In Peircean terms, the representamen, the interpretant and the object *co-art[i]culate* one another; there is no reference from semiotic stuff magically reaching into non-semiotic stuff (that would, indeed, as Malonowski [and van Fraassen] would have it, actually *be* magic!).
 This is an example of logical fallacy known as 'the straw man':
A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.
Bateman's (unsourced) notion of "reference magically reaching from semiotic stuff into non-semiotic stuff" confuses
- the transcendent view of meaning, where linguistic meanings refer to meanings outside language, such as physical objects or concepts, with
- the immanent view of meaning, where non-meaning is transformed into meaning.
 For what Malinowski actually *says* about magic, download a free copy of his Magic, Science And Religion (1948) here.