Cheers for this John, and yes I was "confusing a description of grammar (for some subset of human languages) with a metalanguage for talking about semiotics?" - in the sense that I was mixing them up together - deliberately, but probably very ill-advisedly in such a brief post and when I am still in the middle of teaching and marking. I'll take the coward's way out for now and not elaborate on my underdeveloped words, but tbc....One point only (I can't resist):curiously cognitive I found: surely it depends, as with all semiotic systems of any interest, on the community of practice?Yes and no, my intended point was that cognition from this perspective is simply embodied associations and responses and intentionality is just our post-hoc reflection on this (itself a material process......), so that the line between symbolising and saying is in the language of the construer (hence the blurring of the lines in the first part).
A discussion (on my part at least) to be continued once teaching and marking have ended, preferably IRL and with a pint/cup of tea : )Back to the virtual chalkface....
Blogger Comments:
[1] Bartlett's acceptance of Bateman's misunderstandings of his post as valid, and his reluctance to engage with Bateman on the issue, might reasonably be taken as evidence that Bartlett has only a very superficial understanding of the method he was deploying (using metalanguage to theorise).
[2] To be clear, the portion of Bartlett's original post that Bateman was commenting on is:
at what point does this move from an identifying relation to a verbal process? Does it depend on the intention of the speaker, the understanding of the hearer, or both?
[3] Here Bartlett has abandoned the SFL metalanguage perspective first taken in his original post, according to which cognition is the type of mental process through which propositional ideas are projected.
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