Robin Fawcett On Complement Vs Adjunct

Robin Fawcett wrote to the sysfling list at 11:11 on 16/11/15:

• It’s been read by everyone  

• Ivy handed the vase to Peter.

My position (like that of a good many other SFL scholars) was (and is) that the referents of the nominal groups within these are Participant Roles rather than Circumstantial Roles (since they are explicitly ‘predicted’ by the Process), and that the underlined portions should therefore, in a functional analysis, be treated as Complements rather than Adjuncts. 

… for me the formal evidence of the presence of a preposition was weaker than the functional evidence that if Peter in Peter was handed the vase by Ivy is a PR, Peter in Ivy handed the vase to Peter is a PR too, this being evidence for treating to Peter as a Complement.) 

My point is not to try to persuade you that I was right…

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, where meaning is immanent rather than transcendent, participants such as Senser and Actor are not referents of nominal groups, but functions of nominal groups at clause rank.

[2] In SFL theory, nominal groups within prepositional phrases are designated as indirect participants (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 261).  No-one who understands SFL theory would argue that these nominal groups serve as circumstances.

[3] The underlined portions are not nominal groups; they are prepositional phrases.  (Fawcett's argument about the function of nominal groups is here used to justify a claim about the function of prepositional phrases.)  The nominal groups within the prepositional phrases do function as Complements, but at group/phrase rank, not clause rank.  Each serves as Complement of its minor Predicator.

by	everyone
minor Predicator	Complement

to	Peter
minor Predicator	Complement

Fawcett assumes, without providing any supporting argument, that an experiential participant should be treated as interpersonal Complement and that an experiential circumstance should be treated as interpersonal Adjunct.  However, the criteria for determining interpersonal Complement and Adjunct are not experiential but interpersonal.  Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 122-3):

A Complement is an element within the Residue that has the potential of being Subject but is not; in other words, it is an element that has the potential for being given the interpersonally elevated status of modal responsibility — something that can be the nub of the argument. …

An Adjunct is an element that has not got the potential of being Subject; that is, it cannot be elevated to the interpersonal status of modal responsibility.

In Fawcett's examples, neither by everyone nor to Peter has the potential of being Subject, and so both are Adjuncts, not Complements.  What does have the potential of being Subject is the Complement within each of these prepositional phrases: everyone and Peter.

The motivation for realising Agent, Beneficiary or Range as a prepositional phrase is textual.  Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 295-6):

… the choice of ‘plus or minus preposition’ with Agent, Beneficiary and Range … serves a textual function. … The principle is as follows. If a participant other than the Medium is in a place of prominence in the message, it tends to take a preposition (i.e. to be construed as ‘indirect’ participant); otherwise it does not. Prominence in the message means functioning either (i) as marked Theme (i.e. Theme but not Subject) or (ii) as ‘late news’ — that is, occurring after some other participant, or circumstance, that already follows the Process. In other words, prominence comes from occurring either earlier or later than expected in the clause; and it is this that is being reinforced by the presence of the preposition. The preposition has become a signal of special status in the message.

See clause transitivity and mood analyses here.

See also previous argumentation here.

See further on indirect participants here.

[4] Fawcett posted this on the sysfling list after the person he was arguing with had died and could no longer put his case.  As this post demonstrates, it was the man who can no longer defend himself that better understood SFL theory and the reasoning behind its categories.

David Rose On Lexical Items

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 17 August 2015 at 22:46:

'enable' and ‘understand’ are lexical items realised as verbs… 

It is very common to confuse lexical items with grammatical process types, which is why I am posting this reply to the list 

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL, lexical items are not realised by verbs — a lexical item is not more symbolically abstract than a verb.

A lexical item realises a composite of lexical features, whereas verb is a grammatical class at the rank of word.  The two are therefore related in terms of delicacy, and the lexical item is less symbolically abstract.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568):

The folk notion of the “word” is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical [lexical item] and one grammatical [word rank].

[2] The common error is to assign verbs to process types, not 'to confuse lexical items with grammatical process types'.

David Rose On Instantiation, Stratification & Field

After Waleed Othman wrote to sysfling on 23 June 2015 at 07:58:

Ralph disentangled himself cautiously and stole away through the branches. In a few seconds the fat boy's grunts were behind him and he was hurrying toward the screen that still lay between him and the lagoon. (Lord of the Flies)

What type of process is “were” in “the fat boy’s grunts were …”? Is it relational: circumstantial, with “behind him” as Attribute? It looks like a verb that denotes transformation in Location and could therefore be a material process with “behind him” as a circumstance construing movement in space. …

David Rose replied on 24 June 2015 at 21:49:

As you can clearly see, transitivity is insufficient to interpret what is going on in the field here 

First, grammatically: “were” is not a type of process. Process type is a clause rank system, not a verb classification. The whole clause instantiates a relational process, as you have analysed. By definition it is a relation between Carrier and Attribute. 

Second, you want to re-interpret it as a material process, because it realises a step in a sequence of movements. But this is not a grammatical meaning, it is discourse semantic, as follows. 

Ralph disentangled himself cautiously

^

stole away through the branches

^

In a few seconds the fat boy's grunts were behind him

^

he was hurrying toward the screen

This sequence of figures at the level of discourse realises an activity sequence at the level of field. In principle, the sequence could be realised at the level of grammar in many ways, with the same or similar lexical items, e.g...

Following cautious disentanglement and escape through the branches, Ralph ran quickly away from the grunting fat boy, and the screen grew rapidly nearer.

Classifying clauses is only one step towards understanding text

Blogger Comments:

[1] Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance, not function and form.  It is, for example, the relation between relational process as potential, and an instance of a relational process; it is the relation between a clause as potential and an instance of a clause.  The relation between a clause and a relational process, in the sense of a figure, is realisation — the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] In terms of ideational semantics, the text involves two sequences, the first a sequence of happening figures, the second a sequence of a being figure and a happening figure.

[3] This misunderstands stratification.  The content plane is stratified into meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).  The grammar realises meaning; the meaning that grammar realises is semantics.

[4] It is misleading to refer to the model of sequences and figures (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) as discourse semantics.

[5] In SFL theory, field is the ideational dimension of context, and context is the culture construed as a semiotic system that is realised by language; that is, context and language are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction.  The field that is realised by the ideational meaning of a text is 'what is going on' in a situation, as an instance of the culture.  The misunderstanding of field as 'activity sequence' can be traced back to Martin (1992).

This misunderstanding is compounded by Martin's (1992) misconstrual of context as register, which in SFL theory, is a point of variation on the cline of instantiation (of language, not context).  See other posts for why this creates inconsistencies that make the model internally incoherent, and thus untenable.  See also Discourse Semantic Theory.

David Rose On Field, Register And Discourse

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 7 June 2015 at 09:13 about the clause they will continue to pursue attacks against us:

Another difficulty for analysis is ambiguity without any co-text, especially with metaphor. Without it, its hard to know what they’re pursuing - attacking us or whoever is attacking us. And without knowing the field, its hard to say whether the circumstance is expanding the clause or qualifying the group.
So there’s another problem for linguistics in general… to focus on features of grammar we push register and discourse to the background. But in reality, we can’t read grammar examples without reading register and discourse.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, field is the ideational dimension of context — the culture construed as a semiotic system that is realised by language.  Field is theorised as more abstract than language.

Register, on the other hand, in SFL and elsewhere, is a functional variety of language itself.  It is, therefore, not more abstract than language.  In SFL theory, register refers to a point of variation on the cline of instantiation.  It is 'text type' viewed from the system pole of the cline.  Registers vary according to the probabilities of linguistic choices being instantiated.


[2] Circumstances don't expand clauses or qualify groups.  Circumstances and Qualifiers can be realised by prepositional phrases, and prepositional phrases can be expanded in prepositional phrase complexes.

For expansion (and projection) relations between circumstances and the Nucleus, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 172-6) on degree of involvement: circumstantial rôles.

[3] In using SFL theory, grammatical analysis is done by shunting between lexicogrammar and semantics, giving priority to the view from semantics.  Grammatical analysis includes using cohesion, the non-structural text-forming resources of the textual metafunction: reference, ellipsis & substitution, conjunction and lexical cohesion.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 524-85) around the clause: cohesion and discourse.

See clause analysis here.

David Rose On The Relations Between Grammar, Semantics and Text

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 26 March 2015 at 09:20:

That said, there is an interesting ambivalence in recent IFG editions about the relations between grammar, semantics and text, both realisational and instantial. … 

In fact IFG explicitly models ‘text’ both as the unit of analysis of the semantic stratum, consistent with discourse semantic theory, and as instantiating grammatical systems. It also discusses domains of instantiation of semantic systems as stretches of discourse, also consistent with discourse semantic theory. What it doesn’t admit is the discourse semantic systems described in English Text, Working with Discourse, and a considerable body of other scholarly work. 

My own view is that this omission has as much to do with personal institutional politics within the SFL leadership, as it does with the relative merits of the theory.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] In SFL, the word 'text' is used to refer to the highest semantic unit and to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.  Its valeur depends on what it is contrasted with.  It is misleading to call this 'ambivalence', which means:

• uncertainty or fluctuation, especially when caused by inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two opposite or conflicting things.

[2] The notion of text as a semantic unit was imported, unaltered, by Martin into 'discourse semantic theory' from Halliday's Systemic Functional linguistics; hence the "consistency".

[3] Each text is an instance of systemic potential — whatever the linguistic stratum; just as, above the linguistic strata, at the level of context, situation is an instance of culture.

[4] IFG (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), as the name suggests, is an introduction to functional grammar, not 'discourse semantic systems'.  Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 550-1):

for a systemic description of this [cohesive reference] as a semantic system, see Martin (1992).

Martin's English Text and Martin and Rose's Working With Discourse and 'a considerable body of other scholarly work' are also listed in the References.  

Considering how inconsistent 'discourse semantic theory' is with the core architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistics (e.g stratification and metafunction), its citing in IFG is an act of great generosity, especially in face of bullying insults, such as those of Rose quoted above (appraisal analysis here).

For a rigorous assessment of the "relative merits" of 'discourse semantic theory', including the degree to which it is consistent with (a sound knowledge of) Systemic Functional linguistic theory, see here.

David Rose On 'Semantics Instantiating Grammar'

David Rose wrote to Annabelle Lukin on sys-func and Sysfling on 26 March 2015 at 09:20:

The main problem with your argument is that it hinges on this partial quoting of me

in (b), semantics is 'merely instantiating grammar systems in text’

This section of my analysis actually discussed ‘discourse semantic systems’ not ‘semantics'

The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal 

In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions, in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata

Blogger Comments:

[1] Semantics does not instantiate grammar, regardless of whether Rose is discussing semantics or 'discourse semantic systems'.  Instantiation is the relation between system and instance, not the relation between strata, such as semantics and grammar.

Using the verb 'instantiate' is problematic, because it does not serve as an attributive Process, and instantiation is an attributive relation.  Rose's use of the verb results in a construal of discourse semantic systems as less abstract, a lower stratum, than grammar systems:

discourse semantic systems	merely	instantiate	grammar systems	in texts
Token		Process: identifying	Value	Location

[2] The 'discourse semantic systems' conjunction and ideation are Martin's (1992) rebranding of two of Halliday's lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion: conjunction and lexical cohesion (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 524ff).  Martin took Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical systems and reconstrued them as ideational systems — conjunction is logical, ideation is experiential — on a higher stratum of content.  Doing so violated the meaning of both stratification and metafunction.

[3] Appraisal is a genuine interpersonal semantic system realised in, and construed by, the lexicogrammar.  Viewed from below, it lies within evaluation, between grammar and lexis.  Halliday (2008: 49):

With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”) or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated options within the general region of evaluation.

David Rose On Grammatical Metaphor As Stratal Tension

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 19:29:

Another thing that’s interesting in both the ‘re-mapping’ and ‘stratal tension’ models, is the role of lexis. For example, in IFG 10.5.2 there are many examples of ideational metaphors ‘unpacked’ to congruent clause complexes. Like Obama's example…

America has carried on | Circ:cause not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office

-> America has carried on || not simply because those in high office are very able || or see clearly

Recognising lexical relations such as skill-able and vision-see is necessary to interpret the metaphors, but lexical relations tend to be backgrounded in discussions of grammatical metaphor. To me they indicate that discourse semantic systems like ideation are in tension with grammatical systems like transitivity. It is the lexical item ‘vision’ that construes the process of seeing, and ‘skill’ that construes the quality able, while the grammar construes them as possessions of those in high office.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Lexical relations are a resource of the textual metafunction (the text-forming resources), so it's hardly surprising they are "backgrounded" in discussions of ideational metaphor (incongruent construals of experience).

[2] The relation between lexical relations (cohesion: non-structural textual grammar) and transitivity (structural experiential grammar) is not one of 'stratal tension', since both are construals of the same stratum: lexicogrammar.

Regarding the rebranding of Halliday's cohesion as 'discourse semantics', I have just started a new blog called Discourse Semantic Theory (here) which demonstrates how and why 'discourse semantics' is inconsistent with the theoretical architecture of SFL.  This will be done by paying close attention to its major exposition, page by page, in Martin's English Text.

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Grammatical Metaphor

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 08:35:

The models also differ in their treatment of grammatical metaphor

In c) as ‘stratal tension’ between discourse semantic and grammatical systems (both contributing to meaning of metaphors), so conjunction is realised congruently as clause complexity, and incongruently as transitivity or circumstantiation 

In b) as ‘re-mapping’ between semantic meanings and their grammatical realisations, prompting the treatment of an ideational metaphor as clause rank complexing (‘not simply because the vision…') 

In a) Tom’s comment suggests that the transferred meaning is treated as function, and the grammatical realisation as structure.

Blogger Comments:

Rose presents the difference between how Martin's derived model (c) and Halliday's original model (b) treat grammatical metaphor as a distinction between a 'stratal tension' and a 'remapping' between content strata, but since both involve the distinction between congruent and incongruent grammatical realisations of semantic features, 'stratal tension' is largely Martin's rebranding of Halliday's idea in less precise terms.  In this regard, there is the question of what a model of semantics needs to provide in order to be able to distinguish congruent from incongruent realisations in the grammar and whether the 'discourse semantics' model satisfies those requirements.

However, Rose implies, by inclusion vs omission, that it is only in Martin's derived model (c) that both strata contribute to the meaning of metaphors.  Of course, given that grammatical metaphor, like all semogenesis, involves a realisation relation between strata, it is nonsensical to say that one stratum does not "contribute".

More importantly, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 283) point out, the metaphorical form is junctional: it also embodies semantic features deriving from its own incongruent lexicogrammatical properties.  That is, grammatical metaphor is a means of simultaneously construing the meanings of both the congruent and incongruent grammatical realisations.

These two meanings are themselves in an elaborating token-value relation within the semantic stratum, with the metaphorical Token realising the congruent Value (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 288).

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Discourse Semantic Systems

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 08:35:

The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal

In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions, 

in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, and 

in c) they are distinct systems, where grammar and discourse both contribute to meaning

Blogger Comments:

[1] These 'discourse semantic' systems could easily be incorporated in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, as systems (functions) on the higher stratum of context, and as structures (forms) on the lower stratum.  Given that some of them derive from Halliday's grammatics (textual cohesion), this may already be the case. 

[2] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of instantiation with realisation (see elsewhere on this blog).  Semantic systems do not instantiate grammar systems ('in texts' or anywhere else).  Semantic systems are realised by lexicogrammatical systems.

Regarding the systems Rose mentions, while 'appraisal' is a genuine interpersonal semantic system, construed by the interpersonal grammar — the word 'discourse' is redundant — the others are a mixed bag. For example, Martin's logical 'discourse semantic' system of conjunction derives, at least in part, from Halliday's textual grammatical system of conjunction, and Martin's experiential 'discourse semantic' system of ideation derives both from Halliday's (non-structural) textual grammatical system of lexical cohesion and his (structural) experiential grammatical system of transitivity.

[3] As [2] indicates, integrating these diverse systems as Martin's 'discourse semantic' systems creates theoretical inconsistencies in terms of both metafunction and level of symbolic abstraction.

[4] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of semogenesis with stratification (see elsewhere on this blog).  All strata make meaning, in the sense of semogenesis, but stratification is a means of parcelling out the complexity of language as a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction, in which meaning (semantics) is realised by wording (lexicogrammar).  Does discourse "contribute" to meaning, or is it a semogenic process?

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Structure And Function

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 08:35:

This pointed to some major theoretical differences between 3 SFL models (that "make different and often opposing assumptions”)

In model a) structure and function are treated stratally, structure as grammar and function as semantics 

In b) structure and function are treated by rank - grammatical structures realise functions at higher ranks, and semantics is the meanings realised by grammar 

In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 3 SFL models that Rose has in mind are Halliday's original model (b), and two variations derived from it: Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar (a), and Martin's Discourse Semantics (c).

[2] 'Structure' and 'function' are each one half of two separate dichotomies, each involving the relation of 'realisation'.  On the one hand, 'structure' contrasts with 'system' — this is the relation between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes.

On the other hand, 'function' contrasts with 'form' — this is the relation of symbolic abstraction that obtains between strata, and, in the rank scale, between elements of function structure, such as Senser^Process, and syntagm that realises them, such as nominal group^verbal group.

[3] In Fawcett's derived model, content system and structure are distinguished stratally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

In Fawcett’s model, there is only one system–structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a “realisational component” to form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically…

[4] In Halliday's original model, system and structure are modelled at both strata of the content plane.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

…in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

[5] Grammatical 'structures' do not "realise higher rank structures".  Syntagms (forms) of a lower rank realise function structures of a higher rank.

[6] Rose's claim that only Martin's derived model posits "structure and function" on both content strata is demonstrably false.  For structure on both strata in the original model, see [4]; for function on both strata, consider, inter alia, the metafunctional organisation of both semantics and grammatics.

Tom Bartlett On Facts

Tom Bartlett wrote to David Rose on the sysfling list on 20 March 2015 at 21:37:

Sorry David, 

You are confusing a projected clause and an embedded clause. Clauses with embedded facts can be prefaced by "the fact/idea that"; they are not Complements of verbal processes but of processes of affect:reaction and the like.

He regretted (the fact) that he had lied. [affective process and embedded clause as Complement]

and then on the sys-func and sysfling lists at 21:51:

It's actually slightly more complicated than in my last as "the fact that he had lied" is not an embedding either. In this case the clause "that he lied" is projected by "the fact/idea" which is the (ellipted) Complement of the process of affect etc. So in such processes the Complement is an ngp.  

In verbal processes with projections (cf. Verbiage), the projected clause is projected directly by the verb as process. In such processes there is not an ngp Complement.

Blogger Comments:

[1] 'Complement' is an interpersonal function, not an experiential one.  The experiential function that corresponds to Complement is Verbiage/Range in verbal clauses and Phenomenon/Range in mental clauses.

[2] In SFL, the term 'affect' is used for interpersonal meaning, as a type of Attitude, from Appraisal Theory.  The experiential function in Bartlett's clause is Process: mental: emotive.

[3] The fact that he lied is embedded — rankshifted — since it is a clause that is functioning as an element of the structure of another clause He regretted (the fact) that he had lied.  See analysis here.

[4] Here Bartlett is confused by the distinction between fact nouns and projection nouns, discussed in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 468ff).

David Rose Mistaking A Locution For A Fact

David Rose "corrected" Tom Bartlett on sys-func and Sysfling at 21:01 on March 20, 2015:

Sorry Tom 

What’s coordinated in your example are two nominal groups, a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage 

What’s confusing is that one nominal group is an embedded clause 

Did he tell you / his real name or [[that he was called Hot Lover Boy?]]

Embedded facts can be found in section 7.5.7 of IFG 

The rank scale is a central component of systemic functional theory. Its description is developed throughout Chs 1 and 2 of IFG 

To help untangle these confusions see section 8.9 Logical organization: complexes at clause and group or phrase rank, and groups 

For the students
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] The projection that he was called Hot Lover Boy is not embedded, and so: not a fact, and not forming a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage.  See analysis here.  It does not come pre-projected, but is projected into semiotic existence by the clause did he tell you, just as in did he tell you that he was called Hot Lover Boy?, did he tell you that he tends to arrive early? etc.  If it were a fact, it would be possible to render it as did he tell you the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

Cf. fact as circumstance of Matter: did he tell you about the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

In a recent post — here — Rose made the opposite blunder, mistaking an embedded fact for a projected locution.

[2] Rose would do well to take his own advice and consult the references he provides for Bartlett so that he can 'read to learn' — "for the students".