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David Rose Misconstruing Post-Deictic As Submodifier

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept, 15:56:

But there’s also the issue that nominal group functions are realised at word rank. So is it just one Deictic function realised by a word complex?

Martin and co argue so for Classifiers and Epithets. 

(So can epithesis also be realised prosodically, before and/or after a Numerative?) the same inevitable two stupid questions???

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the function of the post-Deictic is to identify a subset of the class of ‘thing’. Logically, it pre-modifies the Head. This analysis misrepresents its function as sub-modifying within the Pre-modifier; that is, it misconstrues same as modifying the, instead of thing.

[2] No, because Epithets don't precede Numeratives. Instead, attitude can be realised in post-Deictics and Epithets, as explained in previous posts.

At this point, Rose gives up his fight against Cléirigh's analysis of 'mere' as a post-Deictic.

David Rose Misunderstanding 'Post-Deictic'

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 14:23:

I think this is an important question... 'post-Deictic' is actually functionally defined in IFG p373

a second Deictic element in the nominal group, one which adds further to the identification of the subset in question

More specifically...

The post-Deictic identifies a subset of the class of ‘thing’ by referring to its fame or familiarity, its status in the text, or its similarity/dissimilarity to some other designated subset.

Examples follow, illustrating these identifying functions. But then...

Also found in the post-Deictic position in the nominal group are words expressing the speaker’s attitude

Examples follow that have no identifying function. They actually evaluate the Numerative+Thing...

the splendid three Pyramids

those miserable two miles of asphalt and concrete.

a lousy two weeks in New Jersey

an impressive 30 or 60 minutes of high-quality recordings.

a disappointing 9,000 copies.

With this in mind, here are the preceding examples of ‘non-attitudinal’ post-Deictics. Some are clearly identifying...

this same container

the whole four hours

the only right way

Others are evaluating, and less obviously identifying...

the necessary first step

the possible role

the customary grisly inhabitants of Tartarus

A typical elution curve

Epithets can also have an identifying function... 

if I say the long train, the specific Deictic the indicates that you can tell, and that the necessary information is contained in the experiential Epithet long. This particular train, in other words, is defined by its length [p376]

The functional difference between post-Deictics and Epithets seems fuzzy...

The words occurring as post-Deictic are adjectives, and may also occur in the function of Epithet but with a different sense. This different sense is not defined.

This seems like a potentially fruitful area for further research.

Blogger Comments:

At this point, Rose has finally given up disputing CLÉiRIGh's analysis of the aforementioned instances of 'mere' functioning as post-Deictics, and switched to questioning the theoretical status of 'post-Deictic'.

[1] To be clear, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 373) explicitly states: the function of the post-Deictic is to identify the subset of the class of Thing, and this is the case in all the examples they provide and which Rose quotes. Here Rose has misunderstood this use of the word 'identification' to mean Martin's discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION, which is itself a misunderstanding of grammatical reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976).

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. The different sense of an adjective functioning as post-Deictic vs Epithet is explained as the different function of post-Deictic vs Epithet. The function of the post-Deictic was quoted by Rose from Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 373):

The post-Deictic identifies a subset of the class of ‘thing’ by referring to its fame or familiarity, its status in the text, or its similarity/dissimilarity to some other designated subset.

The function of the Epithet, on the other hand, is clearly distinct from that of the post-Deictic. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 376):

The Epithet indicates some quality of the subset, e.g. old, long, blue, fast; since qualities are denoted by adjectives, Epithets are often realised by adjectives. … (i) The quality of the subset may be an objective property of the thing itself, construed as a depiction of the experience of the entity that it represents; or (ii) it may be an expression of the speaker’s subjective attitude towards it … . We refer to these as (i) experiential Epithets and (ii) interpersonal, or attitudinal, Epithets, respectively. … The principal difference is that experiential Epithets are potentially defining, whereas interpersonal ones are not.

[3] To be clear, adequate research has been done — just not by Rose.

David Rose Explaining 'Mere' By Coupling

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 11:15:

Can I suggest we think in terms of coupling? 

...first of lexical items – e.g. attitudinal mere with a target entity such as housemaid, construing a value in a field, such as a person’s occupational status. 

...secondly of lexical choices with grammatical functions. Given that attitude is expressed prosodically through structures such as nom gps – how does the choice of gram function adjust the meaning?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'coupling' is merely Martin's term for grouping any selections.

[2] To be clear, this coupling of lexical items is merely taking a lexical perspective on APPRAISAL:

Under the [APPRECIATION] subcategory of `social value', the object, product or process is evaluated according to various social conventions. This domain is very closely tied to field in that the social valuation of one field will not be applicable or relevant in another.

[3] Trivially, 'entity' is not a type of lexical item, but a semantic category, and attitudes are interpersonal, and so enact (social relations as meaning); it is ideational systems that construe (experience as meaning).

[4] To be clear, the choice of lexical item adds different lexical (more delicate) features to a grammatical function, such as Epithet vs post-Deictic. Meaning is realised by all the lexicogrammatical features, from the most general (grammatical) to the most delicate (lexical).

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As A Judgement Of Capacity

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz Olivares on 7 Sept 2024, at 11:32:

Your questions always demand a bit of SF rigor. Quite right about the word class... I was blinded from above... manner degree so adverb... but mere/merely : adjective/adverb. …

And you’re right about gradability... in this context is it a judgement of capacity? Construing a series... a lowly scullery maid – mere housemaid – capable housekeeper

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the topic sentence ("hyper-Theme"), with 'rigour' being Rose's evaluation of what follows.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'mere(ly)' is interpersonal (counter-expectancy: limiting), not experiential (manner: degree). For example, in he merely said it wasn't cooked properly, the Adjunct merely is not circumstantial: it does not qualify the manner in which he said it.

[3] Clearly, 'a mere housemaid' is not a judgement of the capacity of a servant. Mere housemaids may be more capable or less capable. In terms of APPRAISAL, it might be seen as a negative appreciation of the status of 'housemaid' in terms of social value:

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? 

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As An Adverb Of Manner Serving As Attitudinal Epithet

After Beatriz Quiroz Olivares wrote to SYSFLING on 7 Sept 2024, 08:25:

What would be for you the function of 'mere' in the structure of a nominal group? …

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to a mere housemaid, you know? … 

Linguists who specialise in corpus studies tend to refer to themselves, rather disingenuously, as ‘mere data-gatherers’.

Could it be an Epithet?

David Rose replied at 09:09:

I guess I’d ask what it’s doing in the nominal group (with clues from its word class and position). Isn’t it evaluating the Thing? So an attitudinal Epithet? ...realised by an adverb of manner:degree, preceding the Thing. Then how about ‘a mere three years later’ or ‘the mere mention of his name’

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, some adjectives can serve as either Epithet or post-Deictic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 373-4), and so can evaluate as either Epithet or post-Deictic. Here Rose is ignoring the fact that CLÉiRIGh had already (heteroglossically) identified the function of mere in these instances as post-Deictic realising counter-expectancy: limiting. That is, the meaning of a mood Adjunct of intensity is here realised in a different grammatical domain: as the post-Deictic of a nominal group. The mood Adjunct agnates of the two instances are:

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? … 

Linguists who specialise in corpus studies tend to refer to themselves, rather disingenuously, merely as ‘data-gatherers’.

[2] Clearly, 'mere' is an adjective, not an adverb, and Olivares subsequently informed Rose of the fact. 

Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

David Rose Solving The Non-Problem Of The Synonymy Of 'Unmarked', 'Default' And 'Neutral'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 9 Sept, at 10:43:

Yep, the apparent synonymy of unmarked, default and neutral were pedagogic issues for Brad designing his intonation course (and perhaps for us all). A possible solution lies in their differing usage (instantial). 

Marked/unmarked are used as technical labels for features in textual systems, where the marked option realises textual prominence (stratal). 

Default tends to connote skewed frequency, which realises unmarked features (axial). 

Neutral tends to be used for ungraduated features in interpersonal systems (eg key)

and at 11:47:

My friend Giacomo Figueredo pointed out that description generalises (same stratum) but explanation abstracts (higher stratum). So look up for reasons (eg prominence in discourse).

*I meant to say ‘Default tends to connote skewed frequency *of structures*, which realise unmarked features (axial).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'default' and 'neutral' are glosses for 'unmarked' as a description of an option in a system. There is no problem requiring a solution.

[2] To be clear, the marked/unmarked distinction is not restricted to the textual metafunction, but is used for systems realising any metafunction, e.g. TENSE and TONE.

[3] To be clear, both the marked and unmarked option of THEME assign textual prominence to an element of structure (axial, not stratal).

[4] To be clear, 'default' describes the 'unmarked' or 'neutral' choice in a system, so the structure that realises that systemic choice is the 'default' or 'unmarked' or 'neutral' structure (axis). Skewed probabilities are a system property, whereas skewed frequencies are an instance property (instantiation).

[5] To be clear, in the system of KEY, 'neutral' is a feature in the system, not a description of a feature as unmarked or default. 

[6] To be clear, here Rose is presenting part of the post he is reacting to (below) as if it hadn't already been stated in that post. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

Many systems embody the distinction between an unmarked term and a marked one, and the distinction may be reflected in the descriptive names given to the terms, as in “unmarked theme” vs. “marked theme”. An alternative label for the unmarked term is “neutral”, as in the interpersonal of (declarative) KEY (e.g. Halliday & Greaves, 2008: 50), where ‘neutral’ key is unmarked and the other keys are marked (‘challenging’, ‘non-committal’, ‘reserved’, ‘strong’); another alternative label is “default”.

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.

PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘

and on 3 Sept, at 13:27:

In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:

[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE. 

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

Brad Smith Confusing Markedness And Incongruence

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 2 September 2024 at 17:09:

With a yes/no question move, the polarity is at issue – that is what a yes/no question is all about! Hence, the unmarked, or congruent co-selection in mood and tone for a yes/no question is polar interrogative with rising pitch tone 2.

So when I say that the tone 1 imperative mood is the unmarked, or congruent choice for a command, I mean that these co-selections in clause and tone group are congruent with what a command is trying to get done with language – the issue of polarity is not at stake, hence we expect a command to have a falling tone 1 pitch contour. The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide (e.g polar interrogative + falling tone 1 for a polite command) are based on our understanding of what the congruent choices are, using such unconscious knowledge to motivate the use of language in non-congruent, or metaphorical ways.

The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide illustrate what happens when more complex contextual aspects are operating that make more demands of the language – and, in fact, such complexity is more common than not in social interactions!

Blogger Comments:

This confuses markedness with incongruence. Markedness is 'intra-system': whether a choice is the default/neutral one (unmarked) or not (marked). Congruence is 'inter-stratal' within content: whether the meaning and wording agree (congruent) or not (metaphorical). Importantly, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction only applies to the realisation relation between strata of the content plane, semantics and lexicogrammar, and is only made possible by the natural relation between them. 

That is, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction does not apply to the realisation relation between lexicogrammar and phonology — there is no "phonological metaphor". For example, in realising declarative mood, the relation between unmarked tone 1 and marked tone 2 is not metaphorical, since 'protesting statement' (tone 2) is not a metaphor for 'statement' (tone 1).