complex verbal group, where 'want' shows inclination phase, while in number 2, 'want' is a process that projects 'Mary to visit the Vatican' am I right?  
3. Finally, a case similar to the one with 'forget': in a clause like "that afternoon, we decided to go over the wall" should I say that "decided to go" is a complex VG or should I say that "decided" is a mental process that projects "to go over the wall"

 David Banks wrote to sysfling on 5 October 2018 at 19:47:
1. It seems to me that you can only say that it is a complex verb group if there is only one process involved (e.g. continue to pay). Here, it seems obvious that forgetting and paying are quite separ[a]te processes, so it is not a complex verb group. 
2. It does not seem logical to have completely different analyses for these two examples. The fact that English "understands" the subject of "visit" in 1, to be the same as the subject of "want" does not alter the fact that it is basically the same structure as 2. 
3. The answer to this is the same as for No.1.


Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, a verbal group complex is not a complex verbal group.  The former is a complex of verbal groups, and a theoretical term, whereas the latter is a single verbal group deemed to be "complex".

[2] To be clear, it is important to distinguish between Process (clause rank) and Event (group rank).  A verbal group nexus construes two Events as one Process; examples provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 569, 574, 580, 587) include:
  • decides to write
  • would like to paint
  • forget to do
  • remind to do
  • want to do
  • ask to do
  • anticipate doing
  • profess to do.

That is, the instances in question, forget to pay and decided to go, can be interpreted as verbal group complexes that construe two Events as a single Process.

[3] The two different analyses correspond to the preferred analyses of Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-6), who provide the reasoning on which the analytical distinction is based.

But, to be clear, the two instances do not have "basically the same structure", since, if both are interpreted as projecting clause nexuses, the second projected clause includes a topical Theme, an Actor and an explicit Subject, and so a Mood element, whereas the first has none of these.

However, a functional theory gives priority, in grammatical reasoning, to the view from above: to system and function, rather than to structure and form (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 49).  From above, the two instances differ in terms of the interpersonal meaning being realised.  In the first clause complex, I want to visit the Vatican, the desiderative Process projects an offer, whereas in the second, I want Mary to visit the Vatican, it projects a command.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584) explain:
We saw in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.4.2 that a mental process of desideration projects an exchange of the goods-&-services type, i.e. a proposal. If the Subject of the projection is the same as that of the mental process clause, the proposal is an offer, as in she wants to do it; if the two are different, then the proposal is a command, as in she wants you to do it. In the first type, the Subject is not repeated, but is carried over from the desiderative clause. (It can then be made explicit by a reflexive, as in she wants to do it herself.)
Moreover, the second clause complex is also an instance of an interpersonal metaphor of modality, being the metaphorical counterpart of Mary should visit the Vatican; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693).

Sunday, 7 October 2018

Mick O'Donnell On "Main And Support Verbs"

In answer to the query:
1. In a structure like: "Honey, don't forget to pay the bill before the week is over" should I say that 'forget to pay' is a complex verbal group? O should I say that 'forget' is a mental process that projects the clause complex 'to pay the bill before the week is over'?

 Michael O'Donnell wrote to Sysfling on 5 October 2018 at 18:40:
There are arguments for both analyses, here. 
I would argue for grouping "forget to pay" and "forget that..." as both instances of mental processes.
1. if you follow your precedent and treat "She forgot to pay" as a complex verbal group, then would you do the same with "She SAID to pay at the counter". So, where do you draw the line in determining whether the first verb is the main verb or the support verb
2. In Construal Analysis (analysing a document to see what participant roles particular entities fill), it would probably be beneficial to treat the participant as both construed Sensor and Actor. Alternatively, in "he started to think", I don't see the value of recording a participant role for "starting". 
3. In a case like:
A: Did you pay him?
B: I forgot. 
...where the second is elliptical for "I forgot to pay him", it seems strange to say "forget" is not the main verb. It is certainly the main activity reported. 
None of these arguments are conclusive. I think the issue of where the dividing line lies between aspectual verbs and projecting verbs is very blurred, with different linguists placing the involved verbs on different sides. I have always gone with the criteria that if the verb involves mental or verbal action (semantically), then this should be recognised, allowing it to group with the other cases where the projection takes the form of a that-clause, a present participle clause, or a nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, a verbal group complex is not a complex verbal group.  The former is a complex of verbal groups, and a theoretical term, whereas the latter is a single verbal group deemed to be "complex".

[2] To be clear, while 'forget (that…)' is unambiguously an instance of a mental Process, 'forget to pay' can alternatively be analysed as a verbal group complex that construes two Events, 'forget' and 'pay' as a material Process; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 574).

[3] This is a non-sequitur, since the two instances differ markedly.  In She forgot to pay, a proposition is mentally projected with the same Subject as the projecting clause; whereas, in She said to pay at the counter, a proposal is verbally projected with a different Subject from the projecting clause.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL theory, the question is whether
  • the verbal groups form a complex to realise a single process in a clause simplex, or
  • each verbal group realises a different process in a clause complex.

What O'Donnell calls "the main verb" is the verb serving as the Event of the verbal group that serves as the Process of a projecting clause in a clause complex; what O'Donnell calls "the support verb" is the verb serving as the Event of the projecting verbal group of a verbal group complex.  In focusing on verbs, O'Donnell is focusing on form (the view from below) instead of function (the view from above).

[5] Here O'Donnell is largely consistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) — though unwittingly so, since he presents the analysis as his own.

[6] For reasoning with regard to the distinction between projection in clause complexes and projection in verbal group complexes, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-92).

[7] Here O'Donnell misinterprets the question of what rank complexing takes place, clause or group, as a distinction between "aspectual and projecting verbs".  Moreover, this distinction reduces the vast array of potential relations between (what are) verbal groups in verbal group complexes to time phase elaboration ("aspectual") and projection.  The systemic potential of verbal group complex is given in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-92) as:



[8] To be clear, the issue is not what linguists do, but whether analyses are consistent with the theory said linguists are using.

[9] This criterion is oblivious to the question of what rank, clause or group, the "mental or verbal action" is to be "recognised".

Wednesday, 26 September 2018

David Rose On "The Attributive Nucleus"

The answer lies in their orbital (nucleus/margin/periphery) structuring. David Banks semantically re-interpeted the attributive nucleus (us + into this/ us + out) as a ‘result’ of the attributing agency (I got/gonna get), which is marginal (IFG pp350, 211, Martin 1996, Working with Discourse §3.3). 
Agency in English grammar is potentially recursive…
they made me get us into this
But 'us + into this’ remains the attributive nucleus (Medium/Carrier + Range/Attribute) … 
It's intriguing to see the intricacies of meaning made by the grammar itself.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the answer to a transitivity question depends on the ability to understand and apply transitivity theory.  The 'orbital structuring' Rose refers to is Martin's misunderstanding of Halliday's clause nuclearity, rebranded and relocated to Martin's ill-conceived discourse semantic stratum.
  • For the misunderstandings of clause nuclearity in Martin (1992), see the relevant posts in the critique of Chapter 5 here.
  • For the misunderstandings of clause nuclearity in Martin & Rose (2007), see the relevant posts in the critique of Chapter 3 here.
  • For some of the reasons why Martin's discourse semantic stratum is ill-conceived, see Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.
[2] See the previous post for the theoretical misunderstanding that invalidates Banks' analysis.

[3] To be clear, Banks' clause analysis was presented as grammatical, not semantic.

[4] On the one hand, this is deeply misleading, since it falsely implies that Rose's statement is consistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), and thereby endorsed by them.  On the other hand, it is a poor bluff, since neither of the cited pages — in any edition — says anything at all about clause nuclearity.

[5] To be clear, the discussion of nuclear relations in Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) is §3.4.  The concern of §3.3 is taxonomic relations, which is Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion misunderstood, rebranded and relocated by Martin from textual lexicogrammar to experiential discourse semantics.

[6] To be clear, according to Martin (1992: 319) and Martin & Rose (2007: 95), it is Range: entity that is said to be within the nucleus.  The prepositional phrase into this, interpreted as a circumstantial Attribute, does not function as Range: entity.  Circumstances, on the other hand, are said (ibid.) to be located at the periphery.

For the original, theoretically consistent model of clause nuclearity, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 348):


[7] To be clear, making meaning is semogenesis, and it involves all strata.   In SFL theory, grammar (wording) realises meaning (semantics).  This confusion between semogenesis and stratification derives from Martin (1992); see for example:
On the other hand, in SFL theory, the grammar not only realises meaning, it construes (intellectually constructs) it.  That is, it is the grammar that makes possible the sorts of meanings that language can make.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 603-4):
The central meaning-making resource in language — its "content plane" — is stratified into two systems: that of lexicogrammar, and that of semantics. The semantic system is the 'outer' layer, the interface where experience is transformed into meaning. The 'inner' layer is the grammar, which masterminds the way this transformation takes place.

Tuesday, 25 September 2018

David Banks Conflating Participant And Circumstance

Alternatively (and I think I would prefer this), one could think of this as being some sort of physical action which resulted in our being in this situation. This would give something like:
I
got
us into this
Actor
Material process
Result

I
'm gonna get
us out
Actor
Material process
Result



Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, this flouts the descriptive convention of capitalising the function, Process, rather than its subtype, material.

[2] This conflates participant (us) and circumstance (into thisout) into a circumstance of Cause: result, realised by a nominal group.  On a material reading of such clauses, the conflation is of Goal and Location.  (On a relational reading, the conflation is of Carrier and locative Attribute.)

Interestingly, the conflation arises from confusing result, in the sense of a type of circumstance, with the (locative) outcome of a material Process; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225-36).

As a consequence, both clauses are misinterpreted as intransitive instead of transitive, and the Actor as Medium instead of Agent.

Thursday, 14 June 2018

David Rose On Congruent Relations Between Semantics And Grammatical Classes Across Languages

Useful discussion in 
Halliday, M.A.K. (1988). On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories. James D. Benson, Michael J.Cummings and William S. Greaves (eds.) Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective. (CILT39). Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 27-51.
Otherwise, yes, linguists seem to assume grammatical classes across languages, that are defined semantically to some extent. Eg attached figure (Rose & Martin 2012) could apply to all the languages I know of.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1988) says nothing about the relation between semantic categories and grammatical classes across different languages (the subject of Othman's query).  Instead, it is concerned, on the one hand, with explaining why functional grammatical categories, such as Subject, cannot be theorised by decoding them from above (by reference to what they realise) and, on the other hand, with identifying ways around the problem, which in SFL, means encoding them from below (by reference to what realises them).

[2] To be clear, this figure is intended to represent relations between discourse semantic categories and grammatical classes.  Each of the five realisation relations can be examined in turn.
  • Attitude realised by adjective.  The problem here is that the congruent realisation of attitude is not limited to the word class 'adjective', as demonstrated, for example, by the attitudinal potential of 'idiot' (noun), 'stupidly' (adverb), and 'deceive' (verb).
  • Entity realised by nominal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'entity' is not a general category, but only features as a subtype of Range (Martin 1992: 309-11; Martin & Rose 2007: 96).  For Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177), the experiential semantic element congruently realised by the nominal group is 'participant'.
  • Event realised by verbal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'event' is grammatical, not discourse semantic (Martin 1992: 325; Martin & Rose 2007: 97).
  • Figure realised by clause. This is true, but misleading, because the term 'figure', and its congruent relation with the clause, do not derive from Martin's (1992) discourse semantic model, but from the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).
  • Activity sequence realised by clause complex.  In the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 49), it is the sequence that is congruently realised as a clause complex.  In Martin (1992: 321-5), activity sequences are located in field, the ideational dimension of context misconstrued as register.  In Martin & Rose (2007: 76), activity sequences are reinterpreted as discourse semantic: as an experiential system, IDEATION, Martin's misunderstanding and rebranding of Halliday's textual system of lexical cohesion, inter alia.  For the theoretical inconsistencies in activity sequences in Martin (1992), see here; for theoretical inconsistencies in IDEATION in Martin (1992), see here.

Wednesday, 13 June 2018

John Bateman On Stratification And Reductionism

Stratificational description is not reductionism, it is not dissection and shredding of inalienable parts, and so on; it is drawing out the manifold ways in which behaviours and contexts co-articulate.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is true.  Semantics does not reduce to phonology; culture does not reduce to phonetics.

[2] This misunderstands reductionism. Reductionism is not "the dissection and shredding of inalienable parts and so on" but the epistemological misunderstanding that the analysis of complex phenomena reduces them to the lowest level of organisation.  An example of reductionism is a previous contribution from Bateman himself (critiqued here):
well, *actually* there is no such thing as text. There's just variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field....
[3] To be clear, the stratification hierarchy in SFL theory is a means of parcelling out the complexity of language into different levels of symbolic abstraction:
  • meaning (semantics), 
  • wording (lexicogrammar) and 
  • sounding (phonology) / writing (graphology).

Monday, 11 June 2018

David Rose On The Advantages And Implications Of Martin's Discourse Semantic Model

One advantage of this model is that discourse systems can be described metafunctionally, and explained stratally in terms of social functions. So patterns of tenor tend to be realised by patterns of appraisals and exchanges, patterns of field by ideation and conjunction, and mode patterns by variations in periodicity and identification
One implication of such a Hjelmselvian model is that systems at each connotative and denotative stratum are instantiated simultaneously as a text unfolds. That is, the inter-stratal relation is not only a hierarchy of abstraction, but also of co-instantiation (or coupling), with each stratum contributing different orders of meaning making resources as texts unfold.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  This is not an advantage that the discourse semantic model has over theory-consistent models of semantics in SFL, since this is merely a statement about the SFL hierarchy of stratification that all SFL models share.

[2] The term 'social' here is potentially misleading, since it is the culture as a semiotic system that is realised by the semiotic system of language, not the social system in the sense of the material order of sayers (and sensers) who project the semiotic order of culture realised by language.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, these are patterns of instantiation — feature selection — during logogenesis, with different choice frequencies in texts as instances of different choice probabilities of different registers.

[4] To be clear, Rose follows Martin in misconstruing tenor, field and mode as dimensions of register misconstrued as context.  For some of the theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies in treating register as context, see here (register) or here (context).

[5] To be clear, 'exchange' and 'appraisal' are not "discourse" systems, but genuine semantic systems.  At the beginning of his reply to Steiner, Rose identified discourse systems as the grammatical systems of cohesion that Martin reinterpreted as his own discourse semantic systems.

[6] To be clear, 'ideation' and 'conjunction' are Martin's misunderstandings and rebrandings of Halliday's cohesive systems of lexical cohesion and cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction) as experiential and logical systems. As textual systems, their contextual counterpart is mode, not field. For some of many theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies in Martin's 'ideation', see here; for some of the many misunderstandings and inconsistencies in Martin's 'conjunction', see here.

[7] To be clear, 'periodicity' is a reinterpretation and rebranding by Martin & Rose (2003/2007) of what Martin (1992: 392-3) construes as interaction patterns between strata, with strata misunderstood as modules of meaning.  It is largely a confusion of writing pedagogy and linguistic theory, where pedagogical terms (introductory paragraph, topic sentence, paragraph summary, text summary) are rebranded as theoretical terms (macro-Theme, hyper-Theme, hyper-New, macro-New).  For some of many theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies involved, see here.

[8] To be clear, 'identification' is Martin's (1992) misunderstanding and rebranding of Halliday's system of cohesive reference.  It confuses, for example, reference with nominal group deixis, the experiential meaning of the referent with the textual means of referring, and the immanent perspective on meaning with the transcendent perspective.  For some of many theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies involved, see here.

[9] This is misleading.  This is not an implication of the discourse semantic model in particular, since it is merely a confused statement about the SFL dimensions of stratification and instantiation that all SFL models share.

[10] This is misleading because it conflates the dimension of stratification with the dimension of instantiation and misrepresents the confusion as a theoretical insight (Martin's "co-instantiation or coupling").

[11] With the wording 'different orders of meaning', Rose is repeating Martin's misunderstanding of all strata as modules of meaning, which arises from Martin's misinterpretation of 'all strata make meaning' (semogenesis) as 'all strata model meaning'.  See, for example, here.