Wednesday, 7 December 2011

David Rose On Realisation

In a discussion on the email list sfl_education on 7/12/11, David Rose writes:
For me the issue is not meaning vs structure, since these are really two faces of the same phenomenon
Rather the issue is the pedagogic sequence from instance to system and vice versa. 
Since meanings and the structures that realise them only occur in texts, our approach starts with whole texts, in which learners encounter instances and gradually accumulate systems. 
Using a simple technique of guided repetition we can teach beginning learners to read and say a short text within an hour, and then use this as basis for focusing on particular features. As they acquire fragments of systems these can be used to illuminate new instances and so on.

Blogger Comments:

In SFL, meaning and structure are not "really two faces of the same phenomenon", and structures do not realise meanings.  Rather:

(1) Meaning is a stratum in the hierarchy of symbolic abstraction.  What realises meaning is wording, not structure.

(2) Structure, on the other hand, contrasts with system.  The distinction here is axial: between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes, respectively.  What structure realises is system, not meaning.

That is: 
meaning is realised in wording (stratification)
system is realised in structure (axis)

so:

stratification:
system on the stratum of meaning is realised in system on the stratum of wording
structure on the stratum of meaning is realised in structure on the stratum of wording

axis:
system on the stratum of meaning is realised in structure on the stratum of meaning
system on the stratum of wording is realised in structure on the stratum of wording

Saturday, 19 November 2011

Tom Bartlett On "SFL Refusing To Talk Of The Mind"

On 18 November 2011 at 02:10 on Sysfling Tom Bartlett wrote:
Despite its determination not to discuss "the mind", SFL draws on much social psychology and if we view the mind as the socialised brain there should be no problem with referring to the mind in SFL. Without the mind we can't understand genres or codes - yes, they're social constructs, but where are they stored? Saying "in the collectivity" just dodges the bullet. It wasn't for nothing that Vygotsky talked of "The Mind in Society".
I think that in refusing to talk of the mind SFL is partly responsible for ceding the field of psycholinguistics to the Chomskian dualist/innatist paradim, despite having a viable alternative.

Blogger Comment:

Here are some examples of "SFL" discussing the mind.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 565):
… we are offering the ideation base as a conceptual alternative [to] the mindknowledge, cognition … the concerns of cognitive science.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 590):
The spatial metaphor of the commonsense model is taken over by cognitive science. It serves as the sources of processes in their model of the mind — processes of storing, searching, retrieving etc within figures of doing & happening and processes of being located at/in within figures of being & having. That is, processes of sensing are reified, and processes of doing & happening and of being & having take their place. The spatial metaphor also opens up the way for modelling the mind along computational lines: human memory can be modelled on computer memory.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 594):
… the object of study of cognitive [science] is constructed by ideational metaphor, as reified sensing (perceiving, thinking) or as the names of sensing (the mind, mental phenomena).
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595):
Since it is not taken over as theory, the fundamental insights of the folk theory are ignored: figures of “Sensers sensing (that …)” are re-construed through grammatical metaphor as participants. In particular, the domain of sensing is reified as the “mind”, so that instead of somebody perceiving things happening, or somebody thinking that the moon was a balloon, the model of cognitive science has perception, vision, cognition, learning, memory …
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595-6): 
Since figures of sensing are reified as participants, they can themselves be construed in participant rôles. Here another feature of the folk model is taken over: its spatial metaphor is retained and further elaborated. Thus the mind is construed as a space where the metaphorical participants of sensing are involved in processes of doing & happening and of being & having: thoughts, concepts, memories, images are stored located, retrieved, activated and so on.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 599):
In a way … material reinterpretation [psychology] and ‘unconsciousness’ [psychoanalysis] are opposites: the first reconstrues sensing in terms that are more readily observable by scientific method (ie method other than introspection), while the other introduces a factor that is even less readily observable than conscious sensing: unconscious motivation. But they share the characteristic that they construct the ‘mind’ as remote from our everyday experience with sensing. At the same time the ‘scientific’ models of the mind fail to extend consciousness in the way it is extended by the grammar of English.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 599, 600):
There are, in fact, two complementary perspectives embodied in the semantic and grammatical systems of English; and together they point towards an alternative interpretation both of ‘information’ as constructed in cognitive science and of the individualised ‘mind’ that is its object of study. … [These are] the construal of processes other than the mental (saying and symbolising), and that of meaning as enacting as well as meaning as construing.
 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 603):
… the concept of ‘mind’ should be brought into close relation with other phenomena — biological, social, or semiotic. … But once this has been done, the mind itself tends to disappearit is no longer necessary as a construct sui generis. Instead of experience being construed by the mind, in the form of knowledge, we can say that experience is construed by the grammar; to ‘know’ something is to have transformed some portion of experience into meaning. To adopt this perspective is to theorise “cognitive processes” in terms of semiotic, social and biological systems; and thus to see them as a natural concomitant of the processes of evolution.
See the discussions here.

Sunday, 23 October 2011

Sys-Func Discussion Of Theme Analysis [1]

On the sys-func discussion list, at 21:37 on 11 October 2011, Van Tran sought help in analysing the thematic structure of the following:

One year after they got married, they found ....


Tom Bartlett replied at 23:52 11 October 2011:
As an alternative analysis to Mick's (O'Donnell's analysis of one year [[after they got married]] as a nominal group realising Theme), you could have "one year" as modifying the conjunction "after".
Tom's reasoning at this stage:
This might appear a bit unusual, but from a fucntional [sic] perspective I think it looks like that is what is happening.


Mick O'Donnell then replied:
I'd buy that. Makes sense.










Blogger Comments:

(1) On Halliday's theoretical model, this is not "what is happening".
Premodifiers in conjunction groups, as in their sister adverbial groups, are grammatical items — adverbs of polarity, comparison or intensification, such as even, just, not, only) not lexical items like (one) year [Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 356, 358].

(2) On Halliday's theoretical model, one year [[after they got married]] is a nominal group realising a circumstance of Location: time.  The function structure of the nominal group is as follows:
one Numerative
year Thing
[[after they got married]] Qualifier (realised by a rank-shifted clause).

(3) The utter ludicrousness of regarding preceding lexical words as Premodifiers within a conjunction group can be seen in the following, with the supposed conjunction group highlighted in green:

One excruciatingly painful and somewhat hazardous, and not to say chaotic year after they got married …

See also nominal conjunctions.

Sys-Func Discussion Of Theme Analysis [2]

Lise Fontaine replied on sys-func at 18:12 on 12 October 2011:
I agree with Tom's view.  There are many examples related to this:
after they got married
right after they got married
one year after they got married
10 years after the got married
and there are other prepositions which follow similar patterns.  In IFG terms this ('one year after') constitutes a prepositional group within a prepositional phrase.


Blogger Comments:

(1) Lise says she agrees with Tom's view, even though Tom mistakenly analyses one year after as a conjunction group, while she mistakenly analyses it as a preposition group.

(2) In IFG terms:

after they got married is a clause initiated by the (unmodified) conjunction group after
right after they got married is a clause initiated by the (premodified) conjunction group right after
one year [[after they got married]] is a nominal group with an embedded clause as Qualifier
10 years [[after they got married]] is a nominal group with an embedded clause as Qualifier
and
those twenty unforgettable though nightmarish years [[after they got married]] is a nominal group with an embedded clause as Qualifier

Sys-Func Discussion Of Theme Analysis [3]

Lise Fontaine continued on sys-func at 18:52 on 13 October 2011:
I'm just leaving for a conference so my reply won't be as detailed as I would like. I should say though that I wasn't suggesting I was representing the views of IFG in my reply, only that I agreed with Tom's analysis.



Blogger comments:

Lise says "I wasn't suggesting I was representing the views of IFG in my reply", but in that reply she had written:
"In IFG terms this ('one year after') constitutes a prepositional group within a prepositional phrase".

Friday, 21 October 2011

Sys-Func Discussion Of Theme Analysis [4]

In response to the IFG-consistent analysis provided by Ernest Akerejola, Tom Bartlett replied at 18:19 on 13 October 2011:
I think that your analysis is posssible, but I still prefer the analysis with "one year" as modifying "before".

Tom's Reasoning:
(1) Compare "three times before they were married they went on holiday together", which means that each time individually was before they got married. In this case "before they got married" is a modifier in the ngp with "time" [sic] as head. 
(2) In "Three years before they got married" this is not the case, there is only one occasion. We are told something happened before they got married and additionally how long before
(3) However, in the seemingly similar sentence "The year before they got married they bought a house together" I would analyse "before they got married" as an embedded clause within the noun group "the year before they got married". Something happened in a particular year which is defined as being the one before their wedding.


Blogger Comments:

Tom's analyses in (1) and (3) are consistent with Halliday's analysis.  That is:
three times [[before they were married]]
the year [[before they got married]]

However, his claim that three years before they got married is not the same grammatically, ie
three years [[before they got married]]
is not consistent with Halliday's analysis.

More significantly, the argumentation that Tom uses to support his different analysis is entirely spurious.  There is no grammatical reasoning involved.  Instead, the grammatical difference is said to turn on the distinction between:

"each time individually was before they got married" and
"something happened in a particular year which is defined as being the one before their wedding"

versus:

"something happened before they got married and additionally how long before".

Sys-Func Discussion Of Theme Analysis [5]

Tom Bartlett continues in his response to Ernest Akerejola:
I would analyse "exactly one year after they got married" as [[exactly[one year]] after they got married], with "exactly" modifying the noun "one year" and the whole the ngp "exactly one year" modifying the conjunction "before".





Blogger Comments:

(1) one year is not a noun; it is part of the nominal group; the Numerative of the nominal group is exactly one; the logical structure of the Numerative is b^a —ie exactly modifies one (not one year).

(2) The IFG analysis is exactly one year [[after they got married]], for reasons given previously. So:

exactly one: Numerative
year: Thing
[[after they got married]]: Qualifier

Sunday, 4 September 2011

1. David Rose On Stratification & Metaredundancy

David Rose firstly writes in response to my comments on Jim Martin On Stratification:
contextual strata are metaredundant on the redundant relation between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar... hence relating clause meanings directly to context skips a layer of metaredundancy





Blogger Comments:

(1) clause meanings

The meanings of clauses are semantic not lexicogrammatical. Hence relating clause meanings directly to context does not skip a stratum.


(2) layer of metaredundancy

Strata are not layers of metaredundancy. Metaredundancy is a redundancy on a redundancy. Semantics is metaredundant on the redundant relation between lexicogrammar and phonology. Semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology are not "layers of metaredundancy".

2. David Rose On Realisation

David Rose secondly writes in response to my comments on Jim Martin on Stratification:
clause meanings are realised by system-structure relations cycling through grammatical ranks i.e. meanings are realised by relations between elements of structures in texts, instantiating relations between features in systems, at each rank within phonology, grammar and discourse... (no need to do it twice)



Blogger Comments:

(1) clause meanings are realised by system-structure relations; meanings are realised by relations between elements of structures

This confuses the distinction between stratification and axis. In terms of stratification, meanings (semantics) are realised by wordings (lexicogrammar) — whatever the axis (paradigmatic or syntagmatic). In terms of axis, (paradigmatic) systems are realised by (syntagmatic) structures — whatever the stratum.


(2) meanings are realised by relations between elements of structures in texts

'In texts' refers only to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. The realisation of meaning (semantics) in wording (lexicogrammar) applies to the whole cline, not just the instance. Hence: "stuck in the instance".

3. David Rose On Instantiation

David Rose thirdly writes in response to my comments on Jim Martin on Stratification:
discourse semantic systems are the potential for co-textualising grammatical meanings, instantiated as discourse semantic structures in text





Blogger Comment:

Instantiation is the relation of the system to the instance (of the system). The relation between system and structure — and between semantics and lexicogrammar — is realisation.

4. David Rose On Instantiation

David Rose writes, in response to my comments on 3. David Rose On Instantiation:
All true but doesn't falsify DR's statement. How else are systems instantiated other than as structures in texts? DR's statement corrected CC's claim that "Co-textualised" meanings are only at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation — in text




My Comments:

[1] This confuses the cline of instantiation with the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. The theoretical dimension of instantiation is the (intensive attributive) relation between the system and the instance (of the system). The relation between the paradigmatic axis (systems) and the syntagmatic axis (structures) is realisation (an intensive identifying relation).

Put simply: a structure is not an instance of a system.


[2] By definition, "co-textualised" meanings are meanings of the text. The text is at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

5. David Rose On Meaning

David Rose writes in response to my comments on 2. David Rose On Realisation:
Again this reduction does not falsify DR's statement. SFL is a relational theory of meaning, in which meanings are realised by the whole set of relations in language, including stratal, axial and rank, which DR's statement distilled and explicated. Meaning making is not reducible to a one-dimensional relation between strata.



Blogger Comments:

(1) Again this reduction does not falsify DR's statement.

A distinction — in this case between stratification and axis — is not a reduction.


(2) meanings are realised by the whole set of relations in language, including stratal, axial and rank

The use of 'meaning' here ignores theoretical distinctions. Meanings are realised by wordings (stratification); systems are realised by structures (axis); the functional elements of a higher rank are realised by units of the rank below.


(3) which DR's statement distilled and explicated

Ignoring theoretical distinctions is neither distillation nor explication.


(4) Meaning making is not reducible to a one-dimensional relation between strata.

The original post was about the realisation of meaning, not meaning making. The realisation of meaning is a stratal relation between semantics and lexicogrammar (the axial relation of realisation on the semantic stratum is between system and structure).


(5) Meaning making is not reducible to a one-dimensional relation between strata.

That claim was not made. This is the logical fallacy known as 'The Straw Man'.

6. David Rose On The Cline Of Instantiation

David Rose writes in response to my comments on 2. David Rose On Realisation
Yes, and 'relations between features in systems' refers to the system pole of the cline. Relations between elements of structure are dimensions of meaning making in SFL theory, whether viewed from structural potentials realising features in systems or actual structures instantiated in texts



Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the cline of instantiation. The cline of instantiation is (an intensive attributive) relation between the system and instances (of the system). There are no (syntagmatic) "relations between elements of structure" at the (paradigmatic) system pole of the cline of instantiation.

[2] This misunderstands the cline of instantiation and merges it with (axial) realisation. The cline of instantiation is (an intensive attributive) relation between the system and instances (of the system). "Actual structures" are not instances of a system. The relation between system and structure is realisation (an intensive identifying relation).

7. David Rose On Stratification

The meanings of clauses are made by lexicogrammatical systems/structures. They do not include meanings made by discourse semantic systems/structures, which co-textualise (redound on) these lexicogrammatical meanings. Hence relating clause meanings directly to context skips a layer of (OK) redundancy.


Blogger Comments:

(1) The meanings of clauses are made by lexicogrammatical systems/structures.

This misunderstands stratification. The relation between meaning (semantic stratum) and wording (lexicogrammatical stratum) is realisation — an intensive identifying process, not a creative abstract material process ('made by'). Wording (eg clauses) realises meaning.


(2) They do not include meanings made by discourse semantic systems/structures, which co-textualise (redound on) these lexicogrammatical meanings. Hence relating clause meanings directly to context skips a layer of (OK) redundancy.

This misunderstands stratification. Meaning is the level of symbolic abstraction modelled as the semantic stratum. The meanings realised by wordings — including wordings such as those of clause rank and of cohesion — are at the semantic level of symbolic abstraction. No stratum is "skipped".

Friday, 1 July 2011

Robin Fawcett On Stratal Relations [1]

In a discussion on Sysfling [29/6/11], Robin Fawcett opined:
Indeed, if Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen had formed a clear view of the way in which the choices described in their Construing Experience through Meaning determine the choices in the major system networks of the lexicogrammar, they would surely have said so in that book. I have looked hard for a section that makes this connection, but I have yet to find it. This suggests that the model proposed there is simply one possible, half-complete hypothesis that needs to be subject to the normal process in science of development, testing, evaluation, revision (or rejection), retesting, re-evaluation, and so on.

Blogger Comments:

(1) Here are some of the quotes that Robin Fawcett was unable to find.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):
More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/graphological system.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378):
The realisational relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is one of preselection: semantic features … are realised in lexicogrammar by means of prespecification of lexicogrammatical information, most centrally preselection of lexicogrammatical features.

(2) Regarding the notion that strata "determine" one another, note that higher stratal choices do not cause lower stratal choices.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 25):
In any stratal system (i.e. any system where there are two strata such that one is the realisation of the other) there is no temporal or causal ordering between the strata. … the relationship is an intensive one, not a causal circumstantial one.

(3) On realisation as an analogue of cause:effect in classical physics:

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 510):
… we do not yet fully understand the nature of the relationship that is the semiotic analogue of the “cause : effect” of classical physics: this is the problem of realisation.

Having had his claim falsified, Fawcett subsequently re-interpreted his original question (extending it) in an attempt to obscure the falsification.  This is a subtype of the logical fallacy known as the 'red herring':
The red herring is as much a debate tactic as it is a logical fallacy. It is a fallacy of distraction, and is committed when a listener attempts to divert an arguer from his argument by introducing another topic.

Robin Fawcett On Stratal Relations [2]

In a discussion on Sysfling [1/7/11], Robin Fawcett reacted to the three quotes [in Part 1] from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375, 378, 25) as follows:
In the first two passages we are given a picture of 'preselection' as 'predetermination', and so as something approaching 'causation'. Then in [the third] we are told that the relationship is not like that. But we are not told WHY it is not. We are offered instead a metaphor (taken from the terms of the Sydney Grammar itself), but not an explanation as to WHY the relationship is an 'intensive' one. 
The reader of these three passages will surely ask: How can it be true that choices made at one stratum are realized in choices at a lower stratum, without this being some type of 'pre-determination'? Passage [3] presents the relationship as a great mystery!

Blogger Comments:

Among other things, Fawcett does not understand that:
  1. the theoretical dimension of stratification is organised on the principle of intensive identification — it is not a metaphor, it is what stratification means in this way of modelling language: higher level Value is realised by lower level Token;
  2. the strata are thus different levels of symbolic abstraction of the same phenomenon — there can be no chain of command across different levels of symbolic abstraction;
  3. semantic features being realised by the 'preselection' of lexicogrammatical features simply means that features at the higher level of abstraction entail features at the lower level of symbolic abstraction — same phenomenon, different levels of abstraction.  For example, the logico-semantic relation of 'cause' can be realised incongruently by the preselection of lexicogrammatical features relating to participants, processes or circumstances at clause rank.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94) anticipated Fawcett's misinterpretation (in the very same text):
Such selections have been referred to as “pre-selections”, but in order to avoid any connotations of temporal sequence, we prefer the term “selection” for such relations in the ideation base.

Wednesday, 29 June 2011

Robin Fawcett On Interstratal Specification

On 29 June 2011 at 08:42, Robin Fawcett wrote to Sysfling:
Indeed, if Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen had formed a clear view of the way in which the choices described in their Construing Experience Through Meaning determine the choices in the major system networks of the lexicogrammar, they would surely have said so in that book. I have looked hard for a section that makes this connection, but I have yet to find it. This suggests that the model proposed there is simply one possible, half-complete hypothesis that needs to be subject to the normal process in science of development, testing, evaluation, revision (or rejection), retesting, re-evaluation, and so on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98-9) sets out the congruent lexicogrammatical realisations of semantic figures and elements:

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98):
Within the ideational metafunction, each [of the four types of figure] is realised congruently by one particular transitivity type: doing & happening ( material, sensing ( mental, saying ( verbal, and being & having ( relational.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99):
Within the ideational component, [the three types of element] are realised by different classes of units:
process ( verbal group,
participant ( nominal group,
circumstance ( adverbial group; prepositional phrase.

[2]  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94):
Such selections have been referred to as “pre-selections”, but in order to avoid any connotations of temporal sequence, we prefer the term “selection” for such relations in the ideation base.

[3] For an appraisal analysis of Fawcett's negative attitude towards Halliday and Matthiessen, click here.

Monday, 27 June 2011

Jim Martin On Stratification

In a Sysfling discussion [26/6/2011], Jim Martin wrote:
I don't consider it wise to skip a stratum of metaredundancy and relate clause meanings directly to context, more or less ignoring co-text since it's the co-textualised meanings that construe field, tenor and mode.




Blogger Comments:

(1) "metaredundancy"

Strata are not levels of metaredundancy. Metaredundancy is a redundancy on a redundancy. For example, semantics is metaredundant on the redundant relation between lexicogrammar and phonology. The relation between two adjacent strata is one of redundancy not metaredundancy.


(2) "clause meanings and skipping a stratum"

The meanings of clauses are meanings realised by clauses, and so the meanings realised by clauses are of the semantic stratum. There is no "skipping a stratum" when relating lexicogrammar to semantics to context.


(3) "it is co-textualised meanings that construe field, tenor and mode"

It is meaning that construes/realises context (field, tenor and mode). "Co-textualised" meanings are only at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation — in texts — where they realise specific contexts of situation. There are no "co-textualised" meanings at the system pole of the cline of instantiation, and so: no construal of the field, tenor and mode of the context of culture by them. A theory of semantics must be accountable at all points along the cline of instantiation, not just at the instance pole.

Friday, 3 June 2011

Stratification

Contra Martin (1992: 496), the size of the units on various strata is irrelevant to the principle on which stratification is based.

Linguistic strata represent different levels of symbolic abstraction.

The levels of abstraction are identified as:
meaning (semantics)
wording (lexicogrammar)
sounding (phonology)

Wednesday, 25 May 2011

Robin Fawcett On The Verbal Group

A parallel paper given by Professor Robin Fawcett at the International Systemic Functional Congress held at the University of Melbourne in 2000, was titled, if I remember correctly, something like: 'Why Not Abolish The Verbal Group?'

Fawcett's argument was concerned with the experiential structure of the verbal group: Finite and Event and the optional elements Auxiliary and Polarity. There was no discussion of the logical structure of the verbal group.




Blogger Comments:

Now, as Halliday (1994: 196) pointed out, 'the experiential structure is extremely simple; and most of the semantic load is carried by the logical structure, including the tense system'.

The value of the logical structure in elegantly explaining the tense system of English was pointed out to Fawcett by Erich Steiner at the end of the presentation, despite the lack of time afforded by Fawcett for any discussion.

But consider also the larger theoretical picture. Removing the verbal group from the architecture of the theory does not simplify the model — it complicates it by creating inconsistency. Eg Whereas participants and circumstances are realised by units of the rank below, nominal groups, adverbial groups and prepositional phrases, processes are not. Somehow their realisation skips a rank and is realised by the verb. Try to explain a process such as 'will have been going to have been taking' as realised only at verb rank.

This all demonstrates that Fawcett neither understood the theory he was discussing, nor the theoretical ramifications of his suggested modification nor the principle of parsimony in theorising.

Robin Fawcett On Rheme

On the Sysfling email discussion list, Professor Robin Fawcett argued that 'Rheme' "does not exist" and should thus be removed from the theoretical architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory.








Blogger Comments:

'Rheme' merely refers to that part of the clause which is not 'Theme'. 'Rheme' is a case of 'a presence marking an absence'. Without 'Rheme', 'Theme' extends over the entire clause, meaning that the entire clause becomes the point of departure for the clause as message — a notion which is logically incoherent.

A second point is Fawcett's notion of semiotic categories "existing" or not. Such construals of experience are either functional or not. This is the epistemological position that informs and is informed by Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory.

Tuesday, 24 May 2011

Robin Fawcett On Agent

On the Sys-Func email discussion list, Professor Robin Fawcett argued that for a clause of the type Cameron Diaz burped (it apparently described an incident on British TV), he would analyse the participant as Agent if the act was deliberate, but as Medium otherwise.






Blogger Comments:

Fawcett's analysis for the behavioural clause when the process is deliberate:

Cameron Diaz
burped
Agent
Process

Fawcett's analysis for the same behavioural clause when the process is not deliberate:

Cameron Diaz
burped
Medium
Process

That is, Fawcett analyses precisely the same construal of experience as different grammatically on the basis of situational context (field: 'what's going on') rather than on the basis of linguistic content, wording and meaning (what is said or written).

An example of genuine agency in a behavioural clause is:


Cameron Diaz
burped
the baby
Agent
Process
Medium