Wednesday 22 June 2022

David Rose On Martin's Argument For Genre And Register

Also in the spirit of lessening confusion (pace Chris), JRM’s 1992 argument for positioning genre ‘above’, configuring selections in field, mode and tenor, is long and very heteroglossic, but this little para presents one angle...
Overall it would appear that "rhetorical purpose" is the wild card in contextual description, being variously categorised under field (Halliday 1965), tenor (Gregory 1967), mode (Halliday 1978a, 1985/1989) and as a separate contextual variable in its own right (Firth 1950 — effects, Ure & Ellis 1977 — role, Fawcett 1980 — pragmatic purpose). The main reason for this is that purpose is difficult to associate with any one metafunctional component of the lexicogrammar or discourse semantics. The effect of a text is the result of all components of its meaning. This makes associating the notion of rhetorical purpose with Bakhtin's more global notion of speech genres an attractive one (cf. Gregory 1982).
H&H … apply the term register from the perspective of language, looking ‘up’ at field, mode and tenor. JRM applies it from the perspective of field, mode and tenor, looking ‘down’ at language (and other modalities). Hence register and genre theory.


Blogger Comments:

[1] Some other examples of Rose 'lessening confusion' can be viewed here.

[2] To be clear, heteroglossia does not guarantee a valid argument. Martin's argument for locating genre above field tenor and mode (misconstrued as register) is examined at


[3] This very paragraph (Martin 1992: 501) is closely examined at Confusing Context With Text Type.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents the difference between Halliday & Hasan's view of register and Martin's view of register as a difference in (trinocular) perspective. It is not true that Halliday & Hasan "apply the term register from the perspective of language, looking ‘up’ at field, mode and tenor". Rather, Halliday & Hasan associate the contextual features of a situation type with the linguistic features of a register, which thus can viewed either 'down' from context or 'up' from language. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):
The linguistic features which are typically associated with a configuration of situational features — with particular values of the field, mode and tenor — constitute a register.

Martin, on the other hand, simply misapplies the term 'register' to the situational features instead of the linguistic features.

[5] The word 'hence' is misleading, because it gives the false impression that the validity of 'register and genre theory' has been supported by the text that precedes it.

David Rose Falsely Implying That Ruqaiya Hasan Endorsed Martin's Model

Affiliationally (!), it’s flattering to be called the Martin-Rose model, but you’d have to add a lot more names with hyphens. JRM just tried to give me a leg up as a co-author, as a good teacher does (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999, 2004). It would be more accurate to call it the Hasan-Martin model, as so much of it is built on her work. ET mentions her 197 times, with 15 of her publications cited.



Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the proportionalities here are

Rose : Martin ::
Matthiessen : Halliday

[2] This is very misleading indeed. What is true is that Martin rebranded Hasan's work on cohesion — principally Halliday & Hasan (1976) — as his own model of discourse semantics. What is not true is that Martin's derived model is consistent with Hasan's original work, and what is emphatically not true, is that Hasan endorsed Martin's misunderstandings of her work.

With regard to Martin's model that confuses language varieties with context, Hasan wrote a protracted piece that identified the problems with Martin's approach. See:

Hasan, R. 1995. The Conception of Context in Text. In P. H. Fries & M. Gregory (eds.), Discourse in Society: Systemic Functional Perspectives, Meaning and Choice in Language: Studies for Michael Halliday, 183-283. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.

David Rose On Inexplicit Realisations And Lexis

… So how do we model field elements that are not explicitly realised in a text? That is so complex that SFL has avoided trying to describe lexical items, beyond their very general relations, as ‘sets’ vs systems, as delicate grammar, and as lexical relations in discourse.

It’s long worried me, as I would like to describe how we learn to read (comprehend written texts), and that can’t be done without tackling lexis.

In this paper on reading metaphor I’ve suggested we technicalise the term connote for these kinds of relations.
Rose, D. (2021). Reading metaphor: Symbolising, connoting and abducing meanings. Linguistics and Education, 64, 100932.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Rose, following Martin, regards as 'field' is ideational semantics in SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

… Martin, where"field" corresponds to what has been discussed here in terms of ideational semantic networks in the ideation base …

[2] To be clear, this is a matter of inexplicit realisations of semantic features being instantiated in a text.

[3] To be clear, this is not simply a matter of lexis. A lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features, just as the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the phonological features [voiced, bilabial, stop]. Modelling this phenomenon systemically entails identifying the system, with the choice of in/explicit realisation, that has been instantiated in the text (data).

[4] To be clear, lexis as most delicate grammar means that lexical items are specified by the most delicate grammatical features, and lexical sets are the paradigmatic organisation of the lexical items thus specified. 'Lexical relations in discourse', on the other hand, is the use of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between lexical items to create textual cohesion. In Rose's source, Martin (1992), the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar is confused with lexical cohesion; evidence here.

[5] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'lexical item'. See, for example:

[6] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'metaphor'. See, for example: